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July 25, 2008

Coventry earnings call - the analysts blew it

I think I've figured out why analysts have been unable to accurately forecast health plan financials - they don't know what questions to ask.

That's the only conclusion I can draw after listening to the latest earnings call from Coventry Health. The mid-tier health plan company is still reeling a bit from last month's announcement that it had been surprised by a sharp increase in medical costs, an increase that evidently had caught management by surprise.

Folks, this is a health plan company - one that claims "We deliver exceptional value every day, driving solutions that help people enjoy optimal health."

One might think that a health plan company makes money by managing medical care for hundreds of thousands of Americans. Near as I can tell, Coventry isn't a health plan, it is a transaction processor that makes money by pricing its insurance far enough above medical costs to administer the plans and make a bit of margin.

And from the questions that were asked ,and the ones that weren't, it is pretty obvious Wall Street analysts think Coventry is a transaction processor as well. Out of the twenty or so questions after the management presentation, there was one - yes, one, that got anywhere close to actually inquiring about medical management. That questioner asked what Coventry could do or had done to deliver care to Medicare enrollees through an HMO at lower cost than thru the standard Medicare plan. Coventry Chairman Dale Wolf responded by noting that hospital days per 1000 members among Medicare HMO plans could be in teh 900-1300 range, compared to standard Medicare rates of around 3000 days/1000.

That was it. No follow up question as to how they could do that, what the long term implications were, how that affected pricing, what the techniques were that delivered such a great result and could those techniques be used for commercial members.

The entire conversation was about medical trend and how Coventry was fixing its pricing model to reflect higher trend, and if enrollment was going to decrease as a result. Not the factors causing medical trend and what Coventry was doing about it. Well, to be fair, there was a little dialogue about higher inpatient utilization and unit costs in Medicare, and higher hospital utilization on the commercial side. But if you were interested in Coventry's solution to same, you're out of luck. Not one analyst even asked.

If analysts don't know to ask the company why their costs are going up and what they are going to do about it and how that will play out, what, exactly, are they 'analyzing'?

There's this thing in business called a sustainable competitive advantage - something you do really well, that is hard to do, that others don't do well. This gives you an edge in the market, one that makes you a perennial winner. Coventry doesn't have one, and neither do any of the other health plans. Because all they do is process transactions, adding no value.

Here are some of the questions they should have been asking.

  • What key indicators of medical trend do you watch closely?
  • Exactly what is your average inpatient days per thousand for each block of business and how does that compare to industry standards?
  • How about admissions per thousand?
  • what is driving trend? Is it unit cost (price per service), utilization (number of those services received by a member when they do get those services), frequency (percentage of members that get that service) or intensity (higher cost version of a technology or more expensive procedure type than expected)?
  • Which types of medical care are the biggest drivers; ancillary, physician services, pharma, inpatient, outpatient?
  • What is your plan to address those issues?
  • How will you measure results and when will you know if you've been effective?
  • What is Coventry doing about members with chronic conditions? How have your results compared to industry standards?

And the big one:

How would Coventry compete and win if it could not risk select and had to take all comers at a community rate?

Because that may well be the scenario Coventry, and all its competitors, face in two short years.

Note - this applies almost equally to most every health plan. In fact you could just about replace 'Coventry' with Wellpoint, Cigna, Humana, Blue Cross, etc and the same perspective would hold true.

Now I really am going on vacation.

July 18, 2008

New York gets real

Bowing to the reality of the market, the New York Work Comp Board has issued a revised pharmacy fee schedule for workers comp.

The previous fee schedule based WC pharmacy fees on Medicaid - a linkage that was problematic for at least a dozen reasons. Here are the major ones.

1. Medicaid has 'positive enrollment' - members' eligibility is determined instantly, electronically. In WC, there is no upfront enrollment, therefore retail pharmacies don't know where to send the claim, or even if the claim has been accepted by an insurer. Work comp requires a lot of manual work, while Medicaid is electronic and instant.

2. The Medicaid reimbursement schedule has been a political football of late, as state legislators, under pressure from declining revenues and increasing service demands, have looked to cut Medicaid costs by cutting prices paid for drugs. California's decision to cut reimbursement by 10% has resulted in a political/judicial back and forth that is apparently still not resolved. By tying WC reimbursement to Medicaid, pharmacies, PBMs, and payers would be batted back and forth, not knowing from day to day what they should pay for drugs.

3. Medicaid has a formulary which reduces the cost of the drugs to the pharmacies. There is no such formulary in WC (except in a very few states such as Washington), and therefore drug manufacturers won't give discounts in return for preference in a therapeutic class.

4. The Medicaid FS is actually significantly lower than the contracted prices PBMs pay retail pharmacies. Thus there is no benefit to payers, or retail pharmacies, in working with PBMs. This despite the strong evidence that PBMs, properly implemented and managed, can dramatically reduce utilization (the volume of scripts dispensed).

What drove NY to make the change? Access issues. Claimants were not able to get their scripts filled as pharmacies could not afford to do so under Medicaid reimbursement, and PBMs could not afford to operate in the state while losing money on every script.

That's not to say the revised FS is much better. In fact, as the second lowest fee schedule in the nation, it represents an incremental improvement at best, and may not be sufficient to keep all stakeholders participating.

Cynics may point to California, and note that PBMs and pharmacies stayed in that market after the FS was based on Medicaid. True, but each state's Medicaid FS is unique, and CA's is significantly more reasonable than NY's.

June 26, 2008

Health plans feeding at the Medicare trough

Bob Laszewski has a great post today debunking the myth of Medicare Advantage and Medicare private fee for service.

Both were supposed to help reduce Medicare's costs via a short-term subsidy enabling private insurers to get into the market, figure it out, and use their free-market skills to improve on a moribund, bureaucrat-run government health care program.

Instead it has turned into a gravy train for insurers, who have been getting fat on the subsidy. Meanwhile, physicians are facing a cut of 10% in Medicare reimbursement.

For once it would be nice if the so-called free market advocates would wipe the (taxpayer-subsidized) gravy off their multiple chins before they start spewing peans to capitalism.

Bob asks this key question:

"If the HMOs really want to effectively defend Medicare Advantage they need to demonstrate value. Where is the industry data showing that after five years in this recent version of Medicare Advantage, and 20 years all told in the program, the private sector delivers a better cost/quality result?"

I'd add they damn well better come up with a strong case and soon; health reform is coming. Between recissions, medical underwriting, and medicare advantage/pffs private insurers are making a compelling case - for single payer.

June 19, 2008

Coventry's stumbled - badly

The notice for the teleconference popped up in my email inbox a mere hour and a half before the telecon was scheduled to begin. That was the first indicator of potential trouble.

The second was the opening line from Coventry's CEO: "To say we're disappointed with the news we shared earlier this afternoon is an understatement..."

The source of Mr Wolf''s disappointment was Coventry's report that it will miss its financial projections - by a wide margin.

For a company that has long been (justifiably) proud of its ability to tightly monitor and manage its business, the disclosure that it had significantly underestimated Q1 and Q2 medical costs was a bitter pill indeed, all the more so as it came a few weeks after Wolf's recent efforts to pump up internal morale by comparing Coventry's management discipline favorably to competitors.

Earnings will fall short due in large part to higher than expected medical costs in Coventry's Medicare private fee for service and core group health businesses. In explaining the failure to meet the Medicare program’s projected MLR, CFO Shawn Guertin described the problems inherent in the claims submission and processing flow. Guertin went on to note that the company also had identified some problems in Coventry’s internal claims processing. Curiously, management blamed part of the problem on ID cards not being used by claimants, which delayed claims flows internally. Evidently some members don't bother to show their Coventry cards when leaving the doctor's office. The office sends the bill to Medicare, who returns the bill with a note that the patient is not a member. The office then contacts the patient, gets the correc claims submission info, and sends the bill to Coventry.

This takes time, and has led to Coventry under-estimating claims volume and expense for its Medicare private ffs business. I'd note that in prior calls management has been effusive in its self-praise for its ability to operate this business with statements like 'we couldn't be more pleased with how this business is running'.

For the Medicare business, the MLR is up 300-340 basis points over prior guidance. This isn’t even close enough for horse shoes or hand grenades. From comments by management on last night's call, it appeared this popped up in April and May, after things appeared to look pretty solid earlier in 2008.

Again, this is a pretty big surprise.

On the group health front, higher trend in group outpatient utilization and inpatient unit cost, or price per service appear to be the problem. Instead of the forecast 100 basis point reduction in MLR, management is now expecting higher medical costs - with a potential swing of 400 basis points for outpatient expense. Inpatient costs are also up 100 basis points, so the combination is driving up total MLR by 150 basis points.

Another significant contributor to the higher MLR is an increase in the number of more severe (more costly) claims – not more claims, but more high cost claims, specifically between 50k and 150k in dollars paid.

In contrast hospitals are not seeing increased utilization. Facility revenue numbers are not trending up. Coventry wasn’t able to figure out why their hospital costs were going up while overall hospital utilization nationally is not.

Admittedly Coventry has not yet determined all the factors causing these increases in MLR. They do appear to have a grasp on the major factors; from the tone and delivery
of management comments I'd expect there's a lot of yelling at Coventry HQ, likely to be followed shortly by the distinctive sound of heads rolling. (During the call Wolf did allude to staff reductions in a response to an analyst's query.)

Lastly, management reported that the work comp business is not meeting projections due in part to lower fee revenue for bill review.

As the market closed, Coventry's stock price had dropped to $40.97, resulting in a P/E just under 10. Coventry has long been rumored to be a potential acquisition target, and if the stock price declines further (a not unreasonable expectation) suitors will likely emerge.

May 29, 2008

Why are there so many spinal implants?

Disclaimer - This is the kind of post that makes one want to take a shower after reading. My apologies to readers without convenient access to bathing facilities.

One of the fastest growing segments of the surgical industry is the spinal implant business. In what may be the most comprehensive review of the problem, the Orange County Register reported:

"About 70 percent of U.S. adults -- or 153 million people -- have lower back pain, according to Millennium Research Group. Of those, about 15 million require medical treatment, and most eventually get spinal implants." My take is that is a wildly overstated estimate; one survey reported that the total world market for devices was $4.2 billion; note this study used 2006 data. Another indicated the market was $5 billion in 2005, and predicted growth to $20 billion by 2015. Stryker, one of the major manufacturers, expects growth of 16% per year in the spinal implant market. Yet another report(note opens .pdf) indicated the 2007 worldwide market was $7 billion, with the US accounting for $5.4 billion of that total.

And boy is it profitable. One manufacturer (Allez Spine) sold screws to an implant device company for $79.31 each - screws that were then sold to hospitals for $1000 each (who then marked them up even more when billing insurers).


sidexray.gif
Yep, there are $480 worth of screws in this xray (wholesale), $6000 retail, and probably $9-12,000 to the insurer/patient. And that doesn't include the other parts...


Medtronic, one of the larger device companies with about 45% market share in the US and the same worldwide, reported sales of $869 million for spinal implants last quarter, driven in part by a big jump in sales of its Kyphon technology. The $869 million represents growth of 35% from the same quarter last year.

The Kyphon story is an ugly one, and points to one potentially significant problem in the spine surgery industry - the focus on devices as a tool to maximize reimbursement.

Kyphon (the company) was acquired by Medtronic in 2005. The company settled a lawsuit filed by the Feds, agreeing to pay $75 million in fines. Kyphon agreed to stop providing inappropriate advice on reimbursement to providers, advice that resulted in hospitals filing inflated claims with Medicare for a spine procedure with the otherworldly name of kyphoplasty.

The details of the case, as reported by the New York Times, are revealing.

Kyphon "persuaded hospitals to keep people overnight for a simple outpatient procedure [bold added] to repair small fissures of the spine. Medicare then reimbursed the hospitals much more generously than it otherwise would have for the procedure, which was developed as a noninvasive approach that could usually be done in about an hour.

By marketing its products this way, Kyphon was able to artificially drive up demand among hospitals, bolstering its revenue and driving up its stock price. Medtronic subsequently bought the company, its competitor, for $3.9 billion, greatly enriching Kyphon’s senior executives. "

Margins for Kyphon's devices approached 90%, due in large part to the high price the company charged, a price that hospitals offset by extending hospital stays (as advised by Kyphon's sales reps and reimbursement experts), thus generating higher bills and much higher revenue.

Another major contributor to the rapid increase in spinal implant surgeries may be the growth of device companies that have spine surgeons as stockholders. The OCR article reported that physician-owned companies are now under investigation by HHS' Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In testimony before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, Gregory E. Demske, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs at the OIG said:

"These financial relationships [between device manufacturers and physicians] can benefit patients and Federal health care programs by promoting innovation and improving patient care. However, these relationships also can create conflicts of interest that must be effectively managed to safeguard patients and ensure the integrity of the health care system...during the years 2002 through 2006, four manufacturers (which controlled almost 75 percent of the hip and knee replacement market) paid physician consultants over $800 million [bold added] under the terms of roughly 6,500 consulting agreements. Although many of these payments were for legitimate services, others were not. The Government has found that sometimes industry payments to physicians are not related to the actual contributions of the physicians, but instead are kickbacks designed to influence the physicians’ medical decisionmaking [bold added]. These abusive practices are sometimes disguised as consulting contracts, royalty agreements, or gifts."

All this growth may well be based on a focus on surgical treatment that is just not supported by research. Some studies indicate surgery is not the best treatment for a substantial number of patients. According to the OCR article (source above);

a "2005 study of patients with back pain published in the journal of the British Medical Association concluded: "No clear evidence emerged that primary spinal fusion surgery was any more beneficial than intensive rehabilitation."

"You look at the number of procedures and the rate of growth and it seems to far outstrip the number of patients who need this," said Dr. Steven J. Atlas, a back specialist and Assistant Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School."

And that old nemesis, provider practice pattern variation, is nowhere as obvious as with back surgeries. Looking at Medicare data, the back surgery rate in Fort Myers, Florida was 5 times higher than in Miami. Same population demographics, same state, but different providers.

Perhaps the best explanation for the considerable growth in the use of implants and spine surgery is the lack of evidence either for or against these procedures. There are some reports that indicate positive or negative outcomes, but nothing definitive has been published that could be used by payers and providers to judge the appropriateness of surgery for most patients with back injuries or degenerative conditions.

May 27, 2008

Today's SAT question

Medicare is to Workers Comp as:

a) Mars is to deck stain
b) surgery is to literature
c) a jelly sandwich is to Colorado
d) all of the above
e) none of the above

If you chose (d), congratulations, you understand there few similarities between the two systems, other than both involve paying health care providers to deliver care.

Beyond that, Medicare and Work Comp are, as the Brits say, chalk and cheese. Yet many regulators and legislators still try to base reimbursement under workers comp to Medicare's RBRVS system (resource based relative value scale). The latest effort is in California, where a recent study by the Lewin Group has come under fire from providers in the Golden State. Critics contend Lewin's analysis does not accurately assess the inherent differences between the two systems or the way providers deliver care, and bill for that care, and therefore the study's conclusion is inappropriate.

I think the critics are right. As I've noted before, the additional paperwork, different procedures, complex and dynamic treatment rules and approval process, additional communications requirement, and different demographics make work comp a very different animal from Medicare.

I'll have more on this later, as the reports and analysis require more time than I've got right now.

But there are two more (very) current examples of the problems inherent in linking WC reimbursement to governmental programs. Both involve drugs, and in both cases WC drug costs are linked to Medicaid. The states are NY and CA. In both cases, the FS will also drop in July; to AWP-16.25% in NY for brand and an across-the-board cut of 10% (below the current very low rates) in California.

There are already myriad examples of claimants unable to fill comp scripts in New York today, and that is at the current, slightly more generous FS. There have been fewer reports of this issue in CA, but the new rate reduction has pharmacy chains screaming.

As well they should. Here's how Workers comp and Medicaid are different

1. Unlike Medicaid, there are no copays, restrictive formularies, or other cost- and utilization containment measures in WC. Thus all cost containment efforts in WC for drugs involves Drug Utilization Review processes that can involve pharmacists and clinicians reviewing scripts for appropriateness, medical necessity, potential conflicts and adverse outcomes, and relatedness to the WC medical condition.

2. PBMs pay pharmacies more for WC drugs than for Medicaid drugs; a typical brand discount is AWP-12%, generic is MAC or -25-35%. The Medicaid FS is substantially lower, at AWP-15+% for brand and FUL (>-40%)for generics.

3. Unlike Medicaid, to the extent they exist at all, rebates are much lower in WC. In NY, Medicaid rebates are a minimum of 11% of the Average Manufacturer’s Price per unit. The rebate revenue significantly reduces states’ costs for drugs. As these rebates are much lower or nonexistent in WC, PBMs do not have rebate dollars to offset their drug costs.

Sure, it is easy for lazy insurers, regulators, legislators, and employers to think they are doing something positive by cutting the price they pay for drugs.

It is also a big mistake.

April 16, 2008

Medicare is to Workers Comp as Yin is to Yang

Why do regulators base WC reimbursement on Medicare? It's easy, simple, and already familiar to legislators and regulators alike. It is also a big mistake.

Medicare is a program for America's elderly - over-65, mostly sedentary, and mostly not employed. Workers comp covers 'working age' folks; primarily 18-65. ) Many of the surgeries being performed on Medicare vs. workers’ compensation patients are fundamentally different.

The types of outpatient surgeries that can be performed on workers’ compensation patients, who are generally young and in overall good health, are different than the outpatient surgeries Medicare covers (pays) for. Medicare sharply restricts outpatient surgery for good reason as Medicare patients are frail and surgery followed by an inpatient stay is safer given their complicated medical conditions and health risks of prolonged general anesthesia. WC claimants are younger, in better physical condition, and much better suited for outpatient surgeries - yet basing WC reimbursement policies on Medicare would forbid, or at the least financially dis-incent, outpatient surgery in favor of inpatient.

Medicare fee schedules (like the one Florida's Three-Member Panel is considering adopting) result in more specialist care and more procedures being performed. (opens pdf) National studies show this frequently leads to poorer outcomes and more suffering for patients, in addition to higher costs for payers.

Medicare recipients' medical conditions are very different from comp claimants'. The top ten Medicare DRGs (Medicare's coding for inpatient care) are:

  • Heart Failure & Shock
  • Simple Pneumonia & Pleurisy
  • Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders
  • Psychoses
  • Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
  • Major Joint & Limb Reattachment Procedures, Lower Extremity
  • Angina Pectoris
  • Esophagitis, Gastroent & Misc Digest Disorders
  • G.I. Hemorrhage
  • Nutritional & Misc Metabolic Disorders

No spine conditions, multiple trauma, burns, TBIs, crushing injuries, joint surgeries...

Inflation in Medicare billing is rampant - if you think it is bad in WC generally (and you would be right) it is an order of magnitude worse in Medicare. In Florida, the current annual inflation rate is north of 14% for Medicare outpatient services.

Medicare reimbursement disproportionately favors hospital-based care. With facilities reimbursed at levels much higher than free-standing doctors' offices and clinics, basing reimbursement on Medicare encourages providers to affiliate with, provide care in, and bill thru facilities. In Florida, the impact is dramatic; basing reimbursement on hospital outpatient service charges will increase costs by an estimated $1,675 to $2,320 per claim (calculations courtesy of FairPay Solutions, an HSA client).

What provider would want to treat in their own, lower cost clinic or office, if they could more than double their fees by working through a hospital?

Finally, CMS itself has warned against using their payment methodologies for non-Medicare patients. “The cost-based relative weights were developed solely using Medicare data. We do not have non-Medicare data…For this reason we are concerned that non-Medicare payers may be using our payment systems and rates without making refinements to address the needs of their own population.” (page 272)

I could go on, but you get the picture. The populations are starkly different, claimants' health status is different, their motivations are different, provider types are different, and reimbursement should reflect these differences.

Unfortunately, Medicare is the easy choice. Easy, but dead wrong.

March 9, 2008

Why Medicaid Rx reimbursement rates don't make sense for Workers Comp

Regulators are increasingly seeking politically low-cost ways to reduce workers comp costs. Some have decided to use the Medicaid reimbursement rate for drugs for Workers Comp, evidently figuring that if pharmacies accept it for Medicaid, they'll do the same for WC. Same 'logic' evidently goes for PBMs.

The only problem is it is dead wrong.

1. Unlike Medicaid, there are no copays, restrictive formularies, or other cost- and utilization containment measures. Thus all cost containment efforts in WC for drugs involve resource-intensive Drug Utilization Review processes; pharmacists and clinicians reviewing scripts for appropriateness, medical necessity, potential conflicts and adverse outcomes, and relatedness to the WC medical condition.

2. PBMs pay pharmacies more for WC drugs than for Medicaid drugs; a lot more.

3. Unlike Medicaid, to the extent they exist at all, rebates are much lower in WC. Medicaid rebates are a minimum of 11% of the Average Manufacturer’s Price per unit (and even higher in many states). The rebate revenue significantly reduces states’ costs for drugs. As these rebates are much lower or nonexistent in WC, PBMs do not have rebate dollars to offset their drug costs.

Unlike Medicaid, most workers comp claimants have no idea how WC works, much less who their insurer is; the chances of the claimant presenting with a card is therefore quite low (less than 25% of all WC first fills go to the appropriate PBM). When a Medicaid recipient shows up at a pharmacy, they have been enrolled and thus have a card, and the transaction process is instantaneous and very low cost.

There is no positive enrollment in WC, unless the claimant presents a card, the pharmacy has no way to identify the appropriate PBM. This presents pharmacies with a high level of risk, a level that is not balanced by a reimbursement that makes that risk level tolerable. Specifically;

1. pharmacies are 'at risk' for initial fills where they cannot be sure the carrier/employer will accept the claim - this higher risk level requires a higher reimbursement. There is nothing preventing an individual from writing ‘WC’ on a paper script, thereby perpetrating fraud on the pharmacy.

2. the current regs pay pharmacies 25% more for scripts that are 'controverted'; that is, where the carrier/employer has said they will not (yet) accept the claim

3. The 'controverted' situation is very similar to first fills - the carrier/employer has not indicated they will accept the claim, yet the pharmacy is required to fill it, without guarantee of reimbursement

4. the additional risk forced upon the pharmacies may lead them to:
• not fill scripts without a claim number/specific notice from the carrier/employer
• use the claimant’s existing profile (usually a group health PBM card) to fill the script, thereby increasing group health costs
• require the claimant to pay cash which they may, or may not, be able to do

We're all for reducing work comp medical expense, but the blunt instrument of deep, and inappropriate, cuts in reimbursement for drugs is also counterproductive.

The key driver of prescription drug cost inflation is not the price per pill but utilization – the volume and type of drugs dispensed. The National Council on Compensation Insurance’s recent study on drug costs in workers comp stated “Utilization changes are the driving force in drug cost changes for WC…Utilization is the biggest reason for cost differences between states” (Workers Compensation Prescription Drug Study, 2007 Update; Barry Lipton et al; NCCI, p. 4, 6).

PBMs have adopted and are continuously improving programs designed to address inappropriate utilization. These programs include
• development of clinical evidence-based guidelines for the use of drugs for musculoskeletal injuries
• outreach by PBM physicians in specific cases where the drug treatment plan may be inappropriate
• data mining to identify potentially questionable prescribing patterns including off-label usage of drugs such as Actiq and Fentora
• Prior Authorization of specific drugs (e.g. narcotic opioids, cardiovascular medications).

What does this mean for you?
If PBMs don't operate in a state or can't generate any margin, they'll eliminate any and all utilization control measures.

And drug costs will increase.

February 5, 2008

Why is workers comp paying for hospital errors?

Surgical devices left inside a patient. Dispensing the wrong medication or the wrong dosage. Giving a patient the wrong blood type in a transfusion. Serious pressure ulcers incurred while hospitalized. Infections from catheterization in the ICU.

These are among the 'never-ever' events - incidents that should never, ever happen during an inpatient stay. CMS recently decided to stop paying hospitals for care required due to certain"preventable complications" — "conditions that result from medical errors or improper care and that can reasonably be expected to be averted" (NEJM, 10/18/07). The list includes air embolisms, certain infections, patient falls, pressure ulcers and the like.

HealthPartners in Minnesota was one of the first payers to identify the problem and take action, way back in 2002. Now, other commercial health insurers, notably Wellpoint and Aetna, are planning to move beyond CMS' list and eventually refuse payment for 28 events. These events, identified by the National Quality Forum are also under review by the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association, United Healthcare, and CIGNA who may decide to stop paying for them.

And the Leapfrog Group's membership, which includes many of the country's largest employers, is also asking providers to not bill for these events.

It is not just the payers; hospitals themselves are starting to see the light. Hospital associations in Massachusetts and Minnesota have agreed to not charge payers or patients for these events, which include "wrong-site and wrong-patient surgery, patient death or disability due to wrong use of blood or blood products and medication errors, and follow-up care needed to bring the patient back from such errors."

The largest payer in the nation, CMS, has decided that paying for certain medical errors is bad policy. So has two of the largest health plans, along with one of the best-run health plans in the country. Our biggest companies have joined the "no pay for mistakes" movement. Hospitals themselves have decided it is inappropriate to charge for their screw-ups.

So why are workers comp payers reimbursing hospitals for 'never-evers'? I don't have any empirical evidence that WC payers are not paying for these events. In fact, given the lax payment policies of most payers, I'd be very surprised if more than a very few (if any) payers have the ability to deny payment, much less a policy to do so.

What does this mean for you?

There is clear precedent for non-payment for medical errors. Moreover, workers comp payers may find themselves in the rather awkward position of trying to justify their payments for conditions that their clients have publicly stated are not reimbursable.

January 23, 2008

Warning on Fentora

The FDA has issued a warning notice for off-label use of Fentora after three deaths were linked to off-label usage of the fentanyl tablet.

One issue may be related to the substitution of Fentora for another powerful pain medication, Actiq. Both are manufactured by Cephalon, but Fentora is absorbed more quickly than is Actiq. Therefore, the same dosage of Fentora may result in more of the drug being absorbed into the bloodstream.

Cephalon has been plagued by accusations of aggressive detailing, including encouraging physicians to prescribe the drug off-label. Another recent article indicates the pharma industry has been aggressively lobbying the FDA to allow this type of detailing, which evidently has been going on for two years despite restrictions against the practice.

Of note to workers compensation insurers, Fentora appears to be becoming increasingly popular for treatment of back pain in some areas.

What does this mean to you?

If you are a WC payer, find out which claimants are taking Fentora and figure out why and if it is appropriate. Not only is the drug dangerous, it is also very expensive.

November 27, 2007

Medicare dollars are paying for the uninsured

Adding to the seemingly-endless list of compelling arguments in favor of universal coverage is the rather obvious “if we insure them now, we won’t have to pay for more expensive care tomorrow.”

Specifically, I’m referring to a recent Commonwealth Fund/AHRQ study on health care costs for new medicare enrollees; the study found that new Medicare enrollees with chronic conditions that previously lacked health insurance incurred substantially higher treatment costs than those that had health insurance before enrolling.

While all previously-uninsured Medicare recipients had higher utilization, this was particularly noticeable for those with hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, or stroke, where prevention and routine care can prevent costly and calamitous acute episodes. The uninsured with these conditions reported more doctor visits (13% relative difference), more hospitalizations (20% relative difference), and higher total medical expenditures (51% relative difference) from ages 65 to 72 years than previously insured adults.

Each year, approximately 2.3 million seniors qualify for Medicare. Of this population, 57% had chronic conditions. The average medical cost (2003 numbers) per Medicare enrollee in the 65-74 age group was $9473. While the information available doesn't allow a precise calculation of the additional cost involved in treating this group, the amount is certainly well up in the billions.

According to the original article in the NEJM, "The costs of expanding health insurance coverage for uninsured adults before they reach the age of 65 years may be partially offset by subsequent reductions in health care use and spending for these adults after the age of 65, particularly if they have cardiovascular disease or diabetes before the age of 65 years."

What does this mean for you?

Covering the uninsured would reduce Medicare's expenses.

October 29, 2007

WellCare - the bigger implications

Yes, they are innocent until proven guilty. But it doesn't look good for Wellcare, the Florida-based Medicaid and Medicare health plan.

And what's bad for WellCare may be bad for private insurers.

Continue reading "WellCare - the bigger implications" »

September 28, 2007

Aetna's figured it out

Diabetes, congestive heart failure, and heart disease are increasingly conditions of the poor. And the poorer one is, the more common the condition.(free reg req)

Most health plans have little experience dealing with poor folks with chronic health problems.

They'd better start learning.

Continue reading "Aetna's figured it out" »

August 20, 2007

Pay for non-performance

CMS will no longer pay for medical treatment(reg req) for injuries or illnesses resulting from hospitalization. Expect private insurers to follow suit.

Its about time.

Continue reading "Pay for non-performance" »

August 8, 2007

United Healthcare wins

CMS' hospital reimbursement change is going to create winners and losers; among the biggest winners will be UnitedHealthcare.

Among the losers, their competitors.

Continue reading "United Healthcare wins" »

August 7, 2007

Medicare sneezes

The adage goes something like - when the US sneezes, the world catches a cold, signifying just how much influence this country has on the rest of the world.

That's analogous to Medicare's impact on the health care sector. And Medicare is about to change the way it pays hospitals, a change that will have a dramatic effect on every private payer from HMO to individual carrier to workers comp insurer to self-insured employer.

Continue reading "Medicare sneezes" »

August 6, 2007

CMS denies off-label Actiq coverage

The latest shot in the battle against drug costs comes from the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, which is reported to be denying coverage for off-label use of drugs such as Actiq and Fentora.

Whenever CMS moves, the healthcare world shakes, and this is no exception. There are a host of possible 'downstream implications' in areas as diverse as workers comp, formulary management, and hospice.

Continue reading "CMS denies off-label Actiq coverage" »

May 11, 2007

A buzz kill

I'm on a brief vacation mountain biking in Moab, Utah. A gorgeous place, great people, great riding. And upon return from a long and tiring but very fun ride this am, I open up the latest from Fierce Healthcare to read reports about not one, but two reimbursement scams and one piece on docs who don't disclose when they make mistakes.

That just crushed the hard-earned buzz.

Continue reading "A buzz kill" »

May 1, 2007

Those heartless Democrats

I've been following Bob Laszewski's views on Medicare Advantage with some interest. My take is the program is about to embark on a financial bread-and-water diet, a regimen prescribed by the Democratic Congress seeking funds to offset physician reimbursement increases (or more accurately to prevent decreases) and fund the S-CHIP program.

Bob's view is that the rural programs will not suffer too much, while MA plans located in urban areas may well have their subsidies reduced. The MA program sponsors are now pulling out the lobbying stops, employing a variety of questionable and downright distasteful marketing.

The latest descent-to-previously-unplumbed-depths is their manipulation of minority groups as "victims" of the heartless Dems.

March 22, 2007

Physician pay v. Insurer overpay

Two timely topics are in the news; the likelihood of cuts in the additional payments for Medicare Advantage programs and reductions in Medicare reimbursement rates for physicians.

The juxtaposition is just too...obvious to pass without comment.

Continue reading "Physician pay v. Insurer overpay" »

January 16, 2007

Drug price negotiation and lousy research

Pundits and experts on the right side of the political spectrum are claiming that giving CMS the authority to negotiate drug prices will cost Americans $500 billion in lost productivity due to an annual loss of five million life years.

There are so many flaws in their arguments it's hard to know where to start, but let's plunge in.

Continue reading "Drug price negotiation and lousy research" »

January 10, 2007

Medicare as a business - Coventry's perspective

Coventry CEO Dale Wolf presented at the JPMorgan Healthcare Investment Conference earlier this week; I was particularly interested in his comments re the business opportunity in Medicare and Medicaid.

Medicare Advantage (MA) programs are likely to suffer a significant cut in funding this year as the Democrats, led by Rep. Pete Stark (D CA) take a chain saw to the subsidies paid to MA plans.
Coventry will be close to a $9 billion business in 2007.

The loss of a good chunk of the subsidy will make the MA business less attractive for many health plans; Wolf believes there is a significant opportunity for Coventry as it has successfully become the low cost producer in their markets, an achievement of which Wolf is quite proud.

Continue reading "Medicare as a business - Coventry's perspective" »

January 5, 2007

Dem's D-ficiency

Bob says it better than I could.

January 4, 2007

Humana's Part D problems

Boston's Mayor is outraged at Humana's decision to raise premiums on it's basic Part D plan by 130%. Humana's stockholders should be equally upset.

Continue reading "Humana's Part D problems" »

January 3, 2007

A not very good idea

Among the health reform plans likely to be considered is an expansion of Medicare, allowing non-seniors to "buy in" to Medicare.

This is a bad idea.

Continue reading "A not very good idea" »

December 11, 2006

Medicare reimbursement's downstream impact

In what will come as no surprise to anyone, Congress will eliminate the pending cut in Medicare physician reimbursement. Not only that, but docs who agree to report certain data to CMS will actually get a 1.5% increase in reimbursement from the Feds.

If you listen very closely, you can almost hear the medical community's resounding "yippee".

The reasons docs are not exactly ecstatic about the news are two-fold.

Continue reading "Medicare reimbursement's downstream impact" »

December 1, 2006

Pete Stark fires the first shots

It's starting.

Rep. Stark (D CA) is already talking about cutting subsidies for Medicare Advantage programs, which he claims are costing taxpayers over 12% more than standard Medicaid programs.

This comes as no surprise to loyal readers and those who are old enough to remember when "Pete" Stark was a major player in national health care policy.

Continue reading "Pete Stark fires the first shots" »

November 15, 2006

Why Mike Leavitt needs Dale Carnegie

Yawn.

It didn't take the HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt long to start in with the tired rhetoric about the evils of government-run health care(free reg req). Leavitt does not want the Feds to negotiate drug prices. Heck, he doesn't even want Congress to give the Feds the power to do so.

Why not? What's the Secretary scared of?

According to him, it's the old archenemy of all things good - government-run health care. While I too am a firm believer in the power of the free market, Leavitt's logic falls apart upon even the most rudimentary exam.

Continue reading "Why Mike Leavitt needs Dale Carnegie" »

November 6, 2006

Drugs, profits and politics

By any accounting, Part D has been a boon to the pharmaceutical industry (free registration required). Revenues and profits at Pfizer, Lilly, and other manufacturers have jumped. This will undoubtedly lead to more research dollars available to search for cures for awful diseases, an effort exclusively funded by the US taxpayer that will benefit the entire world.

Aren't we generous?

Continue reading "Drugs, profits and politics" »

November 3, 2006

Medicare games

The annual Medicare physician price cut season is on us. Next year's reduction will average 5%, although payments for office visits (evaluation and management codes) will increase by up to 30%, but reimbursement for other procedures will be slashed up to 20%.

Don't expect this to actually happen; every year the Medicare reductions are reversed by Congress. And this year will be no different. I'd expect Congress will do something to reverse the cuts, at least in part.

Continue reading "Medicare games" »

October 24, 2006

Finding good companies

There is quite a bit of interest among private equity and venture capital firms in the work comp managed care "space". These investors seek to buy into companies that are poised for growth, that have a "sustainable competitive advantage", solid management, long term contracts with customers, and a profitable business model.

A key to success for these investors is to find these firms before the other investors do, which means identifying good companies quickly. Analysts spend lots of time, energy, and brain power analyzing, assessing, and interpreting data. looking for the wheat among the chaff.

A much faster, and probably more accurate way, is to pick up the phone and call the company. Talk to the receptionist, someone in customer service and someone in billing. What they say doesn't matter nearly as much as how they say it.

Good companies have energy, enthusiasm, and a desire to help that comes through the phone. Not so good ones have none of the above.

October 17, 2006

Workers' Comp - the answer to the spinal fusion question

Kudos to USAToday for publishing a pretty good article on variations in practice patterns related to back surgeries. In a front page story today, the paper that has been derided by some as "McNews" explores the issues surrounding the explosion in the number of spinal fusions.

The reporting is balanced, insightful, and thorough, a bit of a surprise coming from a paper that prides itself on short sentences, really short words, and lots of color, not depth and nuance.

Noted throughout the article is the primary problem - no one knows how many spinal fusions are the right number, and there is significant disagreement among stakeholders re when a patient should have surgery. (free registration required) That's all true, and that's where workers compensation comes in.

Continue reading "Workers' Comp - the answer to the spinal fusion question" »

September 6, 2006

McClellan's legacy

Mark McClellan is leaving his post as head of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. He served long and loyally, sticking to the Administration's line even when facts indicated otherwise, remaining a calming force when Part D enrollment was going nowhere. McClellan is also known for listening hard to suggestions and criticism from all sides, and working diligently to address problems.

Here's what's happened during his tenure.

Part D was passed, implemented, and operational. This was a monumental task, and one McClellan was instrumental in accomplishing. It's not his fault it is a fatally flawed program; well, maybe it is, in some small part, as he was probably involved in writing/editing/opining on the legislation. Nevertheless, under McClellan the program became reality, with the initial enrollment problems addressed (in large part).

Continue reading "McClellan's legacy" »

August 21, 2006

Too much health care is bad on many counts

Two recent articles highlight the massive inefficiencies in the US health care system. In Philadelphia, five hospitals now have heart transplant programs, even though there are only enough patients for two. The result? Hospitals will not perform enough to gain the experience needed to improve safety and efficiency while lowering variable costs.

A few hundred miles away, a (reg req)group of cardiologists in Elyria Ohio have evidently decided that their Medicare patients need angioplasties four times more frequently than the national average. I wonder if it's the fried dough at the Elyria fair?

Continue reading "Too much health care is bad on many counts" »

August 9, 2006

Medicare cuts physician reimbursement - Not!

CMS is going to change the way it pays physicians. Really. Well, CMS Director McClellan says they will, and soon. Policy types will recall that every year, physician reimbursement for procedures under Medicare is slated to drop by between 3% - 5%, depending on total expenditures the prior year and a really complicated formula (that is never followed). So each year, physicians scream, and every year, politicians say "no, just kidding", and tweak the reimbursement to send a few more dollars to the docs. And I do mean "few".

This year expect the same to happen; it is an election year, there are lots of powerful (read "lots of money") forces in play here, and few elected officials want to take the political hit for cutting Medicare. So far, 80 senators have signed a letter asking that reimbursement levels be increased, not reduced.

Despite the political realities, McClellan is of the opinion that our elected officials will come up with a pay-for-performance scheme for CMS. Whether it ever gets through Congress is another story altogether.

For further edification, I'll pass on the perspective of Bob Laszewski, long-time national health care policy expert and good friend. Bob's view is that the increase in utilization driven by physician practice patterns is leading to the huge cost increases we are seeing in Medicare, and the stats back him up. Medicare's per-service reimbursement in 2006 is essentially unchanged from five years ago, while utilization has gone up dramatically. So, price controls have not worked to hold down medical inflation.

Thus the interest in pay for performance for physicians. While it sounds interesting, it's really hard to do.

As tough as it's going to be, I see no better alternative.

July 18, 2006

Herzlinger on consumer-driven Medicaid

Prof. Regina Herzlinger, a well-known advocate of consumer-driven health care and professor at Harvard Business School, has come out in favor of a plan proposed by South Carolina Gov. Mark Sanford that would add choice to the state's Medicaid program.

According to Dr. H, "Every recipient would obtain catastrophic and preventive coverage as well as a personal health account (PHA). Enrollees could then use their PHA funds to pay for a consumer-driven option of a traditional Medicaid hospital insurance, along with a doctor of their choice; a managed care policy, with its deductibles and copayment; or a network group of local physicians." OK, sounds reasonable.

She then goes on to say:

(Critics) "believe that Medicaid recipients will overwhelmingly choose the consumer-driven opportunities. But when consumer-driven plans are offered along with other health insurance choices, they are not necessarily the most popular. A 2005 Kaiser Family Foundation survey, for example, found that when enrollees were offered other insurance plans, only about 7 to 15 percent went the consumer-driven route. They also contend that Medicaid enrollees are too poorly educated and lack access to sources of information like the Internet. Although these sources are depicted as high tech, much of what patients learn actually comes from the phone and face-to-face interactions."

I'm not sure what to make of this. Is Dr. H's contention that critics need not worry because most Medicaid beneficiaries won't pick consumer-drive plans? Or is it that Medicaid folks, despite their lower educational level, will grasp health care information as quickly and completely as privately insured people? Or both?

I'm not disagreeing with Dr. H, I'm just not sure where she's going with this.

I am somewhat confounded by her later assertions in the same article that individuals with chronic conditions covered under consumer-directed plans did a better job complying with treatment, testing, and preventive care directions than individuals in non-consumer-directed plans. Methinks the good doctor confuses a statistical relationship with a causal one.

Back in the day, HMOs recruited members by offering health club memberships, knowing that individuals who were already using clubs and those committed to/interested in improving their health status would join up, incur few claims, and therefore the net expense would be considerably less than if the HMO offered comprehensive diabetes care. Marketing and market segmentation at its best.

Just because these HMOs had a lot of people in health clubs does not mean that their members were healthier because they joined the HMO, it could mean that because the members were healthy to start with, they joined the HMO.

My bet is that the folks with chronic conditions that took care care of themselves in the consumer-directed plans were doing so before they joined. Not, as Dr. H says, that "These plans appear to have transformed how some enrollees approach their healthcare."

a nod to fierce healthcare for the head's up.

July 13, 2006

Medicaid down, Medicare up

The latest budget projections have federal spending on Medicaid programs dropping below projections, while Medicare is suffering from the reverse. It appears that the shifting of reimbursement for drugs from Medicaid to Medicare is at least partially responsible for the financials, but increased utilization of physician and outpatient hospital services is also a major contributor to the increase.

This last point illustrates just how ineffective the price controls used in Medicare have become. While per-service prices have been held flat, utilization, driven by the use of more services and higher-cost services, has been the driving force behind the need to increase Part B premiums by 11% for 2007.

Meanwhile, preliminary indications are that Part D costs will come in under (the already highly inflated) expectations, although how this can be determined based on one quarter's worth of data is a mystery to me.

Perhaps those actuaries have gotten much better at predicting direction by looking in the rear view mirror.

June 21, 2006

Big pharma v big government

Prices on branded drugs increased 3.9% in Q1 2006(registration required), the largest increase in six years. Coincidentally, the Medicare Part D drug coverage program went into effect 1/1/2006. Part D has resulted in somewhere around ten million new customers for insurers, who will now pay 4.7% more for Lipitor and 13.3% more for Ambien.

In terms of dollars, AARP calculates the average senior's costs will increase by almost $20 per month, as the Part D providers are passing the cost increases along to their subscribers.

There has been the usual rash of outraged protests from various mouthpieces for big pharma, all of which are either disingenuous, outrageously self-serving, misleading, or poor attempts at deflecting blame towards insurers et al.

So what happens when pharma decides to increase prices?

Well, the mass media starts looking at what the Veterans Administration pays for drugs. Compared to the VA, the only federal entity allowed to negotiate prices, Part D prices are now 46% higher on average.

Here are a couple examples, quoted from the Families USA report.

"For Zocor (20 mg), the lowest VA price for a year’s treatment was $127.44, while the lowest Part D plan price was $1,275.36, a difference of $1,147.92 or 901 percent.

For Fosamax (70 mg), the lowest VA price for a year’s treatment was $265.32, while the lowest Part D plan price was $727.92, a difference of $462.60 or 174 percent."

So here we have big government, in the form of the VA, delivering prices that are about half of what private industry can obtain. While that's kind of interesting, it gets way more than "kind of" interesting when you consider that Part D has added $8 trillion to the nation's long term debt. That's a quarter of the entire Medicare deficit...

Tell me again how privatizing health care for seniors is a good deal for taxpayers, seniors, and the country?

June 8, 2006

Watch out for that hole...

The Fresno Bee editorial page picked up on a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine about the impact of deductibles and copays on compliance. The study analyzed what happened to seniors once they met their coverage limit under a drug program known as Medicare Premium Plus. (this limit was set at $1000)

The results are not terrible surprising - visits to the ER rose, compliance with drug regimens diminshed, blood pressure rose.

We may well see the same result around October, when many seniors will hit the "doughnut hole"; after they have incurred about $2250 in costs, they are responsible for the next $3000 or so, after which coverage kicks in again. If they stop taking their medications, we can expect to see a bump up in ER visits and potentially other services. When you add in their copays and the doughnut hole payouts, a beneficiary who hits $5100 in total expenditures will have paid $3,600 out of pocket.

About 25% of beneficiaries are projected to hit the doughnut hole; 10% will hit the $5100 level and therefore be defined as catastrophic cases.

It is likely that these folks will be less healthy than the seniors who don't spend that much on drugs. And for many, the drugs are keeping them out of the hospital by managing their blood sugar, hormone levels, lipids, hypertension, psychiatric issues, and chronic pain.

If they stop taking their meds, Part D costs may well come in under projections. The other Medicare "Parts" wiil not be so fortunate.

June 5, 2006

CMS data release - and their point is...?

To much fanfare, CMS released several data files containing hospital charge and payment data by state, county, (but not by individual facility) for the 30 most common DRGs and elective procedures. National, state and county financial ranges are included, and the volume of services provided at individual facilities are also available.

This is the first of three planned data releases; the next scheduled for this summer is for ambulatory surgical centers followed this fall by hospital outpatient numbers.

Promoted by the Administration as a part of Bush's "commitment to make health care more affordable and accessible, President Bush directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to make cost and quality data available to all Americans", the data is available at CMS' website. I'm not sure how this data will help consumers become better...consumers, but in the meantime here's my positive spin on the effort.

Here's my take on what you can do with the data.

1. FIgure out how your payments compare to the Feds', and use that to assess your contracting strategy.

2. Identify the hospitals that do the most specific procedures, and direct your patients/insureds/injured workers to those facilities...and away from the others.

3. Publish the data (after translating it into English) on your website so patients can draw their own conclusions.

4. Examine the volume of procedures at specific facilities and compare that to your payments to same see if there is a link between experience and efficiency (or at least billing practices).

5. Look at the payment to charge ratio and wonder.

6. Wonder how the release of the data will help consumers make better decisions, as individual hospital charge and payment data is not available.

There seems to be a problem here. How are consumers going to improve their ability to consume if individual facilities' results are not posted? How could an individual consumer use these data to make better decisions? Do the Feds have a clue?

Here's the detail on what's in the files.

"Top 30 Elective Inpatient Hospital DRGs" contains the volume and ranges of Medicare payments between the 25th and 75th percentiles for a limited set of conditions treated in U.S. states and counties. Included are the 30 conditions that had the highest utilization rates among all Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). Data are aggregated at the county, state and national level.

"Other Inpatient Hospital DRGs of High Utilization" contains ranges of Medicare payments between the 25th and 75th percentiles for a limited set of conditions treated in U.S. states and counties. These conditions are not among the top 30 utilized Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), but were deemed of interest to the Medicare community. Data are aggregated at the county, state and national level."

What does this mean for you?

See above.

June 1, 2006

Part D results are...

Part D’s enrollment deadline came and went, and along with it the orgy of claims, counter claims, blames and counter blames. So now that at least a bit of the dust has settled, where are we?

Confused.

Depending on whom you read or watch or listen to, the program has either been a success or a failure, is working or is not, is profitable or a loser, has enrolled “enough” people or has fallen well short.

The reality is as confusing as the perceptions appear to be. In any effort to cut through the spin, I checked in with Bob Laszewski of Health Policy and Strategy Associates. His take is it is too early to tell how things are going, and in the absence of truly meaningful metrics, we’re just going to have to wait and see.

Here’s why there is so much confusion.

There is no consensus on how many seniors have signed up for Part D or have alternate drug coverage under other plans. For starters, health plans and the Feds can’t agree on who is signed up by whom. Some health plans have been told they have thousands more members than they can account for, while others are being told large numbers of their “enrollees” actually signed up for Part D when they already had coverage under Medicare Advantage or another plan.

As near as I can figure it, there are between 8 million and 4.5 million seniors still without coverage. More details to follow...

Meanwhile, Humana, one of the more “successful” health plans in terms of signing up seniors for its Part D programs, recently saw its debt ratings outlook downgraded by AM Best from ‘stable” to “negative” in part due to large Part D enrollment and associated reliance on government contracts and increased capital requirements.

And AM Best may be on to something. The Medicare Trustees recently projected that the Part D program’s costs would increase by 11.5% annually over the next ten years. If those projections hold true, early claims about the currently “favorable” loss ratios may be short-lived.

We'll have to wait until at least mid-July for reasonably accurate enrollment figures, and accurate financials will take another five months or so. If someone provides numbers in either category before those dates, be skeptical.

May 12, 2006

Part D financials make no sense

A new study released by Part D advocacy group Medicare Today makes a compelling case for seniors' enrollment in Part D. Authored by the Lewin Group (an excellent and unbiased health care reseach and analysis firm) the study makes a compelling case for seniors to enroll.

It makes an equally compelling case for adverse selection.

The only seniors who are signing up are those that can make money on the program. They make money because their premiums will be less than what they are spending on drugs today (or would be tomorrow). The Lewin report provides details on who benefits the most, what the average cost is ($37.43/month), and what benefits accrue to individuals with which conditions. It's really well done.

Make no mistake; this is not insurance.

The Part D program is akin to an ATM card where you can withdraw any amount you want, as long as you pay a set minimum price. So, seniors, no dummies when it comes to managing money, can pretty quickly figure it out.

What's missed in the discussion about Part D is the better off seniors are, the worse off taxpayers are. The ATM account has to be funded by someone, and that someone is the beleagured taxpayer.

This is nothing short of bizarre. The Feds are actively and aggressively encouraging enrollment in a program that will cost three-quarters of a trillion dollars over the next ten years, while cutting taxes that will be needed to pay for this program.

What does this mean for you?

Really high taxes in a few years. Followed by a taxpayer revolt. After which Congress will likely authorize the Feds to negotiate pricing with big pharma. Because the only other choice is to cut benefits, and seniors would never allow that.

May 10, 2006

What's the fuss about the Part D "deadline"?

Listening to all the noise about the upcoming Part D enrollment deadline you'd think if you don't sign up now you'll never be able to. Nothing could be further from the truth.

For seniors who enroll in Part D after the "deadline", their premiums will be increased by 1% for each month post-deadline. So, if the premium is $25.00 now, it will be $28.00 in a year. Now, I know many seniors live on fixed incomes, but the extra three bucks is not likely to break most individuals.

Especially when one considers the decision process seniors are going thru. They look at their drug bills today, see if they can save money by enrolling in Part D, and if they can, they do, and if they can't, they don't. And when they can save money by enrolling, they will.

Plan sellers could change their premiums between now and when a senior decides its finally worth it to enroll, but they can do that anyway.

So the deadline is not a "line in the sand", but it sure makes for good press. It's too bad that the mass media is not doing a better job of educating seniors about the soft deadline, instead choosing to create a false crisis.

April 25, 2006

Part D enrollment myths

Rather than do the 'reinvent the wheel' thing, I'll just refer you to other folks who have been "fact checking" the Administration's claims about the 30 million who have "signed up for" Medicare Part D.

The net is this - out of the 21.3 million eligibles (not covered under some other Medicare or other Rx program), a bit over one-third have signed up for stand-alone Part D.

Matt Holt replays a Wall Street Journal article that (finally!) breaks down the actual enrollment stats by source (something Kate Steadman, Matt, and I have been blogging on for months...).

This makes me nuts because it will be used by some to make the point that governmental approaches to health care coverage do not work. And in this case, they'll be dead on.

April 13, 2006

Medicare cutting physician reimbursement

Physicians will be getting coal in their stockings from Uncle Sam come Christmas, 2006. It looks like Medicare reimbursement will be cut by 4.6% for 2007, just in time for those holiday credit card bills.

For several years, these cuts have been mandated to take place on the first of the year as part of Medicare's legal requirement to maintain expenses under a "sustainable growth rate", or SGR. Up till now Congressional action has prevented the cuts from taking place, but the budgetary constraints on Medicare growth are likely to force Congress' hand.

While that is bad enough, this is by no means the end of the bad news. According to California Healthline, the potential cut "represents the first in a series