Mar
31

Rx Drug Abuse Summit – key takeaways

I’ll keep this short.  Heading home from Atlanta and an incredibly disturbing Rx Drug Abuse Summit.  A few key takeaways.

  • The increase in the prescription opioid death toll is terrifying.  These are drugs ONLY AVAILABLE WITH A DOCTOR’S PRESCRIPTION.
  • cdc-us-overdose-deaths-2014_jr-2
  • Heroin is getting even worse – driven largely by the rampant over-prescribing of opioids.  75% of heroin users started with prescription opioids.cdc-us-overdose-deaths-2014_jr-5
  • We are making progress.  Lots of different approaches, very passionate people, truly impressive effort by the Feds.
  • There’s disagreement around the margins, but not with the central issue – opioid abuse is an unmitigated disaster.

The net is this.  There are far, far too many docs writing way more opioid scripts than they should.  Tens of thousands of people are dying, families are destroyed, kids left without parents.

You want to talk about treating pain?  

How about the pain of kids without parents, moms without daughters, sisters without brothers, communities without hope.

Who is treating their pain?

and who is causing it?


Mar
29

Obama, Pew, Landers and Paduda

Headed to Atlanta for Operation Unite’s fifth Rx Drug Abuse Summit, an event I’ve been privileged to participate in every year (this year Mark Pew of Prium, Michelle Landers of KEMI, and I are going to discuss formularies in work comp, an issue near and dear to my heart).

This year, President Obama is also speaking.

Think about that.

The leader of the free world is taking a day to fly down, talk, and fly back.  It’s not like the guy has nothing else on his plate – the Middle East, Apple v FBI, global warming, Congress, SCOTUS nomination of Merrick Garland, Pakistan, Iranian cyber attacks, China, trade policy…

and yet Pres. Obama a) decides to go to Atlanta; b) does the prep work necessary to speak on a panel about opioid policy, the FDA, drug approvals, law enforcement, heroin, treatment v incarceration; c) make the trip with all that entails; and d) speak on the panel.

While I’m pumped he decided to make the trip, I’m equal parts disheartened that the President of the United States has to do this.  Moreover, there’s a really impressive list of speakers; Governors, Congresspeople, the US Surgeon General, head of the FDA, Senators, head of the DEA, the CDC Director…

Those of us who’ve been up to our eyeballs in the crisis for a decade are gratified indeed to see the level of attention focused on the issue, and sad beyond measure that this has risen to the level that the President is devoting this amount of time to opioids.

What does this mean for you?

I’d suggest we focus on the positive here, as the negative is just emotionally crushing.


Mar
28

Opt out – the final word from the experts

Wrapping up WCRI’s opt out marathon, a four-person roundtable dove into the issue with AIA’s Bruce Wood leading off.  Bruce began with something I kept thinking during the earlier talk: what problem is opt out solving?

Work comp rates are down, no systems are in crisis, benefits are decent and in many states improving, and medical costs are, with a couple notable exceptions, not increasing too much.

Yes, there are problems in many states, some much worse than others – opioids, crappy docs, too much litigation, some outright lousy incentives that motivate bad behavior, and some bad employers, but overall, we’re doing ok.

Bruce went thru a litany of reasons opt out isn’t viable or appropriate; as one of the nation’s most knowledgeable experts on all states’ systems, he knows of what he speaks. One key point is that opt out is a federally regulated plan, therefore states can’t require financial stability or standards or minimums or audits.  Thus, even if states pass laws requiring financial standards, guarantee funds, etc, these laws will not apply to opt out.

Next up Elizabeth Bailey of Waffle House gave her views; the covered-smothered-chunked-and-served company is a non-subscriber in TX and insured thru the work comp system in OK. For those unfamiliar with WH, they sell waffles and related foodstuffs in sort of a mini-diner setting.  WH opted out in TX because the system was broken back in 2002; Bailey indicated that the lack of settlement ability and lifetime medical benefits coupled with the strength of providers made the TX WC system untenable.

That’s worked out pretty well – according to Bailey their plan features solid benefits, the ability to direct to specific medical providers, a strong focus on workplace safety have delivered much lower costs due to a dramatically lower injury rate, almost no indemnity expenses, and an overall decrease of almost 90% in costs.

My based-on-almost-no-real-knowledge-of-WH’s-program view is these folks are doing things the right way, which benefits their workers greatly – far fewer have injuries, which is the core goal of any occupational program.  And they get back to work quickly, so they don’t get stuck in a disability mindset.

Attorney Alan Pierce then weighed in; his slides were very detailed (much better for future reading than trying to follow live).  Perhaps his key point was the contention work comp is a right, not a benefit; a right owned by the employer.

Aside – Pierce’s pontification was more than a bit annoying; his attempt to denigrate the sessions and attendees by asserting that there were few/no injured workers in the audience, and therefore he, as an “injured worker advocate” was somehow uniquely qualified and special.  A physician friend and colleague noted afterwards that this was offensive indeed as there were several treating docs in attendance, all of whom likely had just as much experience “advocating” for injured workers.

Pierce made a case that opt out results in a dramatically greater cost shifting.  While I don’t agree with all the examples of potential issues, he made a reasonable case that opt out may well increase cost shifting of both medical and wage replacement expense away from the employer.

The session wrapped up with a representative from the Oklahoma Insurance Dept, James Mills.  He provided a concise overview of the program, which is regulated much more tightly than Texas’.

The key takeaway is one offered by…once again…David Deitz MD.  There just isn’t enough data, or, arguably, any data that would allow anyone to make a reasonable assessment of opt out and/or a comparison with workers’ comp.

Until and unless there is, it is difficult if not impossible to evaluate opt out.


Mar
25

Bill Minick – In defense of Opt Out

At the WCRI Conference, PartnerSource’s Bill Minick began his talk stating that one shouldn’t just read the language of ERISA opt-out plans but rather understand what actually happens in the real world.  I’m a bit skeptical of this, as whenever something goes wrong, it comes down to the contractual/legal language. I’ve been involved in a few contractual disputes and in every instance the interpretation of the legal agreement was the deciding factor.

Minick noted that the insurance policies issued to cover excess losses under opt-out usually contain language that provides comprehensive coverage, in direct disagreement with the limitations cited by PCI’s Trey Gillespie.  Ed. note – As these are excess loss policies they specifically address claims above a certain dollar limit, and may not cover any claims not deemed “eligible” by the employer due to their ERISA plan.

Key to the argument in favor of opt out is litigation rates and risk thereof.  

While the employer liability risk inherent in opting out of workers’ comp is certainly high, there is less litigation in opt out than in comp in Texas.  Minick asserted that litigation in TX is quite low relative to workers comp, while the risk of litigation and the potential high costs are real. Evidently there have been over 90 awards and settlements in Texas >$1 million.

He also suggested that modifying and altering current ERISA contracts to address some of the shortcomings pointed out by others can and should occur to address issues including reporting timeframes, medical benefits and coverage.

The data cited by Minick certainly supports his assertion that employers’ financial results are better under opt out than in the work comp system. However given that employers can reject claims much more readily in an opt out environment than under work comp, I’m not sure lower LT claims rates, faster RTW, or lower costs cited by Minick are comparable as the “covered incidents” may be significantly different.

Jeff Eddinger of NCCI noted that less than 1/10th of one percent employers in OK have opted out.  Gillespie opined that the legal uncertainty surrounding OK opt out has prevented the vast majority – including the largest employers who originally promoted opt-out – from electing opt out.

There was a series of other questions from several audience members, with the general sense one of skepticism towards opt out.  That’s not surprising as this is, after all, the Workers’ Compensation Research Institute annual meeting.

The final word on opt-out is coming up next…


Mar
24

Opt Out and work comp – the definitive report

At the 2016 WCRI Conference, several hours were devoted to opt out – what’s happening in TX and OK, variations among and between proposals to expand opt out to other states, employer views and challenges and problems and opportunities and…

No stone was left unturned.  Now, some folks think this was way too much time spent on what is a pretty small issue.  I’d suggest the exhaustive and complete review was helpful and needed, providing attendees, reporters, and you, dear reader with a source for a 360 perspective.

Trey Gillespie opened the Opt Out session with a dispassionate, thorough, and compelling demolition of the idea itself and execution thereof.

There are four different types identified by Gillespie

Tx – WC is not mandatory – so companies “opt in” to work comp

OK – qualified employers must have a benefit plan that meets specific requirements

TN – a proposed hybrid of the TX and OK models

SC – pending legislation proposes both models

Really, opt out moves occupational injury coverage from work comp to an ERISA plan – a federally-regulated benefit plan.  Gillespie identified a number of differences between ERISA and work comp; the ones I captured are below (I may well have missed others).

  • ERISA – there is no statutory or contractual entitlement to benefits
  • eligibility is based on employment status at the time of benefit – not the time of injury
  • employer decides what – if any – injuries are covered, and which employees, if any, are eligible.

Opt-out coverage commonly excludes industrial diseases caused by asbestos and silica and similar substances, along with assaults and terrorism.  It’s also much harder to “file a claim” as the reporting requirements, conditions, and limitations are much stricter than under work comp statute.

This last is key; according to NCCI, less than 20% of LT injuries were reported on the date of injury.  As opt out plans typically require immediate reporting, there’s a reasonable question as to the impact of opt out on those workers who can’t or don’t report their claim “immediately”.

There are also quite a few restrictions around the kinds and types of medical care that is covered.  Definitions such as “medically necessary” are fungible and, more disturbingly, almost all of the OK approved plans incorporate language that allows the Claims Administrator to terminate or change a previously-agreed-upon treatment plan at any point.

All in all, this makes a mockery of employers’ responsibility to make employees injured or hurt on the job whole.

More tomorrow…


Mar
23

Rather than inundate your in-box with multiple posts last week, I decided to delay posting on some of the research for a few days.  Today, WCRI’s analysis of work comp reform’s impact.

I had to listen very quickly and type even faster while listening to WCRI’s Carol Telles discussion of the impact of reform efforts in four states…as a result I probably missed most of the really good stuff.

When IL changed their Fee Schedule in 2011, medical payments per claim dropped about 19% while overall prices paid for non-hospital services dropped 27%. What’s with the discrepancy?  Did utilization or intensity of services increase to partially offset the intended 30% decrease in the fee schedule?  I might’ve missed the answer…

North Carolina also tried to reduce facility costs by changing the fee schedule from one based on charges to one based on Medicare for hospitals and Ambulatory Surgical Centers – there is a progressive decrease for services each year from 2015 to 2017, resulting in inpatient at 160% of Medicare and outpatient and ASC at 200%, with no separate billing or mar-ups for surgical implants.

In our favorite state – California – the implementation of SB 863 led to slight but significant decreases in medical payments per claim after many years of continual steady inflation. This was driven by reduction of reimbursement for ASCs from 120% of medicare to 80% effective 1/1/13, the elimination of additional reimbursement for surgical implants, and as of 1/1/14, a gradual transition to a Medicare-based FS for non-hospital providers.

Not surprisingly, ASC payments per claim decreased dramatically, dropping 24% in 2013/2014.  Imaging was also hit hard with a 23% drop, while physical medicine payments increased 28%.  This isn’t surprising as it is consistent with CMS’ desire to increase reimbursement for cognitive services.

Interestingly, the shift to the Medicare RBRVS system  resulted in a change in billing practices; the “rise in billing more complex office visits…stopped…after RBRVS transition.”

Last up was Louisiana.  State-set medical treatment guidelines were introduced five years ago, and there have been slightly fewer visits per claim after that intro.  The biggest drop was in pain management injections followed by a 5.7% drop in physical medicine (PT, OT, chiro).

The net – reform can effectively reduce cost if effectively targeted and well-designed.


Mar
21

Gov. Baker gets it right on opioids, we got it wrong on crack

On opioids, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker (R) has been in the forefront, working with the Democratic-led legislature on intelligent, comprehensive legislation designed to save lives, assign accountability, and reduce costs. The passage and adoption of HB4056 shows what can be done – and what should be done – by every state.

Yet there’s something unsettling about this – for me and for many others.  More on that in a minute.

Friend and colleague David Deitz MD, also a member of the Mass Healthcare Services Board, was involved in this process; here’s his take:

Gov. Baker and his administration have shown real leadership in addressing this issue, and it’s important to note that other groups within the Commonwealth, notably the Department of Industrial Accidents and the Massachusetts Medical Society, have also acted in concert to address problematic opioid prescribing.  The MA Healthcare Services Boards’ guidelines have been updated to reflect the new legislation so there are no inconsistencies.  Much work remains to be done, but this is a good step forward that puts important protections in place for injured workers, in particular.”

Key components of the bill include:

  • a seven-day limit on first-time opioid prescriptions,
  • new efforts to evaluate patients within 24 hours after an overdose,
  • addiction screening for middle and high school students.
  • requires doctors to check a state Prescription Monitoring Program each time they prescribe an addictive opioid to prevent someone from getting prescriptions from multiple doctors;
  • incorporates education about opioid addiction into high school sports training; and
  • establishes a drug stewardship program to dispose of unneeded drugs.

The other 49 states would do well to consider similar legislation.

What bothers me about my/our focus on opioids is that the victims of opioids are generally white, with many middle-class.  Did we – me, you, the powers-that-be, legislators, governors – handle this differently than the crack or “pre-opioid” heroin crisis?

Yes.  And that’s just wrong.

Back when crack and heroin were predominantly a poor and minority issue, it was a crime problem.  Policing, criminal prosecutions and jail time were the approach.  Just contrast the sentencing guidelines passed by Congress and signed into law in the eighties with the legislation pending before Congress today. Crack sentences were 100 times longer than those for powder cocaine.  Today, the bills are all about naloxone, buprenorphine, and addiction treatment, brought to our attention by weeping elected officials.  Back then, it was quite a bit different.

Now that it’s affecting a wealthier and whiter population, the solution is education, prevention, compassion, a disease model of addiction.  Abusers are victims, not criminals.

What does this mean for you?

There are lessons to be learned here, some of them uncomfortable indeed.

 


Mar
17

What’s happened to work comp regulation?

In response to my post on payers shifting medical management strategy decision-making from experts to non-experts, a long-time friend and colleague provided his perspective. With forty years in roles ranging from regulator to compliance consultant to operations exec for payers, states, vendors and employers, he has a depth of knowledge that demands your respect and attention.

Here’s his view [with my edits for clarity]

Over the last several years states have continued to outsource their medical management policy development and implementation. 

Initially this was in the area of treatment guidelines, which seemed logical because states could not afford the staff to develop they type of canonical studies necessary to develop treatment guidelines.  That evolved into the medical fee schedule arena, first as states shifted to Medicare-based fee schedules, with regulators adjusting reimbursement up because of the nature of workers compensation. Over time, many outsourced this to a third party vendor because the state no longer had the resources to develop, update, distribute, and manage fee schedules and the schedules’ associated rules.

This all centers around the budget restraints that states are currently experiencing. 

While most of the administrative agencies are funded by a premium or dedicated tax, legislators tend to ignore that reality and/or fail to make that distinction in reviewing budget requests. [Whether it is the new-found “Cut Taxes!’ orthodoxy or just ignorance, the effect is the same] Across the board, budget requests are denied if additional resources are requested.  More troubling, state agencies are frequently required to down size staffs because of budget short falls [due to declining tax revenues].  All agencies pay the same price; an X percent reduction in the agency budget, and year after year this takes a toll. 

The result is states outsource functions that were traditionally handled internally. Lately there’s been an increasing need for medical management policy development [physician dispensing, formularies, evidence-based clinical guidelines, network adequacy are just some of the areas]. Those states that have sought to meet this need have often had to shift the costs to the payer community, commonly in the form of licensing fees.  Costs have increased but budgets for the states have not, sort of a taxation with out representation. 

Many states have lost key staff with their historical experience and medical knowledge, thereby forcing the regulated to get their answers from the litigation process rather than guidance from the state as to the intent and meaning of the regulations adopted. 

Inevitably, carriers and employers are facing rising costs in administering a workers’ compensation claims.   More to the point, Increases in unallocated loss adjustment expense are harder to recover via rate increase requests than direct loss claim costs i.e. indemnity, medical etc.

In rate hearings attended early in my career I repeatedly observed Commissioners acknowledge direct loss costs but not allow for the full amount of increase tied to unallocated loss adjustment expenses. (the other area that commissioners attacked was trending assumptions that the carriers made.)  Since unallocated loss adjustment expenses are a fixed amount and the carriers are unable to recover those costs through rate adjustments at a pace that is equal to the actual increase in those costs, the carriers are forced to find ways to cut unallocated loss adjustment costs

Here’s the key takeaway.

There are two ways to do this: bundle all medical management into a package and low ball the prices paid to vendors.  Or, in the case where the carrier has retained reputable medical management staff, simply eliminate the department and all of the high-dollar qualified staff and outsource to vendors, adding the expense to claims costs. 

True you may get a work comp program that does not do a good job of reducing lost costs but that is really not a bother as loss cost increases are the easiest to recover.  This will mean higher rates to employers but it will gain profitability for the carriers and keep their shareholders happy. 

My take – What does this mean for you?

Before you complain about taxes or government inefficiency or “incompetence”, you’d do well to actually think about cause-and-effect.


Mar
16

The Opioid Pendulum Swings

The CDC guidelines are out, and that’s a very, very good thing.

Yes, there’s an apparently-reasonable argument that the guidelines’ basis is not sufficiently evidence-based to stand up to the most rigorous standards.  There are two reasons that argument fails.

First, opioid advocates, manufacturers, and most prescribers did not worry about “evidence” when pills by the bucketful were prescribed and dispensed to anyone who presented with a sore back.  For advocates to caterwaul about science, evidence, and a lack of randomized controlled trials lasting more than 12 months is unfair at best.

Second, opioids kill more than 24,000 people a year – likely a lot more.  Mothers, daughters, sons, brothers, fathers are dying every day, causing destitution, devastated families, and disaster for communities. The time for half-measures is long past.

I understand this may lead to a few folks who ostensibly “need” opioids not getting their pills quickly or in the volume they desire.

Ask yourself this – how does this “need” stack up against the deaths, ruined communities, and parent-less children caused by rampant overuse of opioids?

I’d imagine the parents, siblings, and friends of those killed by opioids would be only too happy to wait a while or take another drug or try exercise or…