Insight, analysis & opinion from Joe Paduda

Sep
29

The end of the Property and Casualty soft market

Hurricanes, both meteorological and financial, may well bring an end to what has been one of the softest of markets.
Gustav, Ike, and their to-be-named seasonal relatives have hammered the reinsurance markets, with Lloyd’s of London recently announcing losses totaling $12 – $18 billion for the season’s first two major storms. Lloyd’s also suffered from a dramatic reduction (>60%) in investment earnings, even though the vast majority of the syndicates’ funds are invested in government securities. The combination of storms and poor investment returns cut Lloyd’s members’ earnings in half.
The role Lloyd‘s plays in the international insurance market is a bit obscure to those not immersed in the P&C world. P&C insurance companies write policies for fire, auto, oil wells, pipelines, environmental liability, airplanes, and just about every other physical and financial risk you can think of (and many you can’t, such as credit default swaps). They don’t want all the risk themselves, so they pay part of the premium they collect to other insurance companies, called reinsurers, to take part of the risk off their hands.
When reinsurers raise rates, primary insurers are forced to do the same. That’s likely to happen; Lloyd’s (which is actually a group of individuals and companies and not a single entity) members will certainly want a better return on their capital than they are receiving today. That and the potential for higher losses from future storms will cause them to raise premiums and be more cautious about the risk they take – both measures that will force primary insurers to follow suit.
While reinsurer rates and coverage terms are key, they are not the only factor likely to turn the market. The demise of AIG and write-downs at other insurance companies with exposure to the credit markets make it critical that insurers raise more funds to bolster declining capital. The best way to do that is to charge new customers more, and sock away some of that additional cash (hopefully in investments that mere humans can actually understand).
The other technique is to reduce their exposure by being more careful about the risks that they do write.
Expect workers comp premiums to rise, along with property rates. Premiums for longer tail lines, like WC, liability, environmental impairment will likely increase further faster than sort-tail lines, but we can expect insurance rates to increase across the board.
The P&C market has been soft for several years. Those days look to be over.


Sep
26

Aetna’s plans for workers comp – (a little) more clarity

At the behest of readers and clients, I’ve been working to get some answers from Aetna on what exactly the ‘restructuring’ of their workers comp business division means for customers and prospects. I’m not having much luck.
I’d note that many AWCA customers learned of the restructuring of AWCA from my post earlier this week. That’s not to blow my own horn (well, perhaps a modest toot) but rather to point out that Aetna did not make any external announcement – and still has not made any public statement – about the changes. Nor has any there been any attempt on the part of the new management to reach out to (at least some and perhaps all of) the largest users of AWCA. AWCA Account management staff has been calling their customers, but beyond the “it’s business as usual, I’m your contact”, they don’t have much to report.
Here’s the text of a recent email from an Aetna communications staffer in response to a blog post re the changes. The author is Dr. Dan Bernstein, the head of the New Product Businesses unit. (Bernstein graduated from medical school but never practiced medicine)
“We would like to take the opportunity to clarify a few of the points you made in today’s posting [referring to this post]. We want your readers to understand that the New Product Businesses network and operations areas have not been merged with Aetna’s Group Health network and operations organizations. We have brought together the network and operations teams for the Cofinity, AWCA and Aetna Signature Administrators businesses under two leaders because these businesses all serve business partners, including other Insurers, TPAs and Bill Review companies, that are outside of Aetna’s traditional business channels. [ok, but the markets are completely different, with different providers, different ‘quality’ measures, different buyers, different reimbursement methodologies] Importantly, the network and operations functions described are still separate for AWCA.
[sources indicate the comp network staff now report up to an exec in Maine, sales reports to Denver, operations staff to personnel in the PPOM business (now called Cofinity) in Michigan, and account management to a different person in Maine; Bernstein is located in Maine as well]
The changes we announced this week will help us maximize our resources to create better value for our customers. We see these changes as benefiting our customers by allowing us to concentrate on building our network, providing consistently superior customer service and offering our customers innovative solutions to address their business needs.”
This left me, and others, looking for just a bit more depth and detail. So, I emailed the quite-helpful PR staffer; here’s the ‘conversation’:
Paduda question
Does he [Bernstein] mean there are staff dedicated to WC within each unit? If so, what is their relationship with the larger Aetna provider relations units? Do they work together? Who decides on negotiation strategy and tactics? If not, how does Aetna leverage it’s group health buying power to benefit WC customers?
Aetna response
The AWCA Operations and Network teams are still distinct, dedicated units. They simply report up to new managers, alongside other similar units.
The AWCA Network team has always worked collaboratively with the larger Aetna provider contracting teams, and will continue to do so. The negotiation strategy is jointly developed. The combined size and strength of the relationship with providers across all businesses benefits all customers, including Workers Comp customers.
Paduda question
How will this change affect the network development process? Florida has been an ongoing challenge for awca; is the new structure going to help Aetna address FL?
Aetna response
We are always striving to improve the network development process and strategy. The new leadership team is focused on both strategic and process improvements for our network activities.
So, no answer to the Florida question, nor any sense for how this change will affect network development. A good bit of corporate-speak, and no specifics. I tried one more time to get more specific answers, and got this back: “at this point, we can’t share additional information.”
Either they haven’t thought this through (my bet), or they have and haven’t finished telling the affected parties (doubtful), or they just don’t want to tell me (possible). If the latter is the case, they aren’t telling some of their biggest customers, either.
Here’s a bit of background. Despite the conjecture of several, myself included, that Aetna would get out of this business, Aetna has stuck by its work comp unit for five years (to date). Reports indicate the business has been financially successful, profitable, and achieving success defined as “aspiring to be a rounding error” at mother Aetna (remember Aetna’s annual revenues exceed $24 billion). This success has occurred despite the unit being bounced around the org structure at Aetna, with former AWCA president Pat Scullion reporting up to (at least) five bosses over the last four years.
I’m from Missouri on this. Many health plans/insurers that got into work comp (United Healthcare in FL, with Focus and MetraComp, Travelers with Conservco, UNUM with Genex) got out. Some, such as UPMC, Wellpoint and Horizon, have done pretty well. The ones that have succeeded have almost always had WC as a separate business unit with P&L responsibility reporting up to a ‘special products’ department (that likely had dental, vision, etc). They also had a strong executive sponsor, someone who could, and would, go to bat for the WC network development staff when the group health folks (understandably) started to cave on WC rates to get a better discount for their group health business.
But that’s not the most important reason to have a separate WC division. The most important reason is simple – WC is so fundamentally different from group health that the network development/provider relations, operations, compliance/legal, customer service, and sales staff will find themselves spending most of their time explaining WC basics to their support staff/management/peers – first dollar every dollar coverage; treatment is limited to procedures related to the disabling condition; focus on return to work; and the primacy of fee schedules, that they won’t have much time to resolve issues related to California cascading rules for PT, Florida limits on chiro visits, pre-cert requirements in MA and NY, MPN access requirements in California, EDI requirements in Texas and the gazillion other small but critical-for-compliance comp rules.
The ones who should be the most nervous/interested in this have “Coventry Workers Comp” on their business cards. Coventry has essentially turned network development and management in more than a few states over to AWCA. If Aetna decides to get out of the comp network business (again, I doubt this will happen), Coventry is going to have to scramble.
Aetna’s a good company. Even good companies make mistakes, and they’ve made a few here. This has not been handled well; from here it looks like AWCA management was ousted in a cost-cutting move, replaced by folks who don’t know much, if anything, about workers comp, or about managing a transition.
What does this mean for you?
Be careful and have a Plan B.


Sep
26

Update – Work comp hospital overpayments in Conn.

Last week’s post on Connecticut hospitals’ temper tantrum elicited no public comments but quite a few private ones. Several payers were rather upset that their bill repricing/network vendors have not been applying the laws correctly, resulting in higher payments than the law requires.
The issue of ‘fiduciary responsibility’ and liability therefore came up a time or two…
One person familiar with the State employee workers comp program confirmed that the State is paying Yale-New Haven and its affiliated hospitals billed charges (or something close to), while paying other facilities about 30-35% less than billed charges. That corrects my misstatement in last week’s post that implied the state was paying facilities their billed charges. That said, the state is still paying (somewhat) more than it legally must. Like most states CT is in a bit of a budget crunch, with the Governor and legislature looking for cuts to make up a $300 million deficit.
Workers comp costs for State employees are around $80 million a year; that doesn’t include municipalities and school boards which are covered through the towns (there are over 110 towns in CT).


Sep
24

What happened to Aetna’s work comp division?

The short answer is – it got combined with other sorta-kinda related businesses and put under one boss – Dan Fishbein, MD, in the “New Product Businesses” unit.
According to an Aetna Communications staffer;
“AWCA is part of the New Product Businesses area, which also includes the Cofinity, Aetna Signature Administrators, Pet Insurance and Worksite Health businesses. The former PPOM business, is part of Cofinity. All 5 businesses (including AWCA and Cofinity) now have a common reporting structure in the New Product Businesses area.
These changes will help Aetna identify and successfully execute strategies for new distribution channels, business models, partnerships and products and generate substantial growth for the company. The AWCA business is an important part of this strategy.”
Up until Monday, AWCA (Aetna Work Comp Access) was a separate business unit, with its own leader (Pat Scullion), operations head (Shawn Fisher) and sales leader (Tom Shivers). AWCA also had a network management function, account management, and other support housed within the unit. In the new structure, network management and operations for work comp will be handled by two units also responsible for Aetna’s group health TPA and PPO businesses headed up by Mark Granzier. Here’s how Aetna’s internal announcement put it “All network functions in these businesses will be realigned to Mark. This will enable us to have a single area focused on contracting and provider relations, and to leverage these resources efficiently across our businesses.”
Sounds good in an announcement, and here’s hoping Aetna figures this out. Unfortunately, other companies’ attempts to integrate work comp functions with group health haven’t fared so well, as the contracting staff usually doesn’t ‘get’ work comp; work comp is usually a relatively small part of the overall business; and network negotiators tend to use WC as a bargaining chip, giving away discounts there to get a better group health discount. This can be particularly problematic for hospital and facility contracts, where work comp is a big profit maker for hospitals (while generating higher loss costs for payers).
This isn’t idle speculation. It’s based on personal experience within the old Travelers, MetraHealth, and UnitedHealthcare. I’ve also been privy to hospital negotiations – from the provider side – and watched the big networks cave on comp to get a slightly better deal on the group side.
Sales and account management will be the responsibility of Michael Ciarrocchi who has been named the General Manager for the three businesses. There is no real need for a de facto sales force for AWCA, as the network is being sold (pretty much exclusively) through Coventry. There is a big need for upgraded customer service, as there continue to be issues related to data quality (inaccurate provider data, particularly in Pennsylvania) and AWCA’s historical responsiveness has been less than stellar.
Reporting will be handled by a unit headed by Mike Kane that will service all the businesses (the three mentioned above, plus Aetna’s Pet Insurance and Worksite/Direct2you units). I’m not sure how this benefits AWCA’s customers. Although a common reporting platform would likely be beneficial, there is little other synergy. AWCA customers access network discounts via electronic feeds, and there is no ‘outcomes’ data to be aggregated or mined as the payments, claim records, and bill detail data are housed on customers’ systems.
From a business management perspective, it’s understandable that Aetna decided to cut costs and reduce overhead on a (relatively tiny) business unit that essentially serves one customer with one product. Remember this is a company with annual revenues of $25 billion; it is unlikely AWCA’s revenues were more than two-tenths of a percent of that total.
Work comp just isn’t material.
I’d note that Aetna is perhaps the only big managed care firm that is positioned well for the long term. Their investments have been smart (PPOM, Schaller Anderson), their initiatives in transparency and consumerism are well thought out and (mostly) well done, they have solid people who strive to do the right thing (other health plans also have a lot of good people; Aetna’s workforce seems to have more of them), and they are willing to admit mistakes and work hard to rectify them.
That said, many big work comp payers are relying on Aetna to help them manage their medical expenses. And this move makes many of those payers very nervous.
Click below for the full text of Aetna’s internal announcement on AWCA.

Continue reading What happened to Aetna’s work comp division?


Sep
23

FactCheck’s McCain blooper

FactCheck is one of my favorite all-time ‘helpers’. They do a lot of the digging and checking so we can know what’s right and what’s BS. And most of the time they get it right.
Yesterday they didn’t.
FC took Obama to task for an ad that, according to Igor from Think Progress; “improperly conflated banking deregulation with McCain’s plan to allow health insurers to sell plans across state lines.” Igor claims that deregulating one is same/same as deregulating the other; McCain has been an ardent advocate of deregulation for years, and it is no big leap to think that he’ll do much to deregulate the health insurance business. As he’s already said, himself, repeatedly.
I’d go a bit further than Igor did.
In the McCain plan, what’s to stop a health plan from canceling coverage when they find out you have a bad case of the horribles? Answer – nothing, as long as the state where the insurer is licensed is OK with it. While McCain may say that won’t happen, who’s to say it won’t? States will fight to be the domicile of choice for health insurers, knowing that the lowest cost and lightest regulation makes for lots of fees (see Delaware for corporations…)
McCain says (in the Contingencies article) that he wants to do something (exactly what is undefined) to protect Americans with pre-existing conditions. This desire to ‘protect’ Americans with pre-ex will require the government to either force insurers to cover them (hmmmm, is that a ‘regulation’?) or use high risk pools, a notoriously under-funded and inadequately managed method that has never worked well.
I emailed FactCheck on their smackdown of Obama, protesting what I consider to be a very narrow view of the logic behind the ‘offending’ ad. Haven’t heard back yet…


Sep
23

Aetna terminates work comp subsidiary leadership

Aetna is restructuring Aetna Workers Comp Access, Aetna’s workers comp network subsidiary. Sources indicate AWCA’s president,Pat Scullion, sales boss Tom Shivers, and operations head Shawn Fisher were terminated yesterday in what insiders are calling ‘a complete surprise to them’.
AWCA has become the de facto network for Coventry Health’s workers comp division, replacing Coventry’s own proprietary network in many states. Since the finalization of the Coventry-Aetna deal over a year ago, new customers could only access AWCA through Coventry. This may have contributed to Aetna’s decision to terminate the sub’s leadership as AWCA Is essentially a service provider to Coventry. Aetna does have a workers comp PBM, but sources indicate it has a rather modest customer list.
Although the picture is not yet clear, more details should be forthcoming as meetings are being held today at Aetna’s Hartford home office with the (now senior) AWCA staff. It is likely that the sub will not remain separate, instead report up through the existing health plan structure.
For more background on AWCA enter AWCA in the search box to the right on the blog home page.


Sep
22

Obama’s health care blind spot

We took a look at Sen McCain’s health reform plan last week, aided by an analysis published on the web by the journal ‘Health Affairs. Today it’s Obama’s turn.
Unlike Sen McCain’s plan, Sen Obama’s plan maintains employer-based coverage (something most Americans want), prohibits medical underwriting and cancellation of policies and establishes a minimum set of benefits to prevent ‘back-door’ medical underwriting, and requires employers to contribute to employee coverage or pay a tax.
Estimates indicate Obama’s plan will add eighteen million Americans to the rolls of the insured over the near term, with some likelihood that there would be increasing incentives put in place to encourage more and more folks to buy health insurance coverage. Obama has resisted (although not too strenuously) calls from many to establish a universal mandate, thereby requiring all to have health insurace, noting that it is more important to first control costs and only then expand coverage.
He’s right. Unfortunately Obama’s plan doesn’t do enough to control costs.
Perhaps the most significant cost-oriented part of Obama’s plan is the ‘stop loss’ coverage whereby the government will agree to “reimburse employer health plans for a portion of the catastrophic costs they incur above a threshold if they guarantee such savings are used to reduce the cost of workers’ premiums.” For truly catastrophic claims there’s certainly lots of precedents for this type of coverage – for years self-insured smaller employers have purchased stop loss coverage for high-cost individual claims for years. The question is how much of the claim cost will the Feds assume, and how much it will cost to do so (someone’s got to come up with the dollars, and if the Feds do that ‘someone’ is the taxpayer; it looks like the Chinese are done funding our deficits for a while). But while this will reduce the cost of insurance, this does nothing to address health care costs per se.
The only other solid part of the plan that addresses cost is the call to negotiate drug prices. That may well lower trend rates somewhat, but drug pricing seems to be rather flat these days, so the change may not be all that beneficial over the near term.
Neither of these policy ideas will do much to address costs. That’s because US health care costs are not high (relative to other countries) because care is better, or we live longer, healthier lives, or Americans have more access to expensive medical technology or drugs, or there are proportionally fewer folks dieing of cancer or heart disease or AIDS. US health care costs are higher because for two mostly unrelated reasons – higher unit prices and wildly varying, and inconsistent, medical treatment.
Unit prices for medical services are higher in the US than in other industrialized countries. Office visits, diagnostic imaging, lab tests, hospital stays, surgery, brand (but not generic) drugs – almost are are more expensive – on a per-service basis – in the US than elsewhere. Those higher unit prices mean more profits for manufacturers, higher wages for clinicians and support staff (and consultants) and more cash to use to build even more medical facilities and buy medical machines.
Sounds simple, because it is.
The not-really related issue of practice pattern variation (a technician’s term for different physicians in different geographic areas using different medical care to treat the same condition), and the increasing evidence that this variation results in far too much useless or potentially harmful care may be even more of a problem. Practice pattern variation has been shown to result in far too many hospital admissions in Boston, prostatectomies in Alaska, hysterectomies in parts of Maine, and back surgeries in southwestern Florida,. There is absolutely no evidence that these additional medical procedures deliver longer/better life, or even that they represent appropriate care. On the contrary, these additional procedures add cost and complicate treatment with no apparent benefit.
These two issues are not addressed adequately by Obama (or McCain either, for that matter). However, as Obama has correctly stated that expansion of coverage must be preceded by cost control, this oversight is more obvious in his plan.
Obama has called for the establishment of a Federal Agency to oversee effectiveness assessment – to help determine what medical care works best for what patients. Yet the proposed funding for this agency appears grossly inadequate. It is also instructive to remember what happened to the ‘old’ Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, a body that was emasculated after angering physicians and other stakeholders by pointing out the inconsistencies in treatment for back pain across the country.
As I noted last week, taking on the medical establishment, which is what the next President and Congress must do if they are to rein in health care costs and expand coverage, is going to be a brutal and bloody war. Big pharma, medical device manufacturers, physicians, hospitals, ancillary providers, health plans, nursing homes, medical gas suppliers, distributors, states, attorneys, and consultants will all be vociferous in their defense of their critically important, and therefore financially-deserving role. Health care accounts for a sixth of the US economy, which means that very few would be untouched by a major restructuring of the health care system. While it is understandable that Obama would not tip his hand, thereby opening himself up to the inevitable assault from those whose oxen slated to be gored, it is also unfortunate that the ‘change’ candidate won’t reveal more of his plan than the usual ‘reduce cost through elimination of waste fraud and abuse’.
Solving the health care crisis will absolutely require attacking price and practice pattern variation. This should be the core of any health reform program, for without cost control universal coverage will rapidly drive up costs, crowding out investment in plant, labor, technology and education. We should know where the candidates stand, what they are prepared to do, what groups they will take on and how they will do it. Yet neither candidate has the political courage to take a stand.
Obama’s platform falls well short on the most important issue.


Sep
19

Coppelman on AIG

Jon Coppelman of Workers Comp Insider fame has a very funny take on how Hank Greenberg would have led AIG’s executive session discussion of the $75 billion loss.

Jon’s talent is lost on us here; he clearly needs a literary agent!


Sep
19

McCain’s health reform plan – more cost, less coverage

Sen McCain has modestly noted economics is not his strong suit. Examining his health reform plan provides additional insight into that assessment.
“Achieving Senator McCain’s vision (for health reform) would radically transform the US health insurance system…The decline in job-based coverage would force millions of Americans into the weakest segment of the private insurance system [emphasis added] – the nongroup market – where cost sharing is high and covered services are limited. Senator McCain’s proposal to deregulate this market would mean that people in it would lose protections they now have. These changes would diminish the security of coverage for most Americans, especially those who are not – or someday will not be – in perfect health.”
That’s how Health Affairs summarized the impact of GOP Presidential candidate John McCain’s health reform platform.
I’m at a loss to understand how McCain and his supporters could think that a free market in health insurance would actually help resolve the health care crisis, cover more of today’s uninsured, and provide insurance for those who need it – the folks with chronic conditions.
There are two very simple reasons the free market will not solve the health care crisis. First, private industry is in business to make money. And insuring high cost people is not how insurers make money. Auto insurers refuse to cover drivers with bad records; home insurers won’t insure houses on flood plains, liability insurers won’t provide coverage for companies run by convicted felons, marine insurers won’t write ships operating in a war zone. Ask homeowners on the Gulf Coast about their ability to buy wind and flood insurance – if the various states don’t force insurers to provide the coverage, it is incredibly difficult to find any insurer willing to take the risk.
Second, most health care dollars are spent on/by relatively few people.
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One-tenth of Americans incur two-thirds of all costs. One-twentieth drive half of all costs, and a mere one percent drives over twenty percent.
In a free market, insurance companies would absolutely refuse to cover anyone on the left side of the graph, and they’d work very hard to tweak their underwriting so they only insured folks in the far right column (where half the population incurs less than four percent of costs). That’s not an indictment of insurance companies, it is a statement of fact. Even in today’s regulated markets, fully one-third of individuals seeking coverage in the individual market (the only market that would exist in McCain’s world) were “denied coverage or charged more because of a pre-existing condition…nearly half found it difficult or impossible to find affordable coverage” (Health Affairs).
McCain proposes an expansion of state-run high risk pools to help deal with these folks, but his plan only provides funding for three million potentially high risk people – less than one percent of the population. That leaves (at the very least) fourteen percent of the population without coverage, yet needing care. Who’s going to pay for their health care? Sure some of it would be paid by each person, but few individuals can afford to write a check for a couple days in the hospital. The result? A huge rise in the number of charity cases seeking care at emergency rooms, a rise that would quickly bankrupt many providers.
There’s a further problem with McCain’s plan; the deregulation of insurance would mean that any insurance company would be able to cancel anyone’s policy as soon as they were diagnosed with a potentially costly condition. That is not the case today, where in most states once you’re insured, the insurance company can’t single you out for a premium increase or cancel your policy; the practice, known as post-issue medical underwriting, is illegal in most jurisdictions.
So just as some auto insurance companies cancel policies after an accident or ticket, under the McCain plan health insurers could – and would – do the same.
Then there’s the cost. McCain wants to cancel the tax exemption for employer-based health insurance plans, replacing it with a refundable tax credit of $2500/individual or $5000 per family to help them buy insurance (note – the average individual policy now costs over $4000 and the average family policy cost exceeds $12,000). The Senate Joint Committee on Taxation’s report on the McCain health plan estimates the cost of the tax credits would be $206 billion in FY 2009 and $3.6 trillion over 10 years.
The McCain plan works just fine – in a world inhabited only by free-market economists where no one gets sick or hurt. Except when it comes time to pay for it, or when any of our economists does get ill and finds him/herself seeking care at the doors of a bankrupt hospital.
As Bob Laszewski points out, if McCain is elected, there is absolutely zero chance his plan will be passed. That being the case, why waste my time writing about it and yours reading? Because it shows McCain’s complete lack of understanding, his total ignorance of the workings of one-sixth of our economy. Then again, he’s been covered his whole life by a government plan, so he has had zero exposure to health care in the real world. Come to think of it, he hasn’t had any exposure to the real world in recent memory, as he has been in Washington for the last thirty years.
McCain said it himself – economics is not one of his strong suits. His health plan proves it.
Next week I’ll examine Obama’s plan to see how he deals with the real world. For starters, what about cost inflation, Senator?


Sep
18

Time for work comp insurers to Man Up

Some hospitals in Connecticut are throwing what amounts to a temper tantrum. They are outraged that workers comp payers are actually paying them according to state law.
Strange, but true.
Sources indicate that Yale-New Haven Hospital and their affiliates have informed several payers that they will no longer provide elective procedures for the offending payers’ insureds. There are also reports of an effort on the part of Y-NH to get other hospitals to join in the fun.
The reason for their displeasure is several payers have ditched their hospital networks and begun paying hospitals according to the Workers Compensation Act.
The Act reads, in part, “The liability of the employer for hospital service shall be the amount it actually costs the hospital to render the service”.
But many payers in Connecticut (including the State itself) are not paying costs, but paying billed charges, or something close to it, and they’ve been doing it for years. Workers comp has been a huge moneymaker for Connecticut hospitals; on average commercial payers reimburse between 41.65% and 45.14% of charges.* Contrast that with comp payers’ reimbursing hospitals at billed charges or a few points off (in a network arrangement).
*(The variation between 41.65% and 45.14% depends on which measure you use; the former is based on recent data, the latter from data reported to the State). I’d also note that commercial payers are paying 122% of costs (again from CT State statistics).
Sources also indicate the good folks from Yale (several of whom live in my town) understand, and even agree with, the methodology the payers are using to reimburse the hospital. But they don’t want to accept that reimbursement, as they would rather go back to the good old days when they were making a fortune off all workers comp payers (when hospitals were being paid three to four times more than they should have been). (Most payers are still paying billed charges or close to it)
I’ll leave aside the obvious fiduciary responsibility issue here, except to note that as a CT taxpayer, I’m not too happy that the State has been paying way more than it should to hospitals for State employees’ workers’ comp bills. Instead, I’ll note that this amounts to a hidden tax on employers – all of whom are forced by regulation ot buy workers comp insurance. Those employers (and their insurers) that are paying billed charges, or a discount off billed charges, are helping those hospitals to pay for care delivered to those without insurance, make up the underpayments from Medicare and the state’s HUSKY program (kid health insurance), buy big new machines and build new facilities.
That’s nice, and its also grossly unfair to employers.
Workers comp insurance companies need to “Man Up” and not give into what is tantamount to blackmail on the part of providers. Policyholders need to tell their insurers not to spend one dime more than legally required.
The US health care system is incredibly screwed up, unfair, and dysfunctional, and hospitals are a key part of that system. But it’s not up to Connecticut employers and taxpayers to solve hospitals’ financial problems by paying a hidden tax.


Joe Paduda is the principal of Health Strategy Associates

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