Physician dispensing in work comp; two victories!

I know, you are as tired of reading about physician dispensing in work comp as I am writing about it.  At last, there’s some very good news.

Quick refresher – docs dispensing drugs adds about a billion dollars in excess drug costs – plus increases disability duration by 10 percent, medical costs, and total claims costs.  Dispensing docs also prescribe more opioids to more claimants.

Benefits?  None, except huge profits to dispensing docs, dispensing companies, and their owners – we’re talking about you, ABRY. (investment firm that owns dispensing “technology” firm Automated Healthcare Solutions)

First up, a court case in Louisiana found in favor of the employer, as the 3rd Circuit upheld a workers’ compensation judge’s determination that a claimant would not be reimbursed for drugs dispensed by a third party pharmacy, in this case Injured Workers’ Pharmacy, when the employer had provided access to other pharmacies and otherwise complied with regulations. According to Troy Prevot, Executive Director of LCTA Workers’ Comp -  “The result of this decision will allow us to continue to use retail pharmacies to control pharmacy cost by negotiating lower pricing thru PBMs” instead of paying much higher prices for doctor dispensed or third-party mail order drugs.  

I’d add that LCTA’s victory will enable all other employers in Louisiana to ensure the clinical management of pharmacy is handled correctly by one entity.

Big news from Pennsylvania too – a bill (HB 1846) limiting physician dispensing duration and cost, and specifically targeting opioid dispensing, will become law (there’s some technical stuff going on, but it will happen). Among other things, the law will:

There has been much heavy lifting here – kudos to AIA, the Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania (the leader of the effort) PCI, the PA Chamber and CompPharma’s member PBMs (full disclosure I am president of CompPharma; the PBMs did the work).

This follows the good results in North Carolina – but all is not rosy, as Maryland and Hawaii employers and taxpayers are still stuck paying far too much for drugs and the crappy outcomes they deliver.

What does this mean for you?

Better outcomes for claimants, lower costs for employers and taxpayers!

Drug formularies – much needed in workers comp

Controlling drug usage in workers’ comp is – far too often – the proverbial pushing on the rope.

Sure, PBMs and payers have done a remarkable job constraining costs and reducing the initial inappropriate use of opioids. Virtually all payers use PBMs and benefit greatly from PBMs’ clinical management and pricing that is almost always significantly lower than the state fee schedule or retail price.

However…the explosive growth of compounding, the fact that a quarter of drug costs are for opioids and a third for physician-dispensed drugs, the inability of clinical staff to get many prescribing physicians to discuss potential alternative treatments, and the frustration experienced by adjusters and employers unable to resolve claims due to long-term, highly-dangerous, and counterproductive use of drugs all argue for more regulatory help.

There are two valuable and too-little used tools in the box; evidence-based guidelines backed up by strong UR and formularies. While many jurisdictions dabble in guidelines, the litigious nature of comp coupled with the imprecise and nebulous wording of regulations often results in more problems, less clarity, and more delays.

In contrast, formularies established in regulation, whether the very tight version used in Washington State or the loose one in Texas, are clear, precise, and incontrovertible.  Drugs are either allowed or not.

CWCI’s just-released study analyzes the potential impact on work comp of those two formularies.  By comparing the drugs dispensed in the Golden State to what would have been allowed by Texas or Washington, Swedlow et al have determined that employers and taxpayers are overpaying somewhere between $102 million and $541 million annually – with no negative effects.

Before some naysayer starts screaming about the unfairness of payers influencing doctors’ treatment decisions, that naysayer should understand that formularies are in place in every group health, Medicare, Medicaid, and individual health plan.  Moreover, said naysayer should READ the CWCI study, and note that a “formulary” may be “set” to require dispensing of the drug that is the lowest-cost but otherwise identical drug instead of a higher-priced-but-otherwise-identical medication – or use any one of several other “levels” to establish a somewhat more restrictive formulary.

Formularies provide better care and tighter control without compromising.  And, a major benefit would be the huge reduction in the contentious and generally pointless UR dealing with drugs…a third of California’s IMRs are for drugs.

An excellent review is in this am’s WorkCompCentral – Greg Jones has penned a thorough, detailed, and well-researched piece that should be required reading.

Aetna’s sale of Coventry Work Comp Services…

Is off.

The latest intel from several folks in the know is consistent; APAX will not be buying Aetna’s Coventry Workers’ Comp business.

While its possible Aetna will look for another buyer, that is doubtful; the issues that reportedly led to the collapse of the APAX deal are real, material, and not going to resolve themselves. In fact, the key asset – the PPO network – continues to deteriorate. Aetna has a declining-value asset on its hands, one that, as time goes on, becomes ever less valuable.

According to reports, the biggest sticking point was APAX’ concern that the Coventry network will take at least 2 years to rebuild; when that onerous task is completed it will be nowhere near as valuable as it is today.

That’s far from surprising; I’ve discussed the network contracting issue ad nauseum. Fact is, without the real, committed, and ongoing support of a major group health/Medicaid/Medicare payer, providers aren’t going to give much of a discount to a work comp network.

Workers comp accounts for a bit over 1 percent of total US medical spend. Even if Coventry’s successor could claim 100 percent market share, their influence on a provider – outside of a relative handful – is never going to be appreciable.

But it wasn’t just the network. Sources indicated there were concerns in other business lines as well. Chalk this up to chronic under-investment in the business by Coventry pre-Aetna and the lack of focus on worker’s comp by Aetna since they bought Coventry’s parent company.

With earlier reports indicating Aetna wanted $1.5 billion for a business throwing off more than $200 million in free cash flow annually, a 7x multiple seemed reasonable. However, with no guarantee that the cash would keep flowing, I’d imagine APAX dropped the amount of their bid to account for the lowered expectations.

I’m sure there is much more to the story, but the net is APAX wasn’t willing to pay the price Aetna wanted, and Aetna wouldn’t accept APAX’ lowered bid.

What’s next?

Work comp represents just over 1 percent of Aetna’s revenue.  The company has a few other priorities on its hands at the moment – and as a $50 billion company, well it should.

Guessing here…but if I were at Aetna, I’d think about:

  • Working to keep the PPO network as functional as possible as long as possible without screwing up any of my other – much more important – business lines;
  • Selling off PBM First Script, an asset that should generate a very nice offer;
  • Replacing the bill review platform (BR 4.0) with one of the third party applications currently available. This would allow Coventry WCS to continue its very profitable bill review/PPO outsource business.
  • Leaving current management in place.  Art Lynch is running the show, and he’s the perfect person to do so.  He has strong relationships with current customers, is universally well-liked, and is just the kind of low-key, steady exec WCS needs now.

What does this mean for you?

Don’t delete Plan B - you’re still going to need it.

MSAs – another perspective

In follow up to my posts on MSAs, I had the chance to interview Peter Foley of the American Insurance Association yesterday. Peter is quite knowledgeable about MSAs, the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, CMS’ perspectives, and how this affects payers. He’d be the first to say he is not an “expert”, but in my view he is certainly one of them.

Here is our conversation – and I hope I got it right.

What payers are affected by MSP Act?

All payers – group, Self-Insured (SI) and non group health plans, workers comp auto general liability etc. – including claims where no medicals have been or can be paid. (E.g a claim on an accountant’s E&O insurance)

Does any payer have to file an MSA w CMS?

No. It is not statutorily required and never has been, it has been recommended but not required.

Why do payers send MSAs to CMS?

The payer thinking is in some way they can use a submission as a defense against Medicare coming back to them and say the payer did not take Medicare’s interest into account when settling the claim. While it does not definitively protect the payer from future action but does show that at that point in time they made an effort to protect Medicare’s interest.

If a company stops sending in MSAs, they may be concerned that CMS would think there’s a problem and perhaps subject them to more scrutiny.

Is there a “safe harbor” in regards to MSAs?

There is no safe harbor.

After an MSA is established and set aside does the payer have any protection from future action from CMS?

No. One can’t prevent the federal government from asserting its perceived rights if it so chooses.

It appears the backlog has come down, but other sources indicate it has not. What do you see?

Medicare doesn’t make available what is submitted or processing times they simply capture how many MSAs they have approved for how much in what time frame. The only data available is what individual companies report on their own.

There is no available comprehensive data on turnaround time – MSA companies have repeatedly asked CMS to bring more transparency to the process; my interpretation of transparency is data on the number of submissions, timeframes, and financial data. The problem that CMS has is they only capture numbers of MSAs approved, the date they are approved, and value of those set asides. We and they don’t know when or if the settlements have been finalized or indeed if the claim was settled at all. CMS does not report submission and approval dates, just approval date – what has been made available is just that.

There is no consistent reporting from CMS on those data points, much of the information available required a specific request to CMS, or may have come from congressional testimony.

The information currently available is limited and sporadic and not generalizable to the entire MSA population.

MCM – There’s some hope that legislation currently pending in Congress will provide some relief. There are two bills, a House and Senate version, which appear to be pretty similar.

The bill will be scored (to assess its impact on the budget and deficit) while the Senate and House are out for election and will score favorably. The hope is it will be attached to a bill and considered in the lame duck session. The American Bar Association endorsed it yesterday joining a broad coalition that includes the plaintiff bar, self-insured employers, AIA, and the Property Casualty Insurance Ass’n. More on this from Jennifer Jordan here.

Key elements of the bill:

  • Requires federal govt to adhere to state WC laws
  • Codifies current procedures which otherwise could be changed at any time without prior notification.
  • Allows for parties to submit funds directly to CMS if mutually agreed upon
  • Also includes a separate appeals process on the MSA determination.

Peter – “We are asking for transparency and clarity, and insurers, plaintiffs bar, and self insured employers are all supporting this bill.”

Thanks to Peter for his time, and to AIA for allowing a pseudo-journalist to interview one of their staff for the record.

From my admittedly uneducated perspective, CMS’s position, stance, and requirements border on the ludicrous.

Insurers and self-insured entities will be required to send data on essentially ALL claims to CMS, where the data will likely sit for eons, hopefully untouched unless some hacker gets in and steals all the personal health information, SSNs, and other data, an event that is only possible because CMS requires payers to send it to CMS.

What does this mean to you?

While I applaud the thinking behind the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (taxpayers shouldn’t have to pay for services that an insurer or employer should be liable for), the powers that be at CMS have taken that thinking and turned it into an expensive, ridiculously burdensome, wholly-unnecessary, potentially dangerous and likely pointless exercise.

 

Medicare Set-Asides and Workers’ Comp

I’m gingerly stepping into a topic I’ve mostly avoided to date – MSAs.  I avoid it because it is mind-numbingly complex, seemingly illogical in application, and served by often-contentious vendors.

NCCI’s Barry Lipton et al just released an excellent synopsis of the MSA situation (opens .pdf) and summary of where things are today. The report focuses on the feds’ review process, wherein they examine payers’ proposed MSAs.  Based on an analysis of data submitted by Gould and Lamb and NCCI’s Medical Call database, a few of the Research Brief’s highlights include:

  • most MSAs are for Medicare-eligible claimants, with 45% over 60
  • MSAs make up 40% of the average total proposed settlement
  • Drugs make up fully half of the MSA amount
  • CMS’ processing time for MSAs has declined of late to a median of 41 days
  • The gap between submitted and approved MSAs has shruck dramatically.
  • 29% of settlements are for amounts over $200,000, while 45% of the MSA amounts are less than $25,000.
  • Most MSA settlements are paid as a lump sum.
  • More than 90% of MSAs completed in December 2012 were approved as submitted.  That came after CMS changed approval vendors in July 2012.

The report is stuffed full of great information and, for those of us who are relatively ignorant of MSAs yet encounter them on occasion, well worth a read.

What does this mean for you?

If you don’t have the time right now, put it in your research file so you’ll have it when you need it.  And you will need it.

Physician dispensing in workers’ comp is killing your financials

The cost of physician dispensing is far above the outrageous premiums the dispensers charge.  The real cost includes:

  • longer disability duration
  • higher medical expense – over and above the excess cost of drugs
  • higher indemnity expense
  • more and longer use of opioids

Lost in the conversation, ignored in legislation, and pooh-poohed by dispensers and their enablers, the research – real research by real scientists, not anecdotal BS by dispensers – proves dispensing is having cost implications far and above the cost of the drugs.

In addition to the ground-breaking work done by Alex Swedlow et al at CWCI, the folks at Accident Fund (kudos to Jeffrey Austin White) teamed up with Johns Hopkins to analyze the impact of dispensing on their claims.

The results – which will be discussed next week in an IAIABC-sponsored webinar – are striking.

Slots for the webinar are still available – it will be held next Wednesday, September 10 from 1-2 Central Time.

Kudos to IAIABC for their leadership on this.

 

 

What’s your Plan B?

The pending acquisition of Coventry Workers’ Comp Services by APAX will consolidate a very big chunk of the work comp managed care services market.  The potential impact bears careful consideration.

I’ve taken the liberty of quoting below from a piece I wrote back in April of this year, long before this was on the horizon. I believe it is even more relevant today, as payers consider how the aggregation of market power under ACOG (APAX-Coventry-OneCall-Genex) may affect them. 

Without further ado…

Coventry Work Comp was built by combining the “old” OUCH network with Healthcare Compare, followed by an acquisition of Concentra’s WC services division, which had acquired NHR, which had acquired MetraComp, plus the acquisition of a few other bits and pieces.  Along the way, the company became the dominant work comp PPO.  A few years ago, it was the “must have” network for workers’ comp payers as it was the largest, had the best discounts, and had the most coverage in the most states. While other vendors may have had better networks in one or a couple of states, Coventry’s was the best (defined as largest number of providers and deepest discounts) and broadest.

Coventry’s management (since departed) used this market leader position very effectively.  They forced (yes, that’s the right term) payers to use their network – and other services – by raising their fees for payers who carved out specific states where another network was stronger.  In addition, they discounted other services (notably PBM) if the payer bought their network and bill review services.

This put payers in a tough position.  Try as they might to seek out the best-in-class network, PBM, or bill review offerings, insurers would have to pay a LOT more for Coventry’s network if they didn’t buy everything.

For Coventry’s erstwhile competitors, the playing field was anything but level.  If they built a great network in a state or two, one that far exceeded the depth, effectiveness, and discounts of Coventry, they’d often find the big buyers would tell them they’d won their business, only to learn a bit later that the deal had been undone and Coventry was going to keep it, having told the buyer that their fees were going to go up – often way up – if the state/s were awarded to the competitor.

Things got even more one-sided after Coventry bought Concentra’s work comp services business.

Coventry actually raised their prices, telling customers that the larger network delivered more value, and therefore a higher price was warranted.  Never mind that the larger network would deliver more revenue just by virtue of including more providers; Coventry management very successfully leveraged their all-but-monopolistic status to increase prices and beat out competitors.

According to several colleagues who worked with Coventry at the time (remember this was a few years ago), Coventry knew they had the leverage, weren’t afraid to use it, and was only too happy to let their customers know it.  Even more troubling, customer service and responsiveness got steadily worse.  Managed care execs used words like “arrogant”, “uncooperative”, and “dictatorial” when describing their interactions; many were very surprised, if not shocked, by the tone and tenor of discussions and negotiations.

Which brings us to the current state of the market; it is highly likely a very few vendors will hold leverage akin to that enjoyed by Coventry back in the late 2000′s.  Managed care execs at insurers, TPAs, and large employers are apprehensive/concerned that this may well mark a return to the “bad old days.”

Tomorrow, ACOG will own the largest PPO, one of the largest bill review enterprises, the largest imaging, PT, DME/HHC network, case management vendor, and lots of other stuff. They will undoubtedly promote the benefits of one-stop shopping, data integration, leakage prevention, and consolidated IT interfaces, and streamlined vendor relations and billing, all of which, to the extent they are valid, are excellent selling points.

If I were them, I’d encourage customers to see the benefit of using ACOG, specifically using my dominant position to reward payers who bought all my services, and dis-incent payers thinking about using my competitors.  But that’s just me…

This isn’t bad or good, it is the nature of business.  And this approach worked very, very well a few years back – primarily because only one major customer - Broadspire – was ready and able to tell Coventry “no thanks” when informed about the price increase.

The rest, well, they had no other plan.

What does this mean for you?

You may want to think about a Plan B.  Just in case. 

 

The Apax-Coventry deal – implications aplenty

While it may be a bit premature, I’d suggest it is never too soon to being thinking thru the potential implications of a deal of this magnitude.  

Let’s do a very quick review of market changes, then jump into some detail on the network issue – we will look at other aspects in future posts.

The workers compensation medical management market is going through a period of rapid consolidation across all segments.  There are now five large PBMs; three years ago there were eight (plus two much smaller ones).  Bill review application companies now number four (mcmc, Medata, Mitchell, Xerox); four years ago there were eight.  (this does not include CorVel, it does not sell access to its application) There are now two PT firms; last year there were three.  The sector that has changed the most is IMEs; EXAM is now the biggest player, with its competitors far behind in terms of revenue and market share.  Similar consolidation has occurred in DME/HHC, transportation/translation, and other segments, and this will continue.

The work comp PPO landscape looks markedly different.

Coventry is still the big kahuna, but the gap between CWCS and competitors has narrowed considerably.  The expansion of other PPOS has been a major reason; Procura, Magnacare, Anthem, Prime, Rockport, MultiPlan are all bigger and have more share than they did a few years ago.  Other Blues plans have expanded into the comp network business (or expanded their existing WC PPO).

Simultaneously, Coventry’s PPO has weakened.  It has been increasingly difficult to get meaningful discounts from health systems and facilities, long the biggest driver of Coventry’s success.  That’s due to the consolidation of the provider marketplace and a lack of emphasis on WC on the part of Aetna (and pre-Aetna) provider contract negotiators.

For workers comp payers, big PPOs are the big “savings” driver, yet the biggest of the PPOs is losing its ability to deliver “savings” while its competitors are getting more competitive.

Way back in the day, Coventry used its leverage with the Federal Mail Handlers’ Program along with PPO HMO and Medicaid lives to negotiate discounts with providers – discount arrangements that included workers comp.  Recall total work comp spend is just about 1 percent of total US medical spend; governmental programs (Medicare and Medicaid) alone  are over a third of US health care costs.

While sources indicate Aetna has committed (not sure that is the right word, and may be too strong) to support the PPO re-contracting process for two years, this is one of those times where actions speak louder than words.  As noted yesterday, Aetna just inked a network deal with a relatively small health system in northern California which does NOT include work comp – but does cover medicaid, medicare, group, individual, and other health insurance.

More significantly, Geisinger and Aetna signed a major agreement earlier this summer that also excluded workers comp. Geisinger is the dominant health system in central PA; a very-well-regarded operation with a great reputation and outstanding quality (disclosure, I did a brief consulting stint there some years ago).

And this means…what?

By far the biggest contributor to CWCS’ value is the PPO.  It generates (or perhaps more accurately generated) at least $200 million in cash flow and provided Coventry with the leverage to get payers to use its PBM, case management, bill review and other services.  Clearly, that cash flow is, if not already significantly reduced, at some considerable risk.

That factor alone is why ALL the financial buyers I spoke with (several of the largest private equity (PE) firms) did not pursue the deal - they were very concerned about the long-term viability of Coventry’s PPO.  While the historical numbers looked good, none were convinced the PPO would continue to deliver those results going forward.

Without the market leverage and total commitment of Aetna, it is difficult to see how Coventry can maintain its lead over other work comp PPOs; its negotiating leverage with providers will be based on work comp, and work comp only.

APAX will pay something like $1.5 billion for Coventry’s work comp division.  I’m very sure it will have a very good communications plan, a well-developed strategy, and some talented and experienced people focused on this.  That’s all well and good, but – as other WC PPOs know very well – without the market leverage of a major national health plan, the real negotiating power will be on the other side of the table.

Aetna’s sale of Coventry – the deal is done

While it may not be closed, the deal is done.

Multiple sources indicated APAX is scheduled to close the purchase of Coventry Workers’ Comp a month from now.  The long-rumored sale will close October 1 – if everything goes according to plan.

Here are the details – at least as they’ve been relayed to me.

  • The sale includes all of Coventry’s work comp services division – PPO, bill review, Pharmacy Benefit Management, DME, IME, UR, case management, peer review, and the rest.
  • Aetna has “committed” to supporting the network for two years – don’t know what this means, how it will be measured, or what the guarantees are.
  • APAX is the purchaser.

A few related items worthy of consideration.

  • Coventry’s been working on an RFP for a new bill review system/strategic partner for some time.  No word on whether this will go forward or be mothballed, and I wouldn’t expect to hear anything until October.
  • Aetna recently announced they signed a 3 1/2 year contract with northern California’s Washington Hospital Healthcare System. The contract does NOT include workers’ comp – but does include every other payer type.
  • When the deal is done, APAX will own: the largest work comp PPO, imaging network, PT vendor, DME/Home health network, and case management provider; one of the largest PBMs; a major (but faltering) bill review operation; and a whole raft of ancillary businesses.

The implications of this transaction are rather dramatic. It puts control of many payers’ medical spend squarely in the hands of a private equity firm. (more on this here).

The news also refutes my (strongly-held) view that Aetna wouldn’t sell the business because it a) throws off so much free cash flow and b) can’t.  The latter is based on the premise that the network contracts will rapidly fall apart without Aetna’s combined medical spend as bargaining leverage.

Regarding the latter, we shall see.

What does this mean for you?

Opportunity for bill review firms and niche medical management providers.

A return to the days when Coventry owned the market.

 

 

 

Work comp claim reporting – why no data?

There’s very little publicly-accessible data about who reports work comp claims, via what channel.  We just finished up a brief project for a client interested in comparing their data to national benchmarks, and we found precious little data on the topic. It may be out there, but it sure is hard to find…

We know the sooner claims are reported the better; there’s some good research out there altho arguably the best – the Hartford study – is dated.  There is more info about the impact of delays in reporting on ultimate claim costs, which is certainly critical, but that’s “outcome” information.  What we don’t know is the “process” information – which helps payers understand where they stand and what they can and need to do to improve.

Payers need to know when and who and via what channel claims are reported, by type of payers, states, industries, employer sizes, class codes – if they want to set goals, figure out where to put their efforts, who to target.

In general, we learned that the vast majority of claims are reported by employers via phone.  Whilst many payers have web- or email-based reporting capabilities, these are rarely used.  Some have developed smartphone-based reporting, but with a couple exceptions (very large self-insured employers) very few claims come in via this channel.

What does this mean for you?

Should we do a Survey of Work Comp Claim Reporting?  I’m thinking this may be worthy of study; perhaps HSA should develop and conduct a quick study to gather some baseline intel on the current state of the industry.

If this makes sense to you, please say so in the comment section.

Thanks!