Sep
22

Obama’s health care blind spot

We took a look at Sen McCain’s health reform plan last week, aided by an analysis published on the web by the journal ‘Health Affairs. Today it’s Obama’s turn.
Unlike Sen McCain’s plan, Sen Obama’s plan maintains employer-based coverage (something most Americans want), prohibits medical underwriting and cancellation of policies and establishes a minimum set of benefits to prevent ‘back-door’ medical underwriting, and requires employers to contribute to employee coverage or pay a tax.
Estimates indicate Obama’s plan will add eighteen million Americans to the rolls of the insured over the near term, with some likelihood that there would be increasing incentives put in place to encourage more and more folks to buy health insurance coverage. Obama has resisted (although not too strenuously) calls from many to establish a universal mandate, thereby requiring all to have health insurace, noting that it is more important to first control costs and only then expand coverage.
He’s right. Unfortunately Obama’s plan doesn’t do enough to control costs.
Perhaps the most significant cost-oriented part of Obama’s plan is the ‘stop loss’ coverage whereby the government will agree to “reimburse employer health plans for a portion of the catastrophic costs they incur above a threshold if they guarantee such savings are used to reduce the cost of workers’ premiums.” For truly catastrophic claims there’s certainly lots of precedents for this type of coverage – for years self-insured smaller employers have purchased stop loss coverage for high-cost individual claims for years. The question is how much of the claim cost will the Feds assume, and how much it will cost to do so (someone’s got to come up with the dollars, and if the Feds do that ‘someone’ is the taxpayer; it looks like the Chinese are done funding our deficits for a while). But while this will reduce the cost of insurance, this does nothing to address health care costs per se.
The only other solid part of the plan that addresses cost is the call to negotiate drug prices. That may well lower trend rates somewhat, but drug pricing seems to be rather flat these days, so the change may not be all that beneficial over the near term.
Neither of these policy ideas will do much to address costs. That’s because US health care costs are not high (relative to other countries) because care is better, or we live longer, healthier lives, or Americans have more access to expensive medical technology or drugs, or there are proportionally fewer folks dieing of cancer or heart disease or AIDS. US health care costs are higher because for two mostly unrelated reasons – higher unit prices and wildly varying, and inconsistent, medical treatment.
Unit prices for medical services are higher in the US than in other industrialized countries. Office visits, diagnostic imaging, lab tests, hospital stays, surgery, brand (but not generic) drugs – almost are are more expensive – on a per-service basis – in the US than elsewhere. Those higher unit prices mean more profits for manufacturers, higher wages for clinicians and support staff (and consultants) and more cash to use to build even more medical facilities and buy medical machines.
Sounds simple, because it is.
The not-really related issue of practice pattern variation (a technician’s term for different physicians in different geographic areas using different medical care to treat the same condition), and the increasing evidence that this variation results in far too much useless or potentially harmful care may be even more of a problem. Practice pattern variation has been shown to result in far too many hospital admissions in Boston, prostatectomies in Alaska, hysterectomies in parts of Maine, and back surgeries in southwestern Florida,. There is absolutely no evidence that these additional medical procedures deliver longer/better life, or even that they represent appropriate care. On the contrary, these additional procedures add cost and complicate treatment with no apparent benefit.
These two issues are not addressed adequately by Obama (or McCain either, for that matter). However, as Obama has correctly stated that expansion of coverage must be preceded by cost control, this oversight is more obvious in his plan.
Obama has called for the establishment of a Federal Agency to oversee effectiveness assessment – to help determine what medical care works best for what patients. Yet the proposed funding for this agency appears grossly inadequate. It is also instructive to remember what happened to the ‘old’ Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, a body that was emasculated after angering physicians and other stakeholders by pointing out the inconsistencies in treatment for back pain across the country.
As I noted last week, taking on the medical establishment, which is what the next President and Congress must do if they are to rein in health care costs and expand coverage, is going to be a brutal and bloody war. Big pharma, medical device manufacturers, physicians, hospitals, ancillary providers, health plans, nursing homes, medical gas suppliers, distributors, states, attorneys, and consultants will all be vociferous in their defense of their critically important, and therefore financially-deserving role. Health care accounts for a sixth of the US economy, which means that very few would be untouched by a major restructuring of the health care system. While it is understandable that Obama would not tip his hand, thereby opening himself up to the inevitable assault from those whose oxen slated to be gored, it is also unfortunate that the ‘change’ candidate won’t reveal more of his plan than the usual ‘reduce cost through elimination of waste fraud and abuse’.
Solving the health care crisis will absolutely require attacking price and practice pattern variation. This should be the core of any health reform program, for without cost control universal coverage will rapidly drive up costs, crowding out investment in plant, labor, technology and education. We should know where the candidates stand, what they are prepared to do, what groups they will take on and how they will do it. Yet neither candidate has the political courage to take a stand.
Obama’s platform falls well short on the most important issue.


Sep
19

Coppelman on AIG

Jon Coppelman of Workers Comp Insider fame has a very funny take on how Hank Greenberg would have led AIG’s executive session discussion of the $75 billion loss.

Jon’s talent is lost on us here; he clearly needs a literary agent!


Sep
19

McCain’s health reform plan – more cost, less coverage

Sen McCain has modestly noted economics is not his strong suit. Examining his health reform plan provides additional insight into that assessment.
“Achieving Senator McCain’s vision (for health reform) would radically transform the US health insurance system…The decline in job-based coverage would force millions of Americans into the weakest segment of the private insurance system [emphasis added] – the nongroup market – where cost sharing is high and covered services are limited. Senator McCain’s proposal to deregulate this market would mean that people in it would lose protections they now have. These changes would diminish the security of coverage for most Americans, especially those who are not – or someday will not be – in perfect health.”
That’s how Health Affairs summarized the impact of GOP Presidential candidate John McCain’s health reform platform.
I’m at a loss to understand how McCain and his supporters could think that a free market in health insurance would actually help resolve the health care crisis, cover more of today’s uninsured, and provide insurance for those who need it – the folks with chronic conditions.
There are two very simple reasons the free market will not solve the health care crisis. First, private industry is in business to make money. And insuring high cost people is not how insurers make money. Auto insurers refuse to cover drivers with bad records; home insurers won’t insure houses on flood plains, liability insurers won’t provide coverage for companies run by convicted felons, marine insurers won’t write ships operating in a war zone. Ask homeowners on the Gulf Coast about their ability to buy wind and flood insurance – if the various states don’t force insurers to provide the coverage, it is incredibly difficult to find any insurer willing to take the risk.
Second, most health care dollars are spent on/by relatively few people.
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One-tenth of Americans incur two-thirds of all costs. One-twentieth drive half of all costs, and a mere one percent drives over twenty percent.
In a free market, insurance companies would absolutely refuse to cover anyone on the left side of the graph, and they’d work very hard to tweak their underwriting so they only insured folks in the far right column (where half the population incurs less than four percent of costs). That’s not an indictment of insurance companies, it is a statement of fact. Even in today’s regulated markets, fully one-third of individuals seeking coverage in the individual market (the only market that would exist in McCain’s world) were “denied coverage or charged more because of a pre-existing condition…nearly half found it difficult or impossible to find affordable coverage” (Health Affairs).
McCain proposes an expansion of state-run high risk pools to help deal with these folks, but his plan only provides funding for three million potentially high risk people – less than one percent of the population. That leaves (at the very least) fourteen percent of the population without coverage, yet needing care. Who’s going to pay for their health care? Sure some of it would be paid by each person, but few individuals can afford to write a check for a couple days in the hospital. The result? A huge rise in the number of charity cases seeking care at emergency rooms, a rise that would quickly bankrupt many providers.
There’s a further problem with McCain’s plan; the deregulation of insurance would mean that any insurance company would be able to cancel anyone’s policy as soon as they were diagnosed with a potentially costly condition. That is not the case today, where in most states once you’re insured, the insurance company can’t single you out for a premium increase or cancel your policy; the practice, known as post-issue medical underwriting, is illegal in most jurisdictions.
So just as some auto insurance companies cancel policies after an accident or ticket, under the McCain plan health insurers could – and would – do the same.
Then there’s the cost. McCain wants to cancel the tax exemption for employer-based health insurance plans, replacing it with a refundable tax credit of $2500/individual or $5000 per family to help them buy insurance (note – the average individual policy now costs over $4000 and the average family policy cost exceeds $12,000). The Senate Joint Committee on Taxation’s report on the McCain health plan estimates the cost of the tax credits would be $206 billion in FY 2009 and $3.6 trillion over 10 years.
The McCain plan works just fine – in a world inhabited only by free-market economists where no one gets sick or hurt. Except when it comes time to pay for it, or when any of our economists does get ill and finds him/herself seeking care at the doors of a bankrupt hospital.
As Bob Laszewski points out, if McCain is elected, there is absolutely zero chance his plan will be passed. That being the case, why waste my time writing about it and yours reading? Because it shows McCain’s complete lack of understanding, his total ignorance of the workings of one-sixth of our economy. Then again, he’s been covered his whole life by a government plan, so he has had zero exposure to health care in the real world. Come to think of it, he hasn’t had any exposure to the real world in recent memory, as he has been in Washington for the last thirty years.
McCain said it himself – economics is not one of his strong suits. His health plan proves it.
Next week I’ll examine Obama’s plan to see how he deals with the real world. For starters, what about cost inflation, Senator?


Sep
18

Time for work comp insurers to Man Up

Some hospitals in Connecticut are throwing what amounts to a temper tantrum. They are outraged that workers comp payers are actually paying them according to state law.
Strange, but true.
Sources indicate that Yale-New Haven Hospital and their affiliates have informed several payers that they will no longer provide elective procedures for the offending payers’ insureds. There are also reports of an effort on the part of Y-NH to get other hospitals to join in the fun.
The reason for their displeasure is several payers have ditched their hospital networks and begun paying hospitals according to the Workers Compensation Act.
The Act reads, in part, “The liability of the employer for hospital service shall be the amount it actually costs the hospital to render the service”.
But many payers in Connecticut (including the State itself) are not paying costs, but paying billed charges, or something close to it, and they’ve been doing it for years. Workers comp has been a huge moneymaker for Connecticut hospitals; on average commercial payers reimburse between 41.65% and 45.14% of charges.* Contrast that with comp payers’ reimbursing hospitals at billed charges or a few points off (in a network arrangement).
*(The variation between 41.65% and 45.14% depends on which measure you use; the former is based on recent data, the latter from data reported to the State). I’d also note that commercial payers are paying 122% of costs (again from CT State statistics).
Sources also indicate the good folks from Yale (several of whom live in my town) understand, and even agree with, the methodology the payers are using to reimburse the hospital. But they don’t want to accept that reimbursement, as they would rather go back to the good old days when they were making a fortune off all workers comp payers (when hospitals were being paid three to four times more than they should have been). (Most payers are still paying billed charges or close to it)
I’ll leave aside the obvious fiduciary responsibility issue here, except to note that as a CT taxpayer, I’m not too happy that the State has been paying way more than it should to hospitals for State employees’ workers’ comp bills. Instead, I’ll note that this amounts to a hidden tax on employers – all of whom are forced by regulation ot buy workers comp insurance. Those employers (and their insurers) that are paying billed charges, or a discount off billed charges, are helping those hospitals to pay for care delivered to those without insurance, make up the underpayments from Medicare and the state’s HUSKY program (kid health insurance), buy big new machines and build new facilities.
That’s nice, and its also grossly unfair to employers.
Workers comp insurance companies need to “Man Up” and not give into what is tantamount to blackmail on the part of providers. Policyholders need to tell their insurers not to spend one dime more than legally required.
The US health care system is incredibly screwed up, unfair, and dysfunctional, and hospitals are a key part of that system. But it’s not up to Connecticut employers and taxpayers to solve hospitals’ financial problems by paying a hidden tax.


Sep
18

Credit market collapse – the worst is yet to come

Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch were here one day and gone the next. Their rapid, almost-overnight disappearance from the world wide financial landscape is as stunning as the collapse of the Twin Towers. Solid as concrete and steel, their permanency wasn’t even questioned until days before they were forever gone from the skyline.
The next to go may well include Morgan Stanley and Washington Mutual; if the stock prices of other financial institutions continue to drop, more companies may also be putting up ‘for sale’ signs.
While the Fed’s rescue of AIG may well have prevented a global mess of historic proportions, it also sent a very loud, and very clear message that the financial industry is in danger of worldwide collapse. As one South Korean put it, “”The U.S. government’s rescue of AIG helped the markets to avoid the worst case scenario, but the fact that only the government was willing to help indicated the gravity of U.S. credit problems.“[emphasis added]
Now we learn that rating agencies, all too aware of their failure to accurately assess credit risk in banks, investment houses, and property and casualty insurance, are re-thinking their approach to assessing the financial viability of health insurers. Fitch Ratings will be dumping the traditional debt to capital formula within a month. “Fitch believes operating EBITDA, funds flow from operations (FFO) and subsidiary dividend capacity are the appropriate measures in assessing financial leverage and debt utilization, to augment the debt-to-capital analysis traditionally used for insurance companies.”
Clearly the landscape is changing dramatically – mountains may be disappearing here, but they will likely be replaced by new mountains in other parts of the globe. From here, it looks like New York, long the center of the financial universe, may be losing that status to London, or perhaps eventually Dubai. Investors hate uncertainty, and there’s all too much of it here in what has become the Wild West of speculative ‘investing’.


Sep
17

TPA self dealing

Peter Rousmaniere’s column this month in Risk and Insurance addresses the dirty not-really-secret practice of TPAs getting kickbacks from their managed care ‘partners.
This unseemly practice has been going on for years; perhaps the most notable example is the Broward County Public Schools scandal, where TPA Gallagher Bassett was allegedly paid by CorVel for referrals to case management and other services. This isn’t small potatoes; the scope of this debacle earned it a prominent place in an article in CFO magazine.
Peter notes that SRS (the Hartford’s TPA) is one that specifically rejects doing business this way; pledging “Specialty Risk Services, as a fiduciary of our clients’ money, does not participate in any so-called wholesale-retail relationships with our vendors nor do we request or accept administrative fee arrangements from them.”
Broadspire also doesn’t take kickbacks/commissions/admin fees. But the Florida-based TPA also sells an integrated medical and claims management service so customers don’t require much in the way of outside medical management support. According to a highly-placed source; “we do not do a lot of unbundled arrangements for managed care services…most of the services for managed care [are] provided by our own staff, priced and charged separately from the claim service. On the rare occasion that we are requested to go outside by a customer, we will consider it on a case by case basis but, do not make any requirements from the managed care vendor that they provide us any “commission” or anything else of that nature for the pleasure of working with us.”
I’d note that the TPA business has gotten hammered lately – the soft market has driven down loss costs, and with it admin fees. The reductions in frequency have resulted in fewer claims to adjust, and therefore fewer fees to charge. Employers have been able to get TPAs to bid against each other, thereby lowering admin costs by forcing TPAs to cut pricing.
It’s not entirely fair to blame TPAs for this; their customers share the guilt. While employers are saving admin costs over the near term, this is a short-sighted tactic at best. TPAs, like any other business, have to make a margin, and if they can’t make it thru admin expense they’ll have to make it up in other ways.
What does this mean for you?
Demand full disclosure of pricing and cash flows from your TPA and managed care vendors. And expect to pay a fair price.


Sep
17

Implications of the AIG bailout

I heard about the Fed’s bailout of AIG last night while sitting in the stands at Yankee Stadium (watching the White Sox defeat the Yankees, the desired outcome). The seats in front of me were occupied by Wall Street types, all expressing a great deal of relief that the Fed had come to it’s senses and done the right thing. Now the markets would settle down and they could get back to making money.
My reaction was somewhat different.
AIG’s failure was a direct result of it’s exposure to billions of dollars of liabilities from insanely complex financial instruments it sold to banks and other financial firms. These instruments were neither fish nor fowl; neither bonds nor insurance policies they were not subject to any regulation or oversight. None.
When things were good, the lack of onerous regulatory oversight was great; it allowed the free market to price, assess risk, and trade without the friction and inefficiency inherent in the oversight process.
This morning the ‘cost’ of regulation looks like a pretty good deal compared to the $85 billion taxpayers are paying to save AIG. I’d also note that our (we taxpayers’) ultimate liability may be a lot more than $85 billion. We own AIG and if it needs more capital, we’re going to provide it.
It is going to be interesting to watch how the financial industry reacts to this disaster. And disaster it is; the largest Federal takeover of a private company on record. Will they welcome oversight and regulation, seeing it as a necessary cost of doing business or will they chafe under the ‘burden’ of that oversight?
The broader issue is the impact of the disaster on government policies and politics. In the health insurance market, the GOP has been advocating a dramatically reduced role for regulators, calling for an end to mandated benefits, Certificate of Need processes, and prohibitions against the interstate sale of policies. This would almost certainly result in insurance companies filing their policies in those states with the least amount of regulation and the lowest capital requirements.
Individuals buying those policies would have to hope any problems would be quickly and competently addressed by an insurance department in some other state, led by a commissioner unconcerned with the problems of citizens living outside his/her voting district.
The current climate does not favor de-regulators, a dynamic that may well influence how voters feel about the candidates’ health reform proposals.


Sep
16

AIG’s troubles – the cultural roots

In all the commentary and discussion about the source of AIG’s problems I’ve yet to read or hear what may be the most important contributor – the company’s culture.
There’s no question AIG was long considered one of the world’s best run insurance companies. AIG is legendary for its intramural hypercompetitiveness. The company would rather one of its subsidiaries lose an account or prospect to another internal subsidiary than to an outside firm. The rewards (up till now) for winning those competitions have been huge – the top execs at AIG become Starr Partners, a highly lucrative status.
AIG’s hundreds of subsidiary companies compete against each other for insurance business, talent, resources and recognition. The rules are few, but ironclad – chief among them return an underwriting profit (make sure the combined losses and admin expense is less than premiums). All investment income accrues to the parent organization, where various investment entities compete to deliver the best results.
By several accounts, one result of this business model has been a consistent under-investment in non-revenue driving IT, and a lack of emphasis on paying claims. AIG was one of the first insurers to embrace the web to sell to consumers and small businesses; it also infuriated regulators and medical providers when it screwed up the consolidation of workers comp medical processing by eliminating regional processing centers. Bills were lost, repeatedly processed incorrectly, and paid to the wrong provider.
The company’s auto business has grown substantially over the last decade, yet many insureds are none too happy with the company. An article several years ago highlighted complaints from some of AIG’s commercial clients; here’s an excerpt:
“AIG was losing more than $210 million on auto-warranty claims, provoking the ire of the company’s longtime chairman and chief executive, Maurice R. “Hank” Greenberg, according to court documents. As a result, in mid-1999, a newly installed team at AIG’s auto-warranty division began to reject thousands of claims — including half of the claims that its own contractor, a claims-handling company, recommended be paid, according to court papers.”
I had the pleasure of working for AIG a bunch of years ago. At that time, AIG’s CEO and Chairman, Hank Greenberg, used to have Presidents’ meetings every month where the presidents of AIG’s subsidiaries would present (very briefly) a summary of how their business was doing. My sub was not doing particularly well, which is probably why I was asked to attend the meeting representing my boss’s boss.
Greenberg started at one end of the large U shaped table, with the first of about 25 presidents. After the brief presentation (two minutes or so) he’d grill them – with the temperature on ‘sear’. Fortunately, I was second on the flame, and still in shock when he asked me who I was and what I was doing there. After about thirty seconds of my babbling, he dismissed me as too low in the hierarchy to be worth his time and moved on.
I proceeded to watch as a couple dozen middle aged execs went thru their inquisition sessions. Most seemed to be doing a pretty good job, delivering solid results and expanding revenues, and a couple were doing very well. Despite that evident success, all were scared, several terrified, and at least a couple so distressed that I found them in the men’s room throwing up.
Although Greenberg departed several years ago, according to several insiders this culture still exists – the hypercompetitiveness, coupled with huge rewards for success and caustic tongue lashing from your superiors for anything but success. The combination of the two may have contributed to the company’s recent problems. Execs who are scared of their bosses are not likely to be first in line to tell them that the great investment in mortgage-backed securities or rate swaps has blown up. The turmoil in the executive suite may have distracted top management from tracking these issues as closely as they should have. The constant hectoring from Greenberg (after he was kicked out as a result of Spitzer investigation) certainly soaked up C-suite bandwidth that would have been well-applied to assessment of investment strategy.
That’s not an excuse, but may be a lesson.


Sep
15

AIG’s made it through today

AIG may not be alive and well, but it is still functioning. That’s the good news.
The real news is the source of the financial lifeline thrown to the big insurer – the state of New York. Gov David Paterson has authorized AIG to access $20 billion in capital currently locked up in subsidiary companies to increase the company’s liquidity (free cash on hand). The Governor’s permission essentially gave AIG more capital from internal sources, capital that the company had been desperately seeking (with little luck) from outside backers.
The $20 billion is half of the company’s immediate cash needs; sources indicate the firm is also looking to sell assets to come up with the other $20 billion. Tops on that list may be the General American, the auto insurance business, and AIG’s aircraft leasing subsidiary, long one of the company’s most profitable ventures, which would generate between $7 and $14 billion in proceeds.
The problem with selling International Lease Finance Corp. (the aircraft finance arm) is it is very profitable, generates lots of cash, and is particularly advantageous for AIG due to tax matters. ILFC buys aircraft and leases them to airlines, taking deductions for depreciation and other expenses that it can use to offset earnings – deductions that are more valuable for AIG than they would be to another owner.
AIG would very much like to hold onto ILFC, and it is just possible it will be able to do so. The Fed hired Morgan Stanley to help figure out what to do about AIG, and at this point it looks like the recommendation, and possible short term solution, is for Morgan to put together a pool of capital from JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs to help AIG survive the current liquidity crisis.
And just to make the situation even more difficult, reserves for claims from Ike will also be hitting AIG’s financial statements in the next few weeks. While it is too early to tell precisely what AIG’s exposure may be, the company is one of the ‘second tier’ carriers in terms of property market share in that area, a position that will likely result in substantial claims costs.