Mar
24

The small frauds

Health care costs are higher because of waste fraud and abuse. How much higher is a subject of debate, but common wisdom suspects we’re paying hundreds of billions more each year than we should.
There are big frauds and abuses and small ones, but my bet is that together the small ones add up to more than all the big ones.
One example – pharmacy. CVS just settled a suit brought by CMS regarding alleged Medicaid fraud. The issue? There are two version of antacid ranitidine, a generic version of Zantac. The tablet form which is much cheaper than the capsule form. CVS allelgedly had a corporate policy of filling Medicaid scripts with the more expensive capsule form, a practice that, if true, would be a direct violation of the law.
While not admitting guilt, CVS did agree to pay the Feds and 15 states almost $37 million, and to stop the practice. The huge pharmacy chain refused to admit guilt, instead an exec gave the usual mumbo-jumbo. But their public comments are revealing – here’s how it was reported in the Florida Sun-Sentinel (March 19)
In a statement, CVS Caremark said, “For many years, the company purchased and stocked the capsule form of ranitidine across its chain of retail stores for dispensing to all patients, not just Medicaid recipients, due to the fact that the acquisition cost of capsules was lower than the cost of tablets”.
Reads like an admission that CVS knew darn well that the capsule version was generating a lot more profit.
What does this mean for you?
Private payers – check those NDC codes, and check ’em carefully. Chances are you’re also paying for versions your docs didn’t order.
Thanks to California HealthLine for the heads up.


Mar
20

I like what Aetna’s been doing

Wellpoint has been slammed (justifiably) for its rescission practices (retroactively canceling insureds’ policies when they have the temerity to actually get care) and sued for allegedly inflating earnings expectations (although some of the slamming is, in my view, unjustified).
United Healthcare has also crossed the stupid line a time or four, inflating the CEO’s compensation package by back-dating stock options and fumbling the acquisition and integration of Pacificare, publicly fighting with providers (although occasionally I have to come down on UHC’s side) and mishandling customer complaints.
HealthNet has not escaped unscathed either. The company went way way past the stupid line when it actually paid bonuses based on executives’ success in canceling individual policies (but only for individuals with high claims).
Aetna has been able to avoid embarrassing itself, while making some significant strides in areas that matter. Whether its chronic disease management, sharing data re provider quality and price, or publishing data on outcomes, the huge insurer is moving in the right direction.
Aetna has also been able to build a substantial presence in the work comp network business, essentially forcing its largest competitor to replace its networks with Aetna’s (while sticking with WC despite doubts among industry experts (that would include me) that Aetna had the patience required to survive and prosper).
Their latest move also makes sense – Aetna is investigating a P4P model for pharma, potentially basing payment on efficacy for the wildly expensive specialty drugs.
Perhaps this is partially due to lessons learned after the company’s well-publicized stumbles after merging with USHealthcare a decade ago. For a while, the staid, customer-oriented culture at the old mother Aetna looked to be overwhelmed by the aggressive, no-holds-barred, occasionally-downright-nasty USHC approach. Management righted the ship just in time, and Aetna has enjoyed better relations with providers, solid financial returns, and growing membership for several years now.
As one reader pointed out some months ago, mother Aetna is certainly capable of doing much more – pushing disease management further and faster, becoming more aggressive on P4P, and building out its member services applications.
But compared to its competitors, Aetna is doing well. Sure, the stock is down by 25% so far this year, but that’s a result UHC, Wellpoint, HealthNet, Humana, and Coventry owners would take in a heartbeat.


Mar
19

HWR – the ‘fearless leader’ edition

Here in New England we’re about to welcome spring – that glorious time of year when the wind howls and the rain pours and mud covers all, best enjoyed while standing outside freezing your tukus watching one of your progeny splash up and down a lacrosse field.
What better time to sit in a warm car, editing the latest edition of HWR?

Continue reading HWR – the ‘fearless leader’ edition


Mar
17

Group health v workers comp

One of the frequent questions from potential investors, regulators, and interested parties is why the group health payers are not doing more in workers comp. With the notable exception of Aetna and Wellpoint, the big group health players’ work comp activity is minimal (and in the case of Wellpoint, just a bit over that threshold).
Many group health execs consider entering into the comp business, figuring that if their company can do so well in group, they should be able to clean up in comp – which is in many ways still in the Dark Ages when it comes to medical management.
Superficially, they are right – but only superficially.
The primary difference is that in comp, the payer cares about the claimant’s functionality – if the injured worker can’t work, the payer is ‘on the hook’ for lost wages as well as medical care. This is not the case in group, where the payer couldn’t care less if the claimant returned to work or is sitting home.

Continue reading Group health v workers comp


Mar
13

Selling your managed care company

You’ve been working hard and smart for five plus years, building your managed care company from a small niche player in a couple of states to a national company with an impressive client list. After all that work, the angel investors are looking to cash in on their investment and you’d like to take a few dollars off the table as well.
Before contacting potential buyers, there are a few things to consider. First, find an investment banker that knows your general business and marketplace. This will speed things up dramatically, reduce the amount of time you have to spend educating, and reduce the likelihood of mistakes due to misunderstanding or misinterpretation. It will also make for a fair and reasonable valuation – one that, in all likelihood, will be less than you think your company is worth.
Second, be brutally honest. Don’t claim your company has customers and/or revenue it doesn’t. Obvious, I know, but rare nonetheless. Potential investors are quite used to exaggerated promises and inflated numbers; surprise them with your honesty and they will be
much more comfortable.
Third, don’t dramatically change your staffing, pricing, or sales process in an effort to ‘clean up’ the company unless you have at least a year before you go to market. These changes are obvious; they serve as a flashing red light warning investors that the business they are looking at today is (perhaps) significantly different from the business that grew so successfully. If the model and processes worked before, don’t change them just to look good for a sale.
Unless, of course, something bad is happening in the market and you are just trying to get out from under before the roof caves in.
Finally, don’t think that just because the bankers on the other side of the table aren’t expert in your space that they won’t learn everything there is to know about your company, your business model and operations, customers, competitors, regulatory landscape, and potential issues over the horizon. They may not be experts, but they can, and will, find experts who know the space, your customers, and the market as least as well as you do.
Done right, the process although time consuming and occasionally maddening, will result in a big payoff and a stronger company. Handled poorly, it will degenerate into an endless back and forth that may well result in a withdrawal of an offer.


Mar
11

Workers comp market share

The 2007 numbers are in, and once again AIG is the largest writer of WC in the US. They are followed by Liberty Mutual, Zurich, the Travelers and Hartford, with theCalifornia state fund dropping out of the top five.
The shift is likely driven by the market cycle as much as any individual insurer’s efforts to grow share. With WC premium rates continuing to decline, many formerly self insured employers are now able to buy insurance cheaply, cheaply enough to outweigh the benefits of self insurance.
Witness the bloodbath in the FL TPA market for proof of just how widespread this is


Mar
9

Regulators are increasingly seeking politically low-cost ways to reduce workers comp costs. Some have decided to use the Medicaid reimbursement rate for drugs for Workers Comp, evidently figuring that if pharmacies accept it for Medicaid, they’ll do the same for WC. Same ‘logic’ evidently goes for PBMs.
The only problem is it is dead wrong.
1. Unlike Medicaid, there are no copays, restrictive formularies, or other cost- and utilization containment measures. Thus all cost containment efforts in WC for drugs involve resource-intensive Drug Utilization Review processes; pharmacists and clinicians reviewing scripts for appropriateness, medical necessity, potential conflicts and adverse outcomes, and relatedness to the WC medical condition.
2. PBMs pay pharmacies more for WC drugs than for Medicaid drugs; a lot more.
3. Unlike Medicaid, to the extent they exist at all, rebates are much lower in WC. Medicaid rebates are a minimum of 11% of the Average Manufacturer’s Price per unit (and even higher in many states). The rebate revenue significantly reduces states’ costs for drugs. As these rebates are much lower or nonexistent in WC, PBMs do not have rebate dollars to offset their drug costs.
Unlike Medicaid, most workers comp claimants have no idea how WC works, much less who their insurer is; the chances of the claimant presenting with a card is therefore quite low (less than 25% of all WC first fills go to the appropriate PBM). When a Medicaid recipient shows up at a pharmacy, they have been enrolled and thus have a card, and the transaction process is instantaneous and very low cost.
There is no positive enrollment in WC, unless the claimant presents a card, the pharmacy has no way to identify the appropriate PBM. This presents pharmacies with a high level of risk, a level that is not balanced by a reimbursement that makes that risk level tolerable. Specifically;
1. pharmacies are ‘at risk’ for initial fills where they cannot be sure the carrier/employer will accept the claim – this higher risk level requires a higher reimbursement. There is nothing preventing an individual from writing ‘WC’ on a paper script, thereby perpetrating fraud on the pharmacy.
2. the current regs pay pharmacies 25% more for scripts that are ‘controverted’; that is, where the carrier/employer has said they will not (yet) accept the claim
3. The ‘controverted’ situation is very similar to first fills – the carrier/employer has not indicated they will accept the claim, yet the pharmacy is required to fill it, without guarantee of reimbursement
4. the additional risk forced upon the pharmacies may lead them to:
• not fill scripts without a claim number/specific notice from the carrier/employer
• use the claimant’s existing profile (usually a group health PBM card) to fill the script, thereby increasing group health costs
• require the claimant to pay cash which they may, or may not, be able to do
We’re all for reducing work comp medical expense, but the blunt instrument of deep, and inappropriate, cuts in reimbursement for drugs is also counterproductive.
The key driver of prescription drug cost inflation is not the price per pill but utilization – the volume and type of drugs dispensed. The National Council on Compensation Insurance’s recent study on drug costs in workers comp stated “Utilization changes are the driving force in drug cost changes for WC…Utilization is the biggest reason for cost differences between states” (Workers Compensation Prescription Drug Study, 2007 Update; Barry Lipton et al; NCCI, p. 4, 6).
PBMs have adopted and are continuously improving programs designed to address inappropriate utilization. These programs include
• development of clinical evidence-based guidelines for the use of drugs for musculoskeletal injuries
• outreach by PBM physicians in specific cases where the drug treatment plan may be inappropriate
• data mining to identify potentially questionable prescribing patterns including off-label usage of drugs such as Actiq and Fentora
• Prior Authorization of specific drugs (e.g. narcotic opioids, cardiovascular medications).
What does this mean for you?
If PBMs don’t operate in a state or can’t generate any margin, they’ll eliminate any and all utilization control measures.
And drug costs will increase.


Mar
7

How to control drug costs

pharmaceutical costs have been growing faster than most other types of health care expense for years. Except for the odd year when unusual factors (eg demise of the cox-2s) slow things down, drug costs go up year after year.
Then there are the years (2006) where other factors push costs up even faster (part d).
PBMs, formularies, tiered plans, all reduce trend a bit, but only a bit, and not for long.
We have to something fundamentally differenrt if we are to control costs, something that takes into account utilization, price, generics and efficacy. It has to address every payers’ costs.
I propose a national cap on pharmaceutical expenditures, defined as dollars spent by all payers public and private. Before my conservative friends start howling, hear me out.

Continue reading How to control drug costs


Mar
6

McCain’s beltway blinders

I watched Sen. John Mccain’s victory speech Tuesday night, listening as he trudged thru assaults on his opposition’s likely positions on issues ranging from Iraq to taxes. He then made one of the least intelligent ad I’ll-founded claims I’ve heard in presidential politics; Mccain claimed the US has the best health system in the world.
You could chalk this amazingly wrong characterization as just another pander, more raw meat for the adoring audience in the hall.
Or you could see it as a verbal faux pas of dramatic prorportion. Most Americans’ view of our benighted health care ‘system’ is it OSS anything but the best in the world – when you spend twice as much as the average developed nation which ranks well below average in most indicators of quality, its hard to justify any level of approval.
Which is how the real audience- the one outside the hall- likely saw the Senator’s comment. If you are lying in bed trying to figure out how your company will be able to afford healthcare, or you are locked in a job due to a pre-existing condition or have to choose between heat or drugs or have a kid without insurance and a bad ear infection you’d just be incredulous.
How can anyone think McCain can fix a problem if he doesn’t even acknowledge its existence?


Mar
5

Why drug costs are going up.

Because they can.
Brand drug prices went up yet again last year, by over 7%. This on the heels of a similar price increase in 2006, which ‘coincidentally’ occurred after Part D went into effect and millions of seniors suddenly could buy drugs.
But this isn’t the whole story. Price is only part of the equation, the other parts being frequency (what percentage of the population takes drugs) and utilization (how many pills they take).
The frequency and utilization problem is just as bad. But lets focus on price.

Continue reading Why drug costs are going up.