Jan
27

Why is Minnesota increasing work comp hospital costs?

South Carolina* is a great example of what happens when hospitals are financially incentivized to treat workers comp claimants. Costs go up dramatically, and – surprise! premiums quickly follow.
That hasn’t stopped Florida from merrily marching off the cliff.
But suicidal behavior isn’t limited to those who listen only to southern rock. No, even folks in the frozen north can succumb. The latest victims are in Minnesota, where hospitals and insurance companies are haggling over a hospital inpatient payment standard that would pay smaller Minnesota hospitals about 90% of their billed charges; larger hospitals would get about 85% of their billed charges on higher-dollar inpatient bills.
Are they nuts? Has the cold frozen their brains solid? Too much time in the ice-fishing shack?
Whatever the reason, the result will be the same. Hospitals, which have been absolutely hammered by the recession and accompanying decline in reimbursement, drop in elective surgeries, and increase in the uninsured, are going to be relying on comp to offset their losses and shortfalls, and with fees based on a reduction below billed charges, what’s to stop hospitals from just raising their billings as high as they want?
(the real answer is there are some very tenuous and weak controls, but they will have little effect – hospitals are pretty much free to bill what they wish)
And that’s not all: Minnesota hospitals’ billed charges are rising far faster than hospitals’ costs. Ignored is the fact that, as WCRI’s analyses have shown, it is those states (such as Maryland, Massachusetts & Connecticut) that have made WC a reasonable but not generous payer for hospitals where the WC system is most cost-effective for employers.
And injured workers have better outcomes, too.
*South Carolina put in a Medicare+40% hospital fee schedule on 10/01/06. Now, per NCCI, there is a 23.7% WC rate increase filed and pending.
What does this mean for you?
Higher hospital costs in Minnesota. A lot higher.


Jan
15

The Ingenix settlement – you wanted details…

The phone and email has been buzzing today. So has the blog-o-sphere, at least among those bloggers who follow this. Both of us.
Today’s follow up announcement by Ingenix’ parent UHC revealed the giant health plan will pay $350 million to settle a class action lawsuit directly related to the use of the Ingenix UCR database. This brings the total (to date) cost for legal settlements to $400 million after yesterday’s NY settlement. Here’s the key language from UHC’s statement today.
“UnitedHealth Group (NYSE: UNH) announced today that it has reached an agreement to settle class action litigation related to reimbursement for out-of-network medical services. The agreement resolves class action litigation filed on behalf of the American Medical Association (AMA), health plan members, health care providers and state medical societies.
Under the terms of the proposed nationwide settlement, UnitedHealth Group and its affiliated entities will be released from claims relating to its out-of-network reimbursement policies from March 15, 1994, through the date of final court approval of the settlement. UnitedHealth Group will pay a total of $350 million to fund the settlement for health plan members and out-of-network providers in connection with out-of-network procedures performed since 1994. The agreement contains no admission of wrongdoing.”
The real problems with the Ingenix UCR database weren’t the subject of much discussion in the settlement documents or the various analyses of the settlement. But underlying the case are some significant problems with the database, how it is put together, and its uses. These issues were highlighted in the Davekos case in Massachusetts, and are discussed in the court record. Among the problems are:
– the accuracy and consistency of the underlying data is questionable. Ingenix cannot assure that the entities (health plans and claims administrators and insurance companies) that supply the data that Ingenix uses to determine what usual customary and reasonable charges are in specific areas are all using the same criteria, are coding consistently and accurately, and are aggregating the data in the same way.
– Ingenix may not always have enough charge data to provide a statistically valid sample for every CPT code. In that case, it appears that Ingenix may aggregate data from similar codes to produce a large enough sample. The potential issue with this work-around is obvious. In some instances, Ingenix actually called medical providers in specific areas where it did not have enough data to ask what they would charge for specific procedures. Thus they were combining telephonic survey data with actual charge data in their UCR databases, a commingling of very different data from very different sources with varying reliability.
– Ingenix itself defines the sociodemographic region boundary lines that are used to determine which charges are relevant for which geographic areas. In the Davekos case, the court appeared to be concerned when Ingenix could not give a defensible rationale for the logic or process they used to determine the boundaries for charge areas.
– Ingenix scrubs the data to extract charges that they decide are outliers for reasons that appear to be subjective. It also appears Ingenix removes high end values but not low end outliers. If this is the case, it would likely skew the charge data towards the lower end.
Those are some of the details behind the Ingenix UCR settlements. As to what will happen next, Bob Laszewski’s perspective provides insights as only he can.
What does this mean for you?
If you are using the Ingenix UCR database, you may want to look for other options.


Jan
14

So, what does the UHC Ingenix settlement mean?

Likely quite a bit. But not for a while.
Here’s the quick and dirty. NY Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has been after UHC sub Ingenix for over a year, accusing them and other insurers of defrauding consumers by manipulating reimbursement rates. Yesterday the first round came to a conclusion with the announcement of a settlement. According to the NY Times, Cuomo “ordered an overhaul of the databases the industry uses to determine how much of a medical bill is paid when a patient uses an out-of-network doctor”.
Ingenix will pay $50 million to help fund development of an independent charge database by a not for profit; until the new vendor is selected Ingenix will continue to provide the UCR data through its MDR and PHCS products. Cuomo is still pursuing negotiations with other payers including Aetna.
Cuomo voiced concern that UHC, a very large payer, owned the company that determined how much it should pay in some circumstances to some providers (out of network physicians primarily) and therefore an inherent conflict of interest existed.
Some background is in order. Years ago, the health insurance industry’s lobbying and service arm (HIAA) aggregated and compiled physician charge data as a service to its members. HIAA collected the data and fed it back to members, who then used the data to determine how much they should pay providers in specific areas for specific services (services defined by CPT codes). HIAA was taken over/disappeared about a decade ago, and Ingenix took over the aggregation and distribution of the data, which has become known as “UCR” for “Usual, Customary, and Reasonable”.
For about ten years, all was fine, at least as far as most insurers were concerned. Sure, physicians complained at times and consumers railed about the low reimbursement paid by companies citing their UCR, but the complaints didn’t really make any difference until Cuomo got involved. The problem arose when a few folks in New York complained about the amount they still owed providers after their insurers had paid their portion – according to Ingenix’ UCR. After a lengthy investigation, Cuomo found reason to charge UHC and other insurers, and that action resulted in yesterday’s announcement.
It is too early to tell how this will affect insurers, but there’s no doubt it will. Here are a couple things to consider.
= providers that are paid by UCR will find it much easier to challenge the reimbursement, and payers will likely be plenty nervous if all they have to stand behind is a largely-discredited Ingenix database. Expect higher payments to providers and claimants.
– attorneys in other states may see this as a big opportunity for class action on behalf of physicians and claimants.
– payers will redouble their efforts to negotiate reimbursement prospectively with out of network providers.
– policy language is going to change, and change fast. Look for significant changes in the SPD (summary plan description) and other plan documents more clearly describing the payer’s liability for non-network provider charges. There may even be some movement back to scheduled payments.
– in the work comp world, there’s going to be turmoil and drama in states that do not have physician fee schedules (e.g. NJ, MO). Expect employers and insurers to work much harder to get claimants to network providers, where the UCR issue is much less significant.
There’s some precedence here for the property casualty industry. Last year in a suit in Massachusetts, a court found that Ingenix could not prove that the underlying data was accurate, that it was a fair representation of provider charges in an area, or that the results were anything more than “dollar amounts resulting from the statistical extrapolations from whatever bills were actually included in its database.”

What does this mean for you?
More power to the providers, higher cost for payers, and more business for attorneys.


Jan
8

Who benefits from universal coverage?

As Bob Laszewski trenchantly notes, covering everyone will not reduce costs in and of itself – at least not on a system-wide basis. Absent major changes in reimbursement and demand management, covering more people will just increase total costs.
That said, universal coverage should significantly decrease costs for private payers and their members, as well as the employers who fund most group coverage. Most significantly, a substantial portion (about eight percent, or over $1000 per family) of health insurance premiums go to cover the cost of uncompensated care. Note that this includes costs for both the uninsured and underfunded care; Medicaid is the most often cited example of inadequate compensation.
Covering everyone would not eliminate the inadequate compensation and resulting cost-shifting, but it certainly would reduce providers’ need to recoup lost revenue from treating the uninsured.
Among the beneficiaries of universal coverage, workers comp payers might see the most benefit. Not only is comp a very soft target for cost-shifting, it is also likely claimants without other health insurance receive treatment for their non-occupational conditions in the course of treatment. This is not due to laziness or incompetence or fraud, but rather because the insurer understands that the injured worker cannot return to work unless the injury and any complicating medical conditions are resolved.
What does this mean for you?
The pluses of universal coverage are not often obvious.


Jan
7

Bill review companies – will they be the solution?

Think about what bill review and generalist network and specialty bill review and negotiation firms do. All have the same value proposition – discounted medical bills. (most networks don’t deliver value in the form of better docs or outcomes, their business model is reduce cost by slashing bills retrospectively.)
All are in the cost reduction business although each take a different approach. A useful analogy is transportation; trains, trucks and ships all transport goods; each has its strengths and weaknesses, and at different times one model is more successful than the others. Right now, trucks transport most goods, even though they cost more because they can deliver convenience by moving goods to the precise location on time. This model has gained in large part due to low fuel costs, heavy investment in roads, and customers’ adoption of just-in-time inventory management. As the economics of transportation evolve, we may see a resurgence of rail and/or shipping; the cost per ton/mile for rail and shipping is significantly lower than trucking.
For several years bill review has been a commodity. Despite vendors’ best efforts to differentiate, most buyers place great emphasis on price. As a result, bill review vendors have worked hard to squeeze out cost through automation, auto-adjudication, streamlining and offshoring. None of these technologies are ‘bad’, rather the rationale behind employing them may well be misguided.
In an effort to compete bill review vendors have lost sight of their reason for existence – to ensure their customers pay only what they legally are required to. Instead they compete on the basis of how cheaply they can write checks out of their customers’ checkbooks.
This is not entirely the bill review vendors’ fault. Their customers bear much of the responsibility for the situation, playing vendors off against each other in an effort to reduce the payer’s admin expense. And the payers have succeeded. That success has come at a cost which some payers are only recently beginning to grasp. Here are a few examples.
For some procedures, the amount reimbursed is dependent on modifier codes. At least one large payer has instructed its bill review staff to ignore the modifiers as their entry slows down the bill review process.
A vendor known for its very competitive pricing often charges extra for ‘nurse review’ of items that are commonly audited and repriced within the bill review process. This allows the vendor to recoup the margin it gives away with its low per-bill pricing.
Another large payer’s bill review process actually requires claims personnel to authorize payment of each and every bill, no matter how routine, no matter how many times that provider has been paid for the same procedure in the past. This step has been put in place because the bill review process can’t be trusted; instead of fixing the process the company uses its expensive staff to do something the system should.
Payers want national solutions yet don’t want to take the time to understand some of the state-specific intricacies that can dramatically influence costs. For example, hospital reimbursement in PA is based on each hospital’s chargemaster, requiring repricers to have access to current data. In CT, payers are required to reimburse hospitals at cost, yet very few payer or bill review vendors have invested the energy required to determine each hospital’s costs.
Sure, payers have been able to cut their bill review costs, but the price they are paying is, in many instances, much higher than the reduction in administrative expense.
More and more, payers have come to rely on their networks for cost reduction; bill review is a necessary part of the bill flow and a way to get bills repriced to network rates, and a source of data for state reporting. In large part this reflects the change in pricing methodologies for bill review from a percentage of ‘savings’ below billed charges to a flat fee per bill or per line. In the transition, the purpose of bill review has been lost.
As payers look for better solutions to address rising medical costs, they should go back to the basics. There’s nothing more basic than making darn sure you are only paying what you are legally and contractually obligated to. Simple, yet this will require significant investment on the part of vendors, investment that will have to be recouped from their payer customers.
What does this mean for you?
Bill review vendors should not be competing on the basis of price per line or bill. Payers should buy smarter, but won’t until and unless they realize what they’re buying; technology, people, and processes all focused on writing checks out of the payer’s checkbook. Only then will bill review vendors be able to do their job effectively.
Note: my firm, Health Strategy Associates LLC will be surveying payers on bill review this spring. If you would like a copy of the public report send an email to infoAthealthstrategyassocDOTcom. Substitute symbols for AT and DOT.


Jan
5

Why big comp networks won’t do the smart thing

Because they are more interested in their profits than their customer’s needs.
The big comp network companies (with “big” referring to the size of the network, not the company, as there’s only one BIG NETWORK COMPANY – Coventry) have a problem.
They’ve been selling their network based on the “thump” the directory makes when it hits the managed care execs desk (“wow, now THAT’s a big network”) followed closely by the price (“And if you act now, I’ll get my boss to commit to a rate below 20% of savings!!”). While this has made them lots of money, it hasn’t saved their payer clients much, if anything, in the way of medical costs. Now, some payers are wiping the sleep from their eyes and noticing that those whopping network-access fees have gone up just about as fast as their medical costs.
And that ain’t no small thing.
Payers have been hearing for years about the small network solutions the big boys are just about ready to launch. They’ve been a few months away for about four years now; four years and counting. So, why so late? Why aren’t the big networks innovating? Coventry et al have been selling essentially the same network model the same way to the same markets for fifteen years. The market has moved on, with the early risers amongst the payer community looking for very small networks of physicians who can not only spell w-o-r-k-e-r-s c-o-m-p-e-n-s-a-t-i-o-n but pronounce it as well.
That’s no small challenge, as the payers’ network “partners” haven’t exactly made their business thrive by identifying the docs who treat less, write fewer PT scripts, don’t admit claimants for lengthy hospital stays or order multiple epidural steroid injections. In fact, those are the docs the big networks want to stay far, far away from. Because the more bills there are, the more “savings’ are generated, and the more network access fees are collected.
Ka-Ching!
Therein lies the core reason the big networks haven’t done the right thing – it won’t make them near as much money as their current high-cost, low-benefit big-directory network.
The technical term for the problem faced by these companies is the “Innovator’s Dilemma”. This more-than-a-theory holds that companies that are very successful in their fields keep improving their products, believing that what their customers want is more and better versions of the same. What these companies don’t do is think up new ways of meeting their customers’ needs; ways that are cheaper/faster/easier. Instead, they work diligently on making their existing product a tiny bit better every year. And in the process, they don’t pay attention to what their customers actually need – the problem they are trying to solve.
The leading proponent of the theory, as well as the one who coined the term, is Clayton Christensen. Christensen’s research shows it is often entirely rational for existing companies to ignore new and disruptive innovations, because those new innovations don’t compare well with existing technologies or products. Even if a disruptive innovation is recognized, existing businesses are often reluctant to take advantage of it, since it would involve competing with their existing (and more profitable) technological approach. (in this instance, several large Coventry clients have asked them repeatedly when they are going to develop a physician-centric model. As of late last year, Coventry had nothing to show, or talk about, or demo…)
Here’s an example from Christensen’s book, the Innovator’s Dilemma. Back in the early- and mid-nineteen hundreds, the only way to dig big holes efficiently was to use a cable-actuated shovel driven by coal (initially) and later diesel. The cable shovel manufacturers got really good at making larger and larger shovels that could move yards and yards of dirt. Meanwhile, other companies began developing hydraulically-driven shovels. At the start, these were small, puny affairs, barely able to move a third of a yard of dirt. Not surprisingly, the big cable shovel companies (e.g. Bucyrus Erie) laughed at the upstarts, knowing their customers were not interested in the toy version of their behemoth shovels. But lots of residential contractors and utilities could use the smaller shovels; their only alternative was hand-powered shovels. The new market entrants gradually improved their hydraulic shovels, until they could effectively move as much dirt as the biggest of the big boys. And do it more efficiently, with far fewer breakdowns, and much more safely.
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Of all the big steam shovel companies in the business mid-century, only a small handful survived the onslaught of hydraulics, and the survivors did so by adopting the new technology. They found that the smaller end of their market was gradually taken over by the “toy” manufacturers, which then moved relentlessly up-market, until the only market left for Bucyrus et al was the hundred-yard plus strip mining shovel. Most of Bycyrus’ competitors went out of business, including the Marion Power Shovel Company. Marion employed over 2500 workers at its peak, when it made the largest steam shovels in the world to build the Panama Canal. When it was finally sold off in 2003, Marion had fewer than 300 employees.
Back to our little world. The small, physician-only network doesn’t deliver big “savings” (in the form of discounts) and “penetration” (in the form of a really thick provider directory with most live and some dead docs listed therein) and therefore is not, in the view of the big network companies, something worth developing. Moreover, these big network companies believe the market for the small networks is quite small compared to the market for their established network offering. And they are right – today.
What the big network companies are missing is what their customers want to buy – not “savings” defined as discounts below fee schedule, but lower medical expenses. After a decade-and-a-half of more and more networks delivering higher and higher medical expenses, big payers need, and want, a different answer.
But the big network companies have an even bigger problem, one that did not affect the cable shovel manufacturers. At the height of their business, there were no fewer than twenty companies making shovels, all working as hard as humanly possible to develop better and better cable shovels. They were innovating, all right, but their innovations were designed to make their core product better at moving more and more dirt.
What’s different in the comp network business is the almost complete lack of competition. Coventry controls upwards of 60% of the generalist network business, with the rest spread thinly between CorVel, Wellpoint, Horizon, Prime, and a few others. By all accounts, Coventry is not even bothering to improve their current product offering. Instead, they are raising prices and ignoring customer complaints about data quality.
What does this mean for you?
It took the hydraulic shovel companies a good three decades to all but destroy the cable shovel business. I don’t expect Coventry’s work comp offering, nor those of its competitors, will have that long a horizon. Not by a long shot.


Jan
1

Predictions for Comp managed care in 2009

Much against my better judgment, here are my predictions – in no particular order – for the work comp managed care world in 2009.
1. Coventry will be acquired.
Currently trading just under $15 per share, Coventry Health looks to be an attractive target for another second-tier health plan company. They have solid operations in many secondary and tertiary markets, some decent business in Medicare and other governmental programs, and their work comp sub is wondrously profitable. Expect it to get bought some time this year – likely after the credit markets loosen enough for potential acquirers to feel a little more comfortable. As to what happens with Coventry’s comp business, more on that when the time comes.
2. Aetna’s work comp network business will slowly dissipate.
Now that the provider relations, sales, compliance, and other support services are not all reporting up to one leader, it is inevitable that the focus on work comp will diminish. For customers hoping for improvements in the quality of provider data, this isn’t good news; nor is it for payers looking for solid networks in key states.
3. Corvel’s transition to a TPA with managed care services will accelerate.
As the company’s TPA customers continue to depart, pressure will mount on Corvel to demonstrate the viability of the TPA strategy. For a company that has seen sales increase slightly more than 3% over the last three years and profits decline over the last four quarters, 2009 will be a key year. Either the company is able to make a go of it as a TPA, or investors will weary of the “its coming soon” meme and cash out. The timing is a little better, as the hardening market may make the TPA business more viable in 2009 than it has been the last two years. Then again, there’s lots of other TPAs that are going to be fighting for that business too.
4. Several of the larger payers will announce their own, small physician-centric network products.
Beyond frustrated, large payers have given up hope that the Coventrys will ever do anything meaningful in the small, EPO-type physician-based network product line. Several large payers have been working diligently to do things on their own or in partnership with vendors; expect these to hit the market in Florida and several other states by Q3 2009.
5. – Correction- Oregon will do a do-over.
The state’s misguided, ill-informed, and illogical stance on workers comp network reimbursement is going to blow up, big time. Many carriers are carefully considering their options, as Oregon’s new regs require comp payers to reimburse at fee schedule for those services subject to the FS. Non FS services are to be reimbursed at billed charges. When I asked when a top carrier’s managed care exec what they would do if a bill for a non-FS service came in at a billion dollars, he said, after a pregnant pause, “according to the State, we’d have to pay it.”
6. Innovation
Uh, wrong industry…there will be precious little in the way of innovation, unless you count a few “aggregators” trying to become the “pipe” for payers to connect with various managed care vendors.
7. Specialty managed care
There will be new entrants into the various specialty managed care areas, as private-equity funded companies seek to take advantage of the ground-breaking work done by the innovators. These follow-on firms will do fine for a couple years, after which their customers will figure things out.
8. Medical costs
Will continue to increase far faster than they should, driven by lousy managed care models poorly implemented by payers more concerned with “savings” than claims costs.
If that isn’t a safe prediction, I don’t know what is.


Dec
19

What work comp has done right

The workers comp world has certainly had its problems over 2008, and often these problems have overshadowed the successes, and victories both big and small that were achieved this year. Here without further preamble are a few of the more significant ‘wins’ for work comp in 2008.
1. Frequency declines continued this year, building on a fifteen-year downward trend that has cut the US comp injury rate in half. By any measure, that’s great news. I’d also note that somehow the rate keeps declining, despite various experts (myself included) opining that it has to stop somehow.
2. Pharmacy costs have leveled off, due in no small part to efforts on the part of payers to mine their data, identify trends, and put in place programs to attack over-utilization. Good work to all; your efforts led to the fifth straight year of a decrease in the rate of pharmacy inflation in comp.
3. Predictive modeling continues to progress, albeit in fits and starts. Mistakes are being made, false leads chased, and assumptions proven wrong, but that’s actually good news. This is a new, complex, and weird business tool that will require a lot of trial and error. Mistakes are necessary and vital as the industry learns.
4. More and more payers are actually building new networks and adopting new strategies, either on their own or with new market entrants. These strategies are based on smaller, highly select networks of work comp expert docs, the kind of physician who can drive better outcomes at lower costs. After too many years of relying on the promises of the big networks, these payers are taking matters into their own hands, driving innovation and progress. it may not be as fast or as extensive as some would like to see (me being one of the some), but progress it is.
5. Disclosure of financial relationships among and between managed care firms and TPAs has significantly expanded, with companies including Gallagher Bassett, SRS, and Broadspire leading the charge (in fairness these firms were doing this long before 2008).
6. Specialty managed care has exploded, with carve-out vendors doing an exemplary job managing costs and delivering results in physical medicine, DME/home health, facility bill review, and cat claims. The more they do, the better they get.
7. Regulators in several states are working hard to do the right thing. New York’s willingness to change the pharma fee schedule and increase in benefits, California’s pursuit of lower costs, better medical care, and better benefits, and Texas’ (somewhat clumsy) attempts to fix their system all have been welcome signs of progress. We aren’t there yet, and all have their warts, but the needle is pointing in the right direction.
8. Solvency – unlike other insurance lines, the core solvency of the work comp insurance industry has not been in doubt this year. While parent companies, other insurers, and blue-chip, white-shoe Wall Street firms were imploding on a weekly basis, we in the work comp world have chugged along, hitting a few bumps on the way, but nothing like the rest of the financial world.
We have a long way to go, but in many areas, we’re heading in the right direction.
Good work.


Dec
15

Why health reform will be so tough

From the world of workers comp comes a crystal clear picture of what’s wrong with America’s health care system, and how difficult it will be to get it right.
WorkCompCentral has a piece this morning about California’s proposal to not recommend topical analgesics – creams and ointment that are compounded at the pharmacy.
The pharmacy community doesn’t like the proposal, claiming “there’s [sic] prescriptions for these medications, patients have been getting relief, and we think that they should continue to be reimbursed for the medications that are being prescribed for them”.
Opponents of the proposed language also noted that it “conflicts with the DWC’s written policy stating that only “evidence-based, peer-reviewed research concerning the efficacy of a treatment can be the basis for recommending or not recommending a treatment.”
I’d suggest the opposite is the real issue – there is no evidence-based peer reviewed research documenting the effectiveness or efficacy of compounded medications. The pharmacists want to be paid for preparing and dispensing a medication which has not been shown to work. And they are pulling out the lobbyists and PR folks and ‘inhouse experts’ in an attempt to get California to back down.
Further. compounded medications are outside the scope of the the FDA’s authority.
About a third of US health care dollars are spent on treatments that are likely not effective. One has only to look at the history of MRIs, carotid endarterectomy, and angioplasty to identify billions of dollars that have been wasted on treatments that did not help, and may well have harmed, thousands of patients. These treatments, devices, and providers make money for their purveyors and manufacturers, dollars that they are loathe to give up.
Yet the approval process for these treatments/drugs/devices is is almost laughably low. Here’s how a UK researcher put it:

“the FDA dossier showed that the average improvement produced by drugs introduced in the 1960s was 17%, whereas with the drugs introduced in the 1990s it was 16%![emphasis added]…If one looks at the medical interventions we have for many diseases, whether they be psychiatric or neurological disorders, cancer, cardiovascular or respiratory or gastrointestinal problems, or almost any type of illness other than bacterial infections, what evidence-based medicine shows is that, as my colleague found, many of our interventions are pitifully inadequate. Our studies, although beautifully conducted, have been done on patient populations that bear only a limited relationship to those patients we actually see. The number needed to treat to achieve one success over and above that which could be achieved by placebo may be 10, 20, or even as high as 50. Thus, the trials actually give us almost no guidance as to the likely outcome of an intervention in the individual patient who sits in front of us. For many conditions, therapeutic effects are so small that neither the patient, nor the relative, nor the doctor is likely to be able to recognize any differences in the patient’s state as a result of our intervention. We pride ourselves on our large, well-conducted, immaculately analyzed trials that give significant results. But we have forgotten that we need to conduct such enormous trials only because our interventions are so minimally effective. If we were making a really large difference to the outcome, small trials would suffice and provide clearly significant results.”
That’s one side of the argument. Here’s the other.
I give you the condition known as ‘chronic lyme disease’. This tick borne ailment is pretty common in my area (central coast of Connecticut), in fact I live about twenty miles from Lyme. Walk down the main street in Madison and chances are you’ll encounter at least one person who has had recurrent Lyme disease – the mechanic, artist, college student, mom. Yet try to find a doctor who will treat chronic Lyme and you’ll find very few who will risk their reputation and medical license, as several physicians have been disciplined for just that.
The battle over chronic Lyme (and it is a battle) has been brutal, nasty, and vicious. Nay sayers claim no such disease exists, and cite research and articles in prestigious publications such as the New England Journal of Medicine as support for their opinions. Their opponents decry the poor quality and selective nature of that ‘research’, accuse the authors and study leaders of conflicts of interest, and note the successes – patients treated for chronic Lyme that get better.
Anecdotally, I know at least a half-dozen friends and neighbors who have suffered from some condition that robbed them of their energy, caused great pain, and prevented them from doing many of the things the rest of us take for granted. After extensive treatment (we’re talking over a year) with antibiotics, all have gotten better. Much better.
It is abundantly clear that medicine is an art as much as a science, and art is, as famously described, in the eye of the beholder.
And that’s one reason health reform, which must attack cost, will be so very difficult.


Dec
12

Networks in Texas – what are the results?

Back in September the good folks at the Texas Department of Insurance published a most interesting report (shows what a geek I am) – the 2008 Workers’ Compensation Network Report Card. Let’s start with the overall numbers.
Medical costs were about $130 lower for the Texas Star network (a Coventry product) than for the other networks (with non-network claims second least expensive, and all other networks more expensive(!)).
There’s a lot more here, but I’m going to focus on one page in particular – 15 (23 in the pdf file).
More specifically, the top half of that page. It shows (adjusted) average hospital cost per claim, six months post injury, for non-network and several networks. The Texas Star Network’s hospital costs are 5% higher than non-network costs. Corvel’s network costs are significantly higher than Texas Star, and only slightly lower than all the rest of the networks included in the analysis (except Liberty, which has the lowest costs in the study group). Digging deeper into the report, one finds that Texas Star’s higher hospital expense are due to inpatient hospital stays, which are about $3000 more than non-network costs.
By comparison, Corvel’s inpatient costs are a rather stunning twice as high as Texas Star, and over five times higher than Liberty’s HCN.
Like any report, the results generate as many questions as answers. Here are a few of the more intriguing.
Why are Texas Star’s hospital costs higher than non-network?
Texas’ comp regulations require networks include hospitals. Hospitals know this, and according to sources, most refuse to offer any discount, with many forcing networks to pay above the fee schedule. The Texas Star network is priced at around $12 per bill (not including bill review services) or $110 per claim. Thus, the additional cost of using the network is both the access fee, and the ‘premium’ paid to the hospital for the privilege of having them in the network.
Why are Corvel’s inpatient hospital costs so high?
The Corvel numbers look awful, but they have far fewer claimants treated in facilities (a third less than Texas Star, and even fewer than non-network claims). Corvel’s inpatient utilization is very low; most hospital-based care (it appears) is delivered in ambulatory surgical centers and other types of facilities (p. 32). But, the volume of outpatient facility care is off-the-charts higher than non-network claims or any other network’s results.
Which setting delivers the lowest cost per claim?
Too early to tell. Remember, these data are from six months worth of bills. All the expensive claims take years to develop, so we won’t know what the results are for some time. That said, a good chunk of hospital bills hit in the first year of a claim as the acute phase of the injury is treated. While we don’t know what the ultimate result is, it could well be that the inpatient hospital picture doesn’t change much over time.
And what does this mean for you?
Follow this closely, and watch claim development for non-network v network claims. The numbers should start to diverge in favor of networks.