Apr
21

RIMS day two

Here’s the quick and dirty from Orlando.
The hall is alive with private equity and VC folks looking for the next deal. With the bloom off the MSA rose and the PBM space saturated, the money folks are hunting for niche players with great upside growth prospects. While there are a couple potential niches, there’s not anything really new and different.
Actually the MSA rose is still in bloom, and according to several of the vendors smelling sweeter than ever. The reason for their joy is the upcoming deadline for reporting future liability to CMS which vendors think will drive more volume their way. More on that issue in a later post.
A couple smart industry veterans opined that Stratacare will be used as a platform by its new owners, on which they will build a proprietary network. They will then add other ancillary service offerings as Paul Glover and his team seek to become a force in comp managed care.
The deal is slated to close at the end of April.
Glover has a wealth of experience in this space and has built solid businesses in the past. Stratacare will be a player.
More later…


Apr
21

RIMS – the first day

RIMS is in Orlando this year, a rather ironic location. The P&C insurance industry is in a bit of a fantasy world these days, with increasing reports of reserve inadequacy (anecdotal to be sure) while the soft market continues with few signs of firming pricing.
Monday was a bit of a blur; back to back meetings in the exhibit hall, interspersed with the inevitable encounters with old friends and colleagues passing on the latest news about who’s moved where and what deals are in the works.
The private equity folks are here as well, scouting for promising companies they can buy and use as a ‘platform’ to build a bigger company. There’s talk of several potential deals in the works – more on those as they develop.
The conference itself looks to be rather sparsely attended. Exhibit hall traffic is noticeably light, and few sessions are filled. This is likely due to a combination of the ‘AIG hangover’; big insurance companies are reluctant to send lots of folks to nice destinations (yes, some do think of Orlando as a ‘nice’ destination); the continuing soft market and financial impact thereof (more than a few insurers and vendors have recently laid off staff); and the lack of solid, new information delivered at the conference itself.
I’m using twitter to post brief comments/observations throughout the day – for updates sign up for my feed (Paduda). Here are a few quick takes from Monday.
The PBM world is consolidating at the top, and growing at the lower end. Some of the newer entrants are seeking to carve out niches based on clinical expertise in pain management (MyMatrixx), innovative pricing (PMOA), a focus on smaller payers (don’t use our name) or a push into the mid-tier (don’t use our name either).
There’s a lot of turmoil around Coventry Work Comp, with recent layoffs in their MSA division and in the IT support area (bill review specifically). Reports are that Coventry will ‘own’ the bill review application source code and related assets as of October 1 2009; what they will do then appears to be up in the air. While they would undoubtedly like to move all their payer clients over to BR 4.0 (their platform) from Ingenix’ PowerTrak (the system used by former Concentra clients) there is significant resistance to that move from PowerTrak users. That resistance, coupled with the expense of maintaining BR 4.0 and the recent layoff of BR support staff are clouding the crystal ball.
I’ll try once again to get a read from Coventry staff as to their strategy and direction; I don’t expect much as my repeated requests for information and dialogue have been met with silence. That’s too bad, as they have been and continue to be the dominant player in the comp managed care business, and their directional changes will dramatically impact their current – and potential – customers…


Apr
17

Workers comp bill review survey – initial highlights

I’m about half-way through the first annual Survey of Workers Compensation Bill Review, and already there are a few somewhat surprising findings. These are very preliminary, but nonetheless intriguing.
1. The range of pricing for payers using external bill review vendors is broader than I expected, even after accounting for differences in services provided and volume. The range is over four dollars per bill.
2. Payers’ views of bill review vendors are diverse, with some payers enthusiastic about a particular vendor and others disdainful.
3. A majority of respondents voiced concern about their vendor’s inability to keep up with fee schedule and regulatory changes, and the negative impact this has had on the payer.
4. Regarding the use of UCR databases, some respondents are quite concerned, while others (primarily ones who are not using the Ingenix MDR/PHCS databases) are much less concerned. All respondents are well aware of the issue.
5. Most respondents view bill review as unnecessarily complex, difficult, time-consuming and expensive. The perception is much more of the bill intake, triage, review, repricing, and transmittal processes should be automated, with far fewer bills requiring human intervention.
The survey final report will be completed in mid-May; non-respondents can request a public version of the report by sending an email to infoAThealthstrategyassocDOTcom (substitute symbols for CAPS).


Apr
16

Stratacare sold

Word in the industry is a majority interest in bill review company Stratacare has been sold to a California private equity firm. Stratacare had been in and out of the financing market for over a year, and reports are that the investment firm purchased a majority stake. Several sources report industry veteran Paul Glover is also involved in the deal.
Glover has a long history in the workers comp business, most recently concluding a stint as CEO of Interplan (which merged with the Parker Group in October of 2007). Glover then served on the board of the successor company, HealthSmart.
That’s all for now; details when they become available…


Apr
16

The ‘new’ approach to work comp pharmacy

Today we take a deep dive into the very tiny pool of workers comp pharmacy benefit management – where there’s a recent development worthy of note.
The latest iteration of factoring company Third Party Solutions recently unveiled their new marketing strategy – at least it’s new to parent Stone River.
Stone River Pharmacy Solutions (SRPS) is repeating a strategy employed in the past by previous owners of TPS and WorkingRx – partner with retail pharmacies while simultaneously selling itself as a pharmacy benefit manager.
The pharmacy partnership’s value proposition is straight forward; less paperwork, faster pay, fewer hassles for the retail shops if they’ll sell their work comp scripts to SRPS.
Here’s their pitch to pharmacies:
“The bottom line is your bottom line. StoneRiver Pharmacy Solutions helps you build your business by containing administrative costs, increasing revenue and therefore profits…”
No mystery who their customer is – the retail pharmacy. Nothing new there.
What is somewhat new, well, at least new to SRPS, is the boldness of their approach to employers and other work comp payers. Remember, these are the folks who have been driving up pharmacy costs, reducing network penetration, suing insurance companies and PBMs, hassling adjusters and employers for payment, and otherwise making payers’ lives miserable for years.
But all that’s changed…
Here’s how SRPS puts it…
“Helping employers and payors care for injured employees while managing and reducing pharmacy-related cost is more than our mission. It is a commitment we live daily by delivering our industry-leading solution in workers’ compensation pharmacy care management.
We Ask. We Listen. We Carefully Consider. We Deliver!”
There’s a logical disconnect here; on the same webpage, SRPS claims to deliver “improved revenue and profits” to retail pharmacies. How, pray tell, can a vendor increase a provider’s revenues and profits while reducing payers’ pharmacy-related costs?
Anyone?
There’s more.
“Despite participation in workers’ compensation prescription programs, many employers and payors fail to achieve anticipated cost savings. Injured worker’s routinely don’t know or fail to identify the pharmacy program through which to process their workers’ compensation prescriptions; therefore, the pharmacy uses a default billing service. Until now default billing services have been unable to apply financial or clinical controls to these prescriptions. Without these controls prescriptions are processed out-of-network and higher priced medications or medications unrelated to the patient’s injury are dispensed.”
Hmmm, perhaps the copywriters haven’t kept abreast of the latest information on drug trends in workers comp. In fact, the trend rate for pharmacy has decreased each year for the last five years, and was below 5% last year. This at a time when PBM penetration was growing dramatically, clinical management programs were starting to deliver real results, and payers were aggressively contesting third party biller business practices.
Oh, and SRPS’ predecessor organizations were claiming they could apply ‘clinical and financial controls’ to scripts years ago. What’s different now? Well, SRPS has cleared out all the old management, so perhaps they have some new whiz-bang process, or, more likely, they don’t have the benefit of knowing what was tried – and failed – in the past.
What does this mean for you?
You’ve got to admire their chutzpah. Just make sure to keep your hand on your wallet.


Apr
15

Universal coverage is bad – argument two

Argument two – Universal coverage would result in the government running the health care system making it worse than it is today – because the government can’t do anything right.
There are two separate statements here – first that UC will result in the Feds running the healthcare system, and second that the Feds can’t do anything right.
Let’s take the latter first – but in no way does that mean I concede the first statement is accurate.
I strongly disagree with the statement that government can’t do anything right. I’d also note that ‘the government’ is us; and if it can’t function effectively than we need look no further than the mirror. But it can, and does, work pretty well in many instances.
Among the numerous examples of relatively effective government are the Centers for Disease Control, US Coast Guard, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Head Start, AmeriCorps, NIH, the GI BIll, and the National Weather Service. No, none are perfect, but then again our private sector is not exactly stuffed with competence these days.
It is not the fact that an organization is ‘government’ or private that makes it competent or not, it is the leadership of that organization that is the determining factor.
But perhaps the best is the Veteran’s Administration health care system. As I noted last month,
– compared to commercial managed care plans, the VA provided diabetics with better quality care on seven out of eight metrics by NCQA.
– In 2005, VA hospitals were the highest-rated health system, outperforming other systems including the Mayo Clinic and Johns Hopkins.
– the VA achieves higher scores than private hospitals for patient satisfaction, staffing levels, surgical volume and other significant quality measures
– for six years running, VA hospitals scored higher than private facilities on the University of Michigan’s American Customer Satisfaction Index.
And costs haven’t increased nearly as fast as they have in the private sector. In the ten years ending in 2005, the number of veterans receiving treatment from the VA more than doubled, from 2.5 million to 5.3 million, but the agency needed 10,000 fewer employees to deliver that care – as a result the cost per patient stayed flat. (costs for care in the private sector jumped 60% over the same period).
The VA did this by closing down unneeded facilities, developing an industry-leading electronic health record system, opening clinics, and dramatically increasing the quality of care, especially for patients with chronic conditions.
Oh, and patients can access their own health records – securely – anytime on the web.
Sounds pretty good to me. But alas, universal coverage will not result in the Feds running the health care system. The current proposals under consideration keep providers private (for-profit and not-for-profit), brokers will keep broking, insurance companies doing their thing. Yes, there may well (and should) be a public insurance option, but there is precious little evidence to suggest that the public option will dominate the market. And the evidence that is touted is not compelling.
In fact, providers would not have to participate in a public option – they could refuse to sign up if reimbursement was too low or other terms not to their liking.
And, the governmental option would have to compete with what is already a very mature market, dominated by very few healthplans with overwhelming market share. Here’s just one statistic – In almost two-thirds of all HMO/PPO market areas, one healthplan has more than 50% market share.
Good luck to the Feds fighting for share in Texarkana where the Blues’ share is 97%, or Gadsden Alabama (95%).
Finally, those arguing against UC with the ‘government is incompetent’ meme must not have followed the accounts of healthplans canceling coverage for individuals without justification, employing medical underwriting to refuse coverage for any pre-existing condition, using skewed data to avoid paying what they should for out of network care, fraudulently enrolling seniors in Medicare Advantage plans, and slashing provider bills with the thinnest of justifications.
It would take a good deal of hard work to be more incompetent than some of the health plans out there today.
I’m thinking the VA stacks up awfully well against WellCare.


Apr
14

The latest on work comp drug costs

PMSI will be releasing their annual Drug Trends Report at RIMS in a couple weeks; they were kind enough to send a pre-release copy and give me permission to highlight a couple note-worthy items.
The lead story is cost. After moderating significantly in 2007, drug costs were up by over five percent in 2008, driven primarily by increased price. That is, while each injured worker got more drugs in 2008 than they received in 2007, most of the cost increase was driven by higher prices. But not for generics.
AWP, which remains the basis for drug unit pricing, went up over nine percent for brand drugs last year. (Generic inflation was negligible) With brand accounting for almost two-thirds of spend, the effect was rather significant in overall price inflation.
Interestingly, the introduction of new drugs had almost no impact on drug cost inflation in 2007 – but neither did the release of new generics.
There’s a lot more detail in the report, which should be available shortly. I’ll post a link as soon as it is.


Apr
14

Why PPO litigation is increasing

PPOs, or Preferred Provider Organizations, have been around for a couple dozen years. They are networks of credentialed (with varying degrees of rigor) doctors, hospitals, and ancillary providers that have agreed to provide lower rates for ‘members’ in return for some measure of exclusivity/promise that patients will be directed to use them. I’d note that this ‘promise’ is often not fulfilled, at least in the eye of the provider. That’s a whole separate issue, one we will likely get to in a future post.
As one good friend puts it, ‘PPOs are a box of contracts’, and not many PPO firms do much more than recruit, credential, negotiate, and contract.
Their popularity waxes and wanes, roughly in line with the underwriting cycle (as cost trends decrease, PPOs tend to grow, as cost trends increase, buyers seek more controlled networks and medical management systems).
Typically PPOs are owned by a large group health plan or specialty company such as a workers comp managed care firm. Many PPOs were built to market/sell to health plans and workers comp payers – Rockport, Coventry, and Interplan are examples of ‘vended PPOs’, as opposed to those built for the exclusive use of a healthplan.
The problem
There can be several issues with PPOs; lack of direction by the payer, inaccurate data, failure to maintain credentialing standards and ‘stacking’ are some of the more prevalent.
But of late another issue has been appearing more and more frequently – providers claiming they are not subject to a PPO contract and therefore should be reimbursed at U&C, or in the case of workers comp in many states, the state fee schedule.
Digging into the disagreements that arise when payers assert the providers are subject to a contracted discount, it looks like there are a few contributing factors.
First, some providers have contracts with many health plans and networks, and it canbe tough to keep them all straight. And, the PPO may have changed its name, merged with another firm, or been acquired since the original PPO contract was signed.
Those are the easy ones.
A knottier issue is caused by the mechanism of ‘provider selection’. When the provider’s bill comes into the healthplan/bill repricer, it is ‘checked’ against a database to determine if it is from a contracted, or participating, provider (known as a ‘par’ provider). This checking could occur either at the health plan/repricer, or the bills could be electronically sent to the PPO for the PPO to check par status and apply the discount.
What determines ‘par’ status is often the source of the problem. For example, PPOs want as many ‘hits’ as possible, so they err on the side of counting a provider as par if at all possible. The more hits, the more money they make (often), and the better they look to the payer. Payers like more hits because then the managed care folks can show the savings they deliver due to the discounts. So the payer side of the equation is motivated to use logic that assigns as many bills as possible to the par bucket.
To do that, payers often use a provider TIN (tax identification number) as the only criterion to determine par status. If a bill is from a provider with a TIN that matches some contract somewhere in the PPO company’s database, than the discount is taken. Payers may also use address, provider first name last name, and/or phone, but most try to use as few criteria as possible.
But large provider groups and hospitals and health systems often use the same TIN for many different service areas – outpatient surgery, inpatient, rehab, pharmacy, hospitalists, occupational medicine. And they rarely offer the same discount deal across all service types and locations. Some service types may not even participate due to the internal structure and demands of the health system.
Here’s real world example, provided by a consulting client. A bill from an occ med clinic hits a payer, who determines it is a par provider due solely to the TIN match. A 30% discount is taken, and the check cut. But the occ med clinic is not part of the original contract, which specifically states that discount is for inpatient medical services only.
The provider complains to the payer, who contacts the PPO, who eventually pulls the contract, says ‘oh, yeah, here’s the problem’, asks the occ med clinic to resubmit the bill, after which the bill may – or may not – be paid correctly.
Now multiply this by the hundreds, and it is easy to understand why some providers, fed up by the paperchase, are getting downright litigious. This leads to providers suing payers over a few dollars on an office visit – not to get those few dollars, but to force the payer to apply the correct repricing methodology.
If the PPO is the one doing the repricing (as is often the case), there is considerably less incentive to fix the problem. The PPO doesn’t have to handle all the calls (although in many cases they are involved at some level), figures many providers will not fight it as it isn’t worth it, and even if they do that’s a small price to pay for all those fees.
And that’s one major reason there’s so much litigation in the PPO world these days.


Apr
12

Lewin’s report on the governmental healthplan option

I haven’t read their report in detail, the one that some are claiming proves a governmental healthplan option will quickly dominate all the private plans. But a couple of worthies have, and I suggest you peruse their thoughts if you’re interested.
Merrill Goozner’s take is “the Lewin study may have overestimated the shift to the public plan.”
Roy Poses highlights a potential conflict of interest: Lewin is owned by Ingenix which is owned by United HealthGroup.
I’d be remiss if I didn’t note that I’ve worked with several Lewin folks in the past, and been impressed by their capabilities and intellect. I don’t know what part, if any, they played in the report. I do know that they aren’t the type to slant findings.
But here’s the problem; Lewin’s study assumes the governmental plan would pay Medicare rates, which would enable the Feds to undercut private payers’ premiums by more than twenty percent.
That’s a huge assumption as providers would not have to accept Medicare rates. In fact, as I’ve pointed out before, they could refuse to participate at all, making it kind of hard for the Feds to sell a health plan with few physicians or hospitals in the book.
What does this mean to you?
Question your assumptions.