Two messages from colleagues about yesterday’s claim frequency post add important nuance and depth to the issue.

First, thanks to WCRI CEO John Ruser PhD for his note with more current information on recordable data.

These data are critical as they are the only source I know of that records the actual injury numbers, or counts of occupational injuries and illnesses. Almost all other sources document percentages based on premium dollars or FTEs. While those are useful, service providers really want to know the actual number.

Ruser [emphasis added]

BLS has data through 2016 on its website (the chart book is easiest to digest and can be found here: https://www.bls.gov/iif/osch0060.pdf)  The data show continued decline in OSHA-recordable rates through 2016, particularly among “other recordable cases.”  BLS will release updated non-fatal injury data through 2017 on November 8.

I agree with you that credible research on why rates are declining is lacking.  There simply aren’t good data to tease out the possible factors.  Interestingly, shifts in hours worked away from high hazard industries does not explain the long decline in rates.  The vast majority of industries are experiencing declines.  I documented this in a paper I wrote for the American Journal of Industrial Medicine. 

I’d emphasize John’s comment on high hazard industries. I’ve opined that fewer injuries in heavy manufacturing and construction were a likely contributor to the reductions in trend; thanks to John for correcting my error.

Next, from a former state workers’ comp director. [emphasis added]

as I look at chart provided in your blog today it took me back to the early days after the reform of XXXX. As can clearly be seen in the chart starting in 1992 the trend started down and has continued ever since.  A lot of risk managers and safety staff took a lot of credit for those numbers as proof that they were doing a good job. I remember at the time thinking boy this looks really good but surely there is another explanation other than the [legislated] reform and all that we were doing in safety and I was right. Even after the… emphasis on safety [was reduced]…the number continued to go down. As I look back I was just in the right place at the right time.  But when good things happen that can not be explained we tend to take credit for them…

This expert’s view is well worth repeating, perhaps best said by Tacitus:

victory is claimed by all, failure to one alone

What does this mean for you?

Claim counts are dropping – and will continue to do so. There is little “white space”, so growth for claims service companies will come from taking business from competitors.

A recently-released analysis of workers’ comp claim frequency tells us what we’ve known for years – the percentage of workers that gets hurt on the job has been and continues to drop.

Yet one major insurer indicates there are warning signs that frequency may be ticking back up, albeit in a tightly defined sector of the economy. More on that below.

There are many theories about why frequency has declined for decades – more automation, more emphasis on safety programs and loss control, less heavy industry here in the US, low investment in infrastructure leading to fewer jobs doing heavy construction. Many theories, but I have yet to see any credible research into exactly why frequency is declining.

This is one of those data points that is enormously important, yet it doesn’t get enough attention. So, here’s the skinny.

Claim frequency is a percentage  – the number of injuries compared to premium dollars or FTE workers. Therefore the number of work comp claims is driven by the denominator; if premium or employment goes up, that can offset a decline in the percentage of claims.

But employment is about maxed out, so any changes in the percentage of claims will closely mirror the actual number of claims.

Another way to track the number of claims is to compare it to Federal data on the actual number of occupational injuries and illnesses. The graph below shows that the actual number of claims per 100 workers…

You’ve already figured out that the graph ends in 2013…so what about the intervening years?  Fortunately NCCI provides ongoing research into just that here.  When you dig deeper, we learn that total frequency dropped almost one-fifth from 2011 to 2016, led by office and clerical job classes.

As we learned at AIS in May, NCCI estimated frequency declined another 6 percent in 2017; the average decline over the last two decades has been 3.7 percent.

But.

Last week the Hartford announced it is seeing early indications of an uptick in claims volume. Chairman and CEO Chris Swift said [emphasis added]:

“workers’ compensation 2018 frequency trends are elevated from expectation…

our frequency in small commercial and middle market has turned positive this year. Based on our business and economic analysis, we view this trend as broader than just our book of business.…

Many businesses are struggling to find qualified employees and beginning to add more new workers to their payroll, generally increasing the risk of workplace injury versus what it would have been say a year or two ago.

Additionally, the tightening labor market produces more hours work for employee often resulting in fatigue and less training time compounding the risk of injury for the less experience workers.

Our uptick in frequency change has been moderate turning positive on a rolling 12-month basis. The actual frequency levels are now comparable to what we experienced in 2016 which is a very manageable shift in a book of business as large as ours.

The frequency increase is more pronounced among less tenured employees and it can be several times that of experienced workers.”

Notably, the Hartford attributed a 3.5% increase in Accident year combined ratio for its middle market business to this increase in frequency.

Couple of key points about this.

1.  The Hartford is the largest national seller of work com policies to small employers, and thus has the broadest lens.
2. As a major writer, it also has lots of dollars to invest in business analytics – so it knows more faster than many insurers do. This from Hartford President Dough Elliott:

we have now installed a new claim platform over our 5,000 desk throughout claim. And the ability to access what I’ll call structured data and to slice and dice and be on top of it and to look at your metrics and watch your trends is much advanced from where we were five years ago. And so we have monthly and weekly discussions but we’re sitting on top of trends that candidly five years ago were very manual in nature to try to get our arms around and they were slower than we’d like to them to be.

What does this mean for you?

• This is not unexpected; we are close to max employment; small employers are desperate for workers and don’t have the time/expertise/resources to screen/train/protect those workers.
• Time to look at your data – closely.
• And likely time to dust off those underwriting, safety, and loss prevention manuals.

 

Over the last decade I’ve worked with over 30 investment firms on perhaps 60 deals.  One question I almost always get is:

Would you buy this company?

And a related question:

What would you pay for this company?

For years I tried to answer those questions, factoring in the company’s service reputation; the uniqueness of it’s services and/or business model; experience of management; value delivered to it’s customers; and a bunch of other stuff.

I finally realized those criteria often had little to do with the “value” defined by most investment firms. And much more to do with Dutch Tulips.

To most private equity firms, “value” is what can they sell the company for in a few years. One would think the selling price would be driven in large part by those other criteria; in many cases, one would be wrong.

Recent valuations of some work comp service companies are – in my view – completely disconnected from the actual value inherent in these companies – actual value defined as the value they bring to their customers and the potential for those companies to grow and prosper.

In fact, what seems more important than actual value is the ability of the seller to craft a story about how the company is going to grow, it’s unique business model, it’s scalability and potential to be a platform to which other acquisitions can be added. This is typically future-forecasting, theoretical stuff based on assumptions thin enough to blow away in the slightest of headwinds.

But more often than not, enough potential investors buy into the story to create a bit of a feeding frenzy, until one agrees to pay way more than that company’s actual value.

I’m far from an investment expert – one look at my personal portfolio will prove that – and in no way am I saying the brilliant folks at private equity firms don’t know what they are doing.  Far from it – these people are doing exactly what they are supposed to do – make gobs of money for their investors.

What I am saying is these firms are rewarded when they sell the companies they bought for a lot more than they paid. That works out really well – if they can find someone to buy it at a hefty markup. At some point the next owner – or the one after that – finds out that the actual value of that company is far less than they thought.

It’s also known as the Greater Fool Theory, or the Dutch Tulip problem. You know the asset isn’t worth what you’re paying, but you’re sure you can find someone else who will pay more than you did.

What does this mean for you?

Beware of tulips. They flourish until winter comes. And winter ALWAYS comes.

Several years ago it was smaller private equity firms who bought companies for $75 – $200 million, built them up, and sold them off. Then it was the bigger PE firms who put together a couple of these and hoped to sell them for more than they paid – and were mostly successful.

One of the first deals was way back ten years ago – and what’s transpired with that deal is emblematic of the evolution of the industry.

PMSI was sold by owner Amerisource Bergen after the PBM industry’s founding company just kind of melted away. HIG Capital picked it up for  about $50 million, and quickly brought in one of the most talented managers I’ve ever had the honor of knowing – Eileen Auen. Greatly aided by a major cash infusion, Eileen and her team turned the all-but-buried company around. HIG profited  handsomely when it was sold to Stone River and merged with Progressive Medical, a deal that was backed by Kelso.

The new company, renamed Helios, grew and was eventually sold to OptumRx, a division of giant health insurer UnitedHealthcare.

Optum is what is known as a “strategic” buyer. Strategics are investors that buy assets to add to its existing operation, ideally leveraging existing infrastructure, customers, systems, and suppliers. The result is infrastructure costs (and ideally supply costs) are reduced and revenues increased.

So, we have strategics such as Optum, Mitchell (see acquisitions of Pharmacy Benefit Managers), and Paradigm buying companies that somehow make the whole greater than the sum of the parts.

I’d note that some of these transactions seem a bit of a stretch, but, hey, I’m not the one who went to Harvard Business School, so what do I know.

The financial investors are the other entities still in the game.  Of late, it’s been the giants – Carlyle, Stone Point, KKR – investment firms with billions in ready cash, deep knowledge of the business, and the savvy needed to pick out management teams and business models that will flourish in what is a declining industry – workers’ comp.

We haven’t seen much activity on the small end of the deal world – except for Adva-net and a couple smaller transactions things have been pretty dull of late.  While there are a bunch of smaller companies in various geographic and/or service niches, there’s been precious little trading activity over the last couple of years (with a couple exceptions)

There’s one more investor type that’s getting more active these days – distressed asset investors. Their strategy is to find companies that aren’t doing well financially and buy them – sometimes out of bankruptcy or just before they tank.

I’d expect we’ll see more of the distressed asset folks making the rounds in Las Vegas in six weeks, finding out what’s up and who’s making it and who isn’t.

What does this mean for you?

The work comp service industry is getting awfully mature.