Feb
20

Sebelius – front runner for HHS Secretary…or not?

One of the great things about blogs is I can always point back to previous posts where my predictions came true – thereby confirming my prescience.
One of the lousy things is you can point back to where I was wrong, thereby confirming my inability to be accurate all the time, or, as some prefer to label it, my cluelessness.
Today may be one of those days. The NYTimes’ Peter Baker reporteded that yesterday that Kansas Gov. Kathleen Sebelius will be appointed HHS Secretary, perhaps as early as next week.
That prediction was refuted today by the anonymous White House source
I don’t think Sebelius will be the HHS pick, as she is the front runner for a Kansas Senate seat and, if elected, would help cement Democratiic control over the upper body. Here’s what I said; “Although Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius (D) has been mentioned as a top candidate, the NYO thinks not. The reason? She is so popular in her home state that she could well run for the Senate, thereby a) possibly giving the Dems a cloture-proof majority, and b) help expand the Dems further into the ‘Heartland’, thereby forcing the GOP to play defense on formerly-unassailable terrain. Sebelius leads both potential Republican candidates by double-digit margins.”
Here’s what well-informed MCM commenter Rick had to say about my prediction – and hats off to him, he knows of what he spoke.
“While it’s true that making the GOP fight for a seat in a very red state would be immensely useful, and Sebelius’ politics are in the right place, we have to look at her skill set as it applies to either HHS or a Senate seat.
Senators are negotiators. Sebelius’ relevant experience has been as an executive. In spite of her enormous talents, she would face a learning curve in the clubby Senate as a junior Senator from a red state.
But before she was governor, she was a state insurance commissioner. And not just any insurance commissioner. She was the one who stood down Anthem when it tried to convert BC/BS of Kansas to a for-profit so it could be absorbed into Anthem (and later WellPoint). Fought it all the way to state supreme court, sent Anthem home empty handed, and extracted millions in seed money for a state healthcare foundation from BCBS of KS. It was an act of enormous courage and foresight, for which she was awarded the governorship by an appreciative electorate.
Maybe I’m seeing what I want to see, but I see Sebelius as someone who understands the role of nonprofits in healthcare, and who sees too much power in the hands of for-profit, publicly traded firms as a net negative. That’s the person I want in charge of HHS, shepherding healthcare reform for the next few years. To make her a just another low-seniority Senator in a Democratic caucus that already has some fine healthcare luminaries (Wyden, Baucus, Kennedy, etc.) would be a waste.”
I believe Sebelius would a great choice. She’s knowledgeable, respected, experienced, and about as bi-partisan as it gets. As the Democratic Governor of a deeply red state, Sebelius knows how to work with Republicans, and is respected by most from that party.
The conservative think tanks are already sharpening their long knives; expect their strategy to begin with hysterical claims about her ‘radical abortion record’ and continue with attempts to discredit her work in Kansas.
Too bad these folks weren’t equally critical of the past administration’s Part D/Medicare Advantage giveaway to big pharma/big health plans.


Feb
19

Why comp hospital expenses are rising so fast

NCCI’s newly released report on fee schedules provides interesting reading. If you don’t have the time right now, here’s the key quote:
“For comparable injuries, when WC pays higher prices than GH for specific services, those services tend to be used more often in WC than in GH. [emphasis added]”
No kidding.
Before you dismiss this as common knowledge, remember that (in most states) work comp hospital reimbursement is much higher than for group health. That’s why hospital costs are the fastest growing sector of comp medical expense.
Here’s another quote: “Reimbursement for care that physicians provide at hospitals and other facilities is more likely to exceed the fee schedule than care provided in their offices.”
So, physician reimbursement is usually higher in facilities, and the facility’s costs are typically higher as well.
Yet regulators in Florida are adopting fee schedules that continue, if not worsen, this situation by dramatically increasing reimbursement for outpatient services. The reimbursement scheme will pay hospitals 74% more than Medicare for surgeries and four times Medicare for other outpatient services. And the comp system in South Carolina is deteriorating daily, due in large part to overpayment of hospitals. The state adopted a Medicare+40% hospital fee schedule on 10/01/06. Now, per NCCI, there is a 23.7% WC rate increase filed and pending.
Minnesota is considering similarly suicidal behavior, specifically a hospital inpatient payment standard that would pay smaller Minnesota hospitals about 90% of their billed charges; larger hospitals would get about 85% of their billed charges on higher-dollar inpatient bills.
What does this mean for you?
Clients are reporting hospital expenses are rising faster that at any time in recent memory. Don’t look for any help from the regulators.
Tip of the hat to workcompcentral.com for the NCCI report info.


Feb
18

Sorry to harsh your health care reform mellow

As much as I and others would like reform to happen fast and smoothly, with broad consensus, it is not going to happen. I’ve been taken to task by folks of all political persuasions for my negativity – guilty as charged.
It now looks like the coalitions are beginning to break apart. As Maggie Mahar reports, Divided We Fail is fraying at the edges. And Bob Laszewski has also been talking this up for several months.
Sorry folks – reality bites.


Feb
17

FDA’s limits on prescribing of narcotics

Last week’s announcement that the FDA is considering requiring physicians’ to obtain additional training in order to prescribe certain Schedule II narcotics is welcome news – for payers and patients. Physicians aren’t so welcoming.
The list of drugs includes several varieties of morphine (e.g. Avinza, MS Contin), fentanyl (including Duragesic patches), methadone, and that old favorite, OxyContin. As a group, the listed drugs accounted for 21 million prescriptions written for 3.7 million patients in 2007.
The rationale behind the FDA’s move is concern over the adverse consequences suffered by many patients on the medications – consequences the FDA – and others – believe could be reduced by more thorough training of prescribing physicians. The FDA’s move came as a result of a law passed in 2007 enabling the agency to selectively address certain medication issues utilizing ‘Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies’. In the past, the FDA’s powers were sort of all-or-nothing; they could either require warnings or pull a drug off the market.
According to the NYTimes, the head of the FDA’s initiative, Dr. John K. Jenkins, said:
“What we’re talking about is putting in place a program to try to ensure that physicians prescribing these products are properly trained in their safe use, and that only those physicians are prescribing those products…”
This is good news for many payers, who have expressed concern over physicians’ apparent willingness to prescribe very powerful drugs for conditions that didn’t appear to merit them. Workers comp payers have long held that prescribing patterns are a major driver of extended disability as well as high costs. I’d cite the use of OxyContin as a major issue for comp payers. Purdue Pharmaceuticals, OxyContin’s manufacturer, has been hammered by the FDA and others for its egregious, and illegal, marketing activities. While Purdue was fined $600 million, reports indicate the manufacturer’s OxyContin revenues totaled almost $3 billion during the time it was illegally marketing the drug.
What does this mean for you?
Unfortunately, it looks like in some instances, crime does pay. The good news is the FDA’s new initiative will likely help reduce not only costs, but more importantly adverse outcomes.


Feb
16

For we policy types, one of the most important provisions in the stimulus bill, aka the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, addressed comparative effectiveness research.
Alas, the $1.1 billion+ invested in transforming medicine from art to science has been fed through the sausage grinder, and what has come out doesn’t look terribly appetizing. But after you chew on it for a while, it does taste better than it looks.
Merrill Goozner sees the end result as a partial victory noting “The House conferees also insisted on keeping the phrase “comparative effectiveness” throughout the authorizing language, removing the Senate’s insertion of the word “clinical.” However, the report language did note its removal was “without prejudice.”
But he also cites this language from the conference report itself:
The conferees do not intend for the comparative effectiveness research funding included in the conference agreement to be used to mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer [emphasis added]. The funding in the conference agreement shall be used to conduct or support research to evaluate and compare the clinical outcomes, effectiveness, risk, and benefits of two or more medical treatments and services that address a particular medical condition.
A quick read is disheartening as the language seems to make the whole thing rather irrelevant. But parsing the words makes it less concerning. Note the use of the words “do not intend…to mandate coverage, reimbursement or other policies…” The key here is”mandate”, the meaning and intent of which is likely to gladden the hearts of many an attorney.
The definition of the term is “An official or authoritative command; an order or injunction; a commission; a judicial precept.” But there’s a good bit of flexibility left here. It may well be that creative bureaucrats (that term is not used pejoratively) will be able to use the results to encourage certain types of treatment while discouraging others; to require physicians requesting approval for procedures lacking justification provide support for their request to use those procedures, while approving procedures immediately that comply with research recommendations.
The findings of research conducted by the three agencies that will disburse the funding (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the National Institutes of Health) may be used by payers as part of the criteria set used to select providers that use certain treatment methods and de-select those docs that don’t.
As I noted, the use of the term mandate will undoubtedly drive up litigation and associated expense. Although the legislative process is far from perfect, at least we’re heading in the right general direction. As the Gooz said;
“Based on the experience of the past few weeks, it’s clear the U.S. is still many years away from having a rational discussion about limiting access to technologies that have been priced far beyond a societally-agreed upon benchmark for what constitutes affordable care.”
Why would we ever want government to ensure that it spends taxpayer dollars wisely?


Feb
13

The stimulus bill and workers comp

With the passage of the stimulus bill, it’s timeti consider the implications fir workers comp. I’ll get to the details next week, but there are a few broad statements we can make today.
First, the unemployment rate will not drop much more. Comp insurers, Occ Med clinics, managed care firms and TPAs started feeling the effect of a rapid drop in frequency last summer, a drop that would have accelerated throughout this year. For carriers, the decline was good news/bad news, as fewer claims meant lower claims expense, while fewer employees produced lower premiums.
The funding for COBRA and Medicaid will help keep folks insured, thereby decreasing cost shifting (below what it would have been without the bill). This is very good news indeed; although it is impossible to calculate what cost shifting would have done to comp, it would undoubtedly have driven medical costs up significantly.
Over the long term the effectiveness research funding will be a big help to payers and providers. Solid guidelines for back injuries will be most welcome.
There’s much more to come.


Feb
12

Is Corvel a TPA or a managed care company?

Both. At least that’s how company execs want to ‘brand’ Corvel – but it isn’t what their TPA customers want to hear.
Me? I’m not so sure.
Here’s how Corvel described itself in a recent SEC filing:
“CorVel Corporation is an independent nationwide provider of medical cost containment and managed care services designed to address the escalating medical costs of workers’ compensation and auto policies.”
Interestingly, the company’s website does not describe itself as a TPA, and combines its TPA business with case management in case management. While this hasn’t changed since this time last year, it does muddy the waters – is Corvel a TPA with managed care services, or a managed care company that does a bit of claims adjusting?
In last week’s earnings call, CEO Dan Starck said “We also continued with our Enterprise Comp expansion; our strategic initiative of bringing a new approach to claims management and our overall transition to becoming a full service provider to the workers’ compensation market…The addition of our claims administration product expands our service offering in this area and continues to open new opportunities.”
Starck went on to say a lot about Enterprise Comp:
“Moving forward in 2009, we will continue to focus on our four key initiatives and their role in transitioning the organization to a full service provider. The first initiative is the continued expansion of Enterprise Comp. Despite the continued decline in the overall volume of claims; we believe that this initiative is on point. In fact in this market environment, we believe that this initiative continues to grow their importance.
Traditionally, through our managed care services, CorVel has only had access to a small number of employer customer opportunities. The employers that purchased their TPA services and managed care services separately. This group of employers is the minority in the workers comp market.
Enterprise Comp provides the ability for CorVel to meet the needs of the larger segment of the employer market, the employers that buy their services in a bundled format. By owning all of the major components of the workers’ compensation continue, claims administration, managed care and the software applications needed to integrate and execute the different business lines. We feel we are in a strong position to bring the truly differentiated product to the market.
Over the course of the past few quarters, our field operations have been busy with the all of the integration activities that must take place after acquisitions have been completed. At the same time, our IT team has been busy developing our claims management software application into one that begins to realize the vision of Enterprise Comp in the future.
Much of the December quarter involved laying the foundation of the software into our production systems and the beginnings of field implementation. Although I discussed the Enterprise Comp imitative [sic] at times it’s just getting started, our claims administrations today as a company are strong.
We currently administer workers’ compensation claims in 45 states, and have the ability to deliver service in all 50 today. We expect to see improving growth in this product line as our software and system’s integration process continues and our sales force gain the momentum.”
Whew. That’s a lot to digest – but the net is the two guys who run the place obviously believe Enterprise Comp is a big part of their future.
After reading all that, I contacted Corvel. Here’s what they had to say about the TPA business, their strategy related to that business, and where they’re headed.
“…selling services to employers is where we’ve moved some emphasis. We didn’t really choose this path so much as the managed care market matured. Beginning in the mid-’90’s the TPA’s began to see that they could control the managed care business if they first won the claims administration business. So, they priced the claims work down to control accounts and then began to participate economically in the managed care subcontracting that had previously just been purchased from independents such as CorVel or Intracorp or the many others…CorVel continues to expand in our Enterprise Comp initiative and to gradually reduce our older more commoditized services. I believe we have a unique new technology for claims management and that we’ll see a breakthrough in that area over the next two years similar to the big changes we enjoyed in what we call Network Solutions.”
From a financial perspective, Corvel looks like a managed care company with a small presence in the work comp/P&C TPA business. Corvel paid about $15 million apiece for two TPAs (Schaffer, Baltimore MD and Hazelrigg, SoCal). Corvel’s TPAs account for 8.6% of annual revenues. The company reported both TPAs produced $24 million in revenues; annualizing that number to account for the partial year for Schaffer gives an annual TPA revenue of just under $26 million. It is highly doubtful their revenues have been increasing; TPAs have been under tremendous price pressure over the last two years. It could be the TPAs are driving more network, bill review, and case management revenues to the parent company, but the revenue picture doesn’t support that view. Corvel paid about 1.2x revenues for the two TPAs, a reasonable number – although the deals were done during a soft market when valuations are typically lower than normal.
As a side note, the TPA acquisitions aren’t mentioned in the company’s history.
Financially, Corvel has been hampered by the decline in claims frequency; revenues were essentially flat last quarter from the previous year’s quarter at around $77 million. This was noticeably better than the profit picture as EPS dropped from $0.43 to $0.34. The news was better for the last three quarters, with revenues increasing a few points from the same period in 2007 ($225 million to $233 million). However, gross margins declined over that time from 25.5% to 24.2% primarily due to a 9.5% increase in G&A costs.
The company’s stock is also pretty low these days – not that stock value is related to actual value today, as pretty much anything that doesn’t have ‘beer’ in its name has been hammered recently.
Which leads back to the original question – what is Corvel? From here it looks like the TPA strategy hasn’t generated growth or profits to date – overall revenues are flat over the last few years and profits down, while the patient management segment (where TPA revenues are reported) declined from 44.4% of revenues in 2005 to 42.4% in 2008. The company is investing heavily in Enterprise Comp, and perhaps this investment will pay off in a couple years. With that noted, as I’ve said before, Corvel’s entry into the TPA business infuriated some customers – including a couple very big ones. It remains to be seen if their managed care business will stabilize, or at least shrink slowly enough to allow Corvel enough time to build their TPA capability and business.
What does this mean for you?
Be very careful not to antagonize current customers when you change strategies.
But be equally careful your customers don’t move your services inhouse.
thanks to SeekingAlpha for the transcript.


Feb
11

Why did Coventry’s medical loss ratio increase?

Because they allowed workers comp and national accounts to dictate provider contracting strategies, a decision that drove up the core group business’ medical loss ratio.
Here’s how.
The beginning of the tough times for Coventry came last spring. Up till then, things had been moving along quite nicely – just a year ago, I noted “For Coventry, 2007 was an excellent year. Total revenue (including group and medicare) came in just short of the $10 billion mark, the commercial group medical loss ratio (MLR) was a stellar 77.3%, and there was modest membership growth in group, Part D and the individual health lines.”
Just before the wheels came off, I said “this is a company that, justifiably, prides itself on its ability to predict and price for medical trend. It is not expert in nor does it even emphasize medical management, chronic care management, outcomes assessment, provider profiling, or any other form of ‘managed care’. Coventry is expert at managing the balance between pricing and reimbursement.”
Well, I was half right – and half wrong. Coventry may be expert in managing pricing but it is now obvious that it doesn’t understand reimbursement.
Now that new CEO Allen Wise is on the job, Coventry’s staff is conducting a top to bottom review to determine, in part, what drove medical costs up so high without anyone noticing/understanding/fixing it early on. Here’s how Wise characterized what happened in the earnings call earlier this week, as provided by the good folks at SeekingAlpha in the transcript.
“When I was conducting a review of the company, I was trying to determine the cause of the 300 or 350-basis point deterioration in the commercial medical loss ratio, and I think it is impossible for me to determine precisely what happened there. You heard a little bit about the flow and you heard a little bit about MSDRGs [new medicare hospital pricing methodology], and you heard a little bit about [hospital] unit costs, and I think it’s a probably a little bit of every thing, but there was not any question there was stress at the local health plan of a contractual nature by some of our other businesses, and by that I mean the network rental business, the Workers’ Comp business. I am not sure on the Medicare front, but when you interviewed people here and in the field, look at our litigation count on litigations for network-related issues, there was stress enough there, and enough of frequency to people recounting stops among major providers they started off with that until you solve X or Y problem, none of which were connected to the commercial health risk thing that your rates are going to go up or something.…[emphasis added] I think there was a bit of pressure on unit cost. I expected to find some deterioration in local patient management activities. I did not find that. The core competency of the company, while there is plenty of clutter with new activities and a feeling of a lot of things going on at one time, I did not find a loss of focus at the local health plan levels. Many of those medical directors have been with us for a decade, and I didn’t see much change there. If you take the unit cost level, I just think in meeting with our new guy Allen Karp and best practices in each of the plans and having more quantitative information on what really happens on a month to month basis out there, I think there’s just room for improvement there.”
Shawn M. Guertin, Coventry’s CFO, went on to say “…There is no doubt that the facility unit cost experience was worse than it had historically been and worse than we had expected in ’08…”
Coventry’s local provider relations folks were tasked with getting contracts with providers, contracts wherein providers would agree to discount their prices to patients affiliated with Coventry – either health plan members, employees of larger employers who used Coventry’s PPO contracts, workers comp claimants, and Medicare members. It appears the contracting effort was hampered by the need to include all these ‘products’ in provider contracts – especially for hospitals. As Wise said, during the contracting process, “[recruiting and contracting] people [were] recounting stops among major providers they started off with that until you [Coventry] solve X or Y problem, none of which were connected to the commercial health risk thing that your rates are going to go up or something…”
Coventry has determined that their group health MLR was higher than it should have been because their hospital costs were too high. This was driven by their hospital contracts – and the contracted rates were too high because Coventry wanted their payers to accept all products. When hospitals dug in their heels, Coventry’s staff gave away some discount for the group health rates in return for discounts for workers comp and PPO claimants.
Remember group health is the big business at Coventry – work comp accounts for less than 7% of the company’s total revenues. I get the sense that Wise is wondering why the needs of the workers comp and PPO businesses were allowed to take precedence over his core business – and increase the group business’ MLR.
Good question.


Feb
10

Coventry’s earnings call – facility costs are the problem

The Allen Wise II era has begun with today’s release of Coventry Health’s fourth quarter 2008 earnings. Wise, who occupied the CEO/Chairman’s office before the recently-departed Dale Wolf, resumed the position ten days ago after Wolf resigned.
Here’s my key takeaway. Wise has figured out that Coventry’s non-group lines of business – work comp and Medicare – were in part responsible for higher medical loss ratios for their group business. Recall that Coventry’s medical loss ratio (MLR) sent up more than 300 basis points last spring, sending shock waves through the company.
It appears that Coventry’s local network negotiators/provider relations staff had to consider medicare and WC when negotiating contracts with providers (especially facilities), and the larger providers said that if Coventry wanted deals on those lines, then their unit prices were going to increase. This led to higher MLRs on their core group business. For Coventry, higher costs are being driven by facility expense.
More to follow as I digest the call and comments.
Here are a couple highlights.
Medicare Advantage membership increased 34% in 2008. I suppose that’s good news, although the pending termination of the MA premium subsidy isn’t going to help the profitability of that segment (expect a rapid cut in the Feds’ 13% average subsidy this year).
– Commercial group membership declined each quarter in 2008, leading to a decline of ust under 100,000 members for the full year. This isn’t necessarily bad news, as the company raised prices a lot after last summer’s surprise disclosure that the Medical Loss Ratio unexpectedly jumped.
– The workers comp business is muddling along, with no evidence of growth. It’s not possible to tease out the precise WC numbers as they are combined with other businesses in the Specialty Services Revenue line item – but that line was essentially flat quarter over quarter throughout 2008. And although it grew nicely (if my guess-timations are accurate), in the past, it looks like that growth leveled off during the last three quarters of 2008. For more on Coventry’s WC top line growth strategy, click here.
Finally, what does the future hold? As I noted a year and a half ago, the company has “a tight focus on managing the medical loss ratio (MLR), although that ‘management’ appears to emphasize financial rather than medical management – the MLR strategy is driven much more by increasing premiums ahead of medical inflation than by actually ‘managing’ medical care and costs.
This will serve the company well over the near term, but the ‘MLR management approach’ has to change over the longer term.

What does this mean?
A change in management personnel may not mean any change in how the company operates. Simply put, Coventry has to change its business model from one that is financially driven (raise prices) to one that emphasizes medical management (actually add value). This is CEO Wise’s second stint in the job; we’ll see if he changes course.
Note – there’s a lot to interpret, these are initial takeaways so more to follow